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In this thesis, I examined the phenomenon of cross border marriage
migration between Thai women and Singaporean men by applying the fundamental
idea behind Giddens’s Structuration theory which argues that the relationship between
social structures and human practices is inseparable. As such, social structures are in
themselves first and foremost constituted of human’s activities but these human
activities are made possible (enabled) only by the structural properties that guide
them. This brings about the dynamic characteristics of any given social structure in
that it is always involved in a process of reproduction through these human activities.
It shows that a structure does not only constrain or limit human’s activities but the
process of reproduction also enables opportunities for humans to challenge,
circumvent and change an existing structure. In this thesis, I focus on the specific
circumstances of Thai migrant wives. As their experiences demonstrate, they are
active agents in the process striving to improve their lives and social status, not
merely passive victims.
At the macro level of Giddens’s theoretical framework, I show that cross
border marriage migration is the outcome of both First World men’s and Third World
women’s activities in negotiating and reproducing structures. I also use Giddens’s
duality of structure at the micro level to understand the dynamic nature of structure as
well as the inseparable relationship between social structure and human practices. For
Thai migrant wives, after marriage migration, their transnational lives are constrained
by the various structures, namely the immigration legal structure, economic structure
and socio-cultural structure in Singapore. In each category, I demonstrate that the
structure is indeed dynamic as it is constituted through complex human activities. The
structure could be reproduced to constrain or enable human’s practices since each
vii
individual has both structural motives and capabilities. These structures tend to limit
the options and practices of Thai migrant wives as a result of gender stereotypes
existing within the global capitalist system. Yet, I also show that working class
women have agency and are knowledgeable about their condition. They rationalize
their choices and act in a variety of ways to reproduce, negotiate or circumvent the
structures. As I argue in this thesis, marriage migration studies must venture beyond
the discourses of foreign brides viewed merely as working class women victimized in
positions of subservience .To some extent as I argue in this thesis, they have a variety
of means to circumvent and renegotiate the structures by using the resources available
to them in the context of their life situations as Thai migrant wives in Singapore.
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The perspective on cross border marriage migration between women from 
developing countries and men from developed countries emphasizes ways in which 
women who migrated from developing countries to First World countries had 
migration motives based on economic desperation. In this respect, radical feminists 
perceive the cross border marriage migration influenced by the phenomenon of mail-
order brides in 1970s as women’s oppression. It is radical feminists like Mila Glodava 
and Richard Onizuka (1994), who have highlighted the gendered migration of 
‘prostitutes’ and ‘brides’, focusing such studies on the plight of the ‘trafficked 
women’ who are illegally bought and sold.  Among these categories of women, it is 
argued that foreign brides “sell” themselves for their reproductive labor and other 
forms of unpaid household labor for the family that they marry into. The story of 
Keaw, a lady from rural village in Chiang Mai1 who decided to become a foreign 
bride in Singapore seems to fit well within women’s trafficking framework. 
“I met my ex-husband when I worked at a bar in Hat Yai2. At that time, my 
family was very poor, sometimes we drank water instead of having a meal. So, I 
decided to go to Hat Yai to work as a sex worker. When I worked there, I tried to 
approach foreigners. Then, I met my ex-husband, a Singaporean man whose 
background I did not know much, but I immediately agreed when he proposed to me. 
After that, we went to Chiang Mai to arrange our wedding. He built a relatively 
terrible house for my family which is used only to protect rainfall and sunshine. Then, 
I moved to Singapore with him.  I did not know anything about the country as well as 
my husband’s background. When I firstly arrived, I stayed with his family in a big 
house. I got a short term social visit pass. However, I realized that my ex-husband 
married me because he just wanted a free maid. He had detained me in a house for 5 
years. I did not know anyone and go any places in Singapore. He also tore all letters 
that my family sent me.  Fortunately, one day I had a chance to know the couple next 
door. They recommended me to get PR first, then I could run away from him. So, I 
told him to apply PR for me otherwise I would inform the police. After I got PR, I 
                                                 
1 Chiang Mai is a province in the northern part of Thailand. 
2 Hat Yai, the biggest city of Songkhla province, is located in the southern part of Thailand. It is also 
the tourist-oriented spot especially for Malaysian and Singaporean.  
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divorced and went back to Chiang Mai. The first time which my father saw me again, 
he cried and said that everyone thought I already died because they did not get any 
news from me for 5 years.  At that time, my family was still very poor and starving. All 
my neighbors looked down on my parents by saying that why we were still poor, 
although we already sold the daughter to be a prostitute. So, I decided to come back 
to Singapore again to find a job and retrieve my parents’ honor” (Kaew, 36). 
 
Kaew’s dream of saving her family from poverty led her to move from Chiang 
Mai to Hat Yai to become a sex worker and subsequently a foreign bride voluntarily. 
By marrying a Singaporean whom she met in Hat Yai, she had a typical “Cinderella 
dream”3. However, she found that life was worse than before as she was unable to 
achieve any socio-economic status in Singapore and was confined in the husband’s 
household. Kaew’s story demonstrates a common anecdote within the discourses of 
cross-cultural marriage between Third World women and First World men. It is a 
story rooted in the problems of global patterns of gender inequality that put pressures 
on these women to search for a better future for themselves and their families at home 
through migration. The migration phenomenon represents life histories of poverty, 
opportunism, women’s mobility, and the presumed “lack of free will” (Constable 
2005, p.2) resembling the mail-order brides in the 1970’s. However, Keaw’s story 
does not end up in the pessimism of the radical feminists’ trafficked women as the 
rest of her story showed her agency to resist and create change in her life. Today, 
Kaew has successfully obtained her Singaporean permanent residency and work as a 
beer sales promoter in Singapore. She has also been able to help her family out of 
poverty by investing in a farming business in Thailand. 
 As such, it would be myopic to understand cross border marriages based 
solely on the pattern of structural, political and economic inequalities. It is also naïve 
                                                 
3 In this context, the connotation ‘Cinderella dream’ means women from developing countries upward 
their socioeconomic mobility by marrying upward through foreigner from developed countries whereas 
Lan (2006) use this notion refer to other means to upward mobility such as women who migrate to be 
transnational domestic labor. 
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to assume that all foreign brides are simply victims. As Constable (2003; 2006, p.2-3) 
points out, the flaw in the radical feminists’ “women trafficking framework” is that 
these women’s primary motives are sometimes not just economic desperation or 
material wants. Rather than adopt the singular focus on gender exploitation, in this 
thesis I apply Nicole Constable’s (2003) framework to highlight women’s agency as a 
crucial lens to investigate Thai migrant wives’ experiences in Singapore.  The central 
focus in this thesis is not feminist critique, rather I would like to explore further the 
culturally distinctive marriage migration experiences of Thai women in Singapore in 
which the women to some extent have diversity of resources to negotiate and 
challenge the structural constraints. My aim in this thesis is to understand the dynamic 
migration experiences of Thai women that they are not absolutely powerless or totally 
empowering. The informants in my thesis are not highly educated and have migrated 
to Singapore due to economic desperation. While their lives in Singapore may be 
limited and constrained or even exploited by societal structures, my argument is that 
they have demonstrated that they also have opportunities to negotiate, maneuver and 
challenge the legal, economic and socio-cultural structural constraints.  Each 
individual has varying forms of success or closure of the agency under different 
structural constraints, circumstances and with relevant factors. I use Giddens’s 
Structuration framework to examine the phenomena of cross border marriage 
migration between Thai women and Singaporean men at both macro and micro levels.  
 
I. Theoretical Consideration towards Cross Border Migration 
Phenomena 
 “The basic domain of study of the social sciences, according to the theory of 
Structuration, is neither the experience of individual actor, nor the existence of any 
form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. Human 
social activities like some self-reproducing items in nature are recursive. That is to 
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say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by 
them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and through 
their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible” 
(Giddens 1984, p.2).  
 
 Anthony Giddens (1984) developed the theory of Structuration to address 
fundamental problems of dichotomies in the social sciences - agency/structure, 
subject/ object, micro/macro. Giddens’s analysis of society focuses on the notion that 
human agency and social structure are not separate concepts. Rather, human agency 
and social structure needed to be reconciled and synthesized in any considerations of 
social practices. For Giddens,  the enactment of everyday activities cannot be seen as 
separate from society. He calls this the “the duality of structures” (Giddens 1984).  
 Giddens (1995, p.107) explains that “the notion of duality of structure,…, is 
not such as external to human action, and is not identified solely with constraint. 
Structure is both the medium and the outcome of the human activities which it 
recursively organizes”. As such, structure is both the medium and outcome of the 
human’s practices. Social structures are in themselves dynamic, constraining and 
enabling for human’s actions. To understand this duality of structure, Giddens 
proposed the term ‘structural modalities’ - rules and resources4 that constrain and 
enable human activities.  As Giddens (1995, p.107) asserts, “institutions, or large 
scale societies, have structural properties in virtue of the continuity of the actions of 
their component members. But those members of society are only able to carry out 
their day to day activities in virtue of their capability of instantiating those structural 
properties” In this respect, he shows the duality of structure is such that any structure 
is constituted by human’s activities but also places limits on humans to act in a certain 
                                                 
4 ‘Rules’ refer to the social structure which gives form and regulate social life while ‘resources’ refer to 
the product of human’s actions which human agents transform into power and capacities to act in the 
social world.  
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way.  The social scientist must understand that the individual is a reflexive being. 
Individuals are knowledgeable about the conditions that influence them and are 
consciously rationalizing their choices and using their resources in social practices.  
Hence, humans are not complete free creative agents nor  completely passive victims 
constrained by societal rules and norms (Tucker 1998, p. 67).  They have the agency 
to ignore, reproduce alternatives and even transform the social structures through their 
social practices.  
 At the macro level, I use Giddens’s approach to argue that cross border 
marriage migration between Thai women and Singaporean men could be interpreted 
as the outcome of the empowerment of women and men across the boundaries in a 
globalized world system. Cross border marriages enable people in different cultural 
contexts to negotiate economic constraints and opportunities presented by a global 
capitalist economy. Thai migrant wives are reflexive individuals who marry 
foreigners from developed countries like Singapore in order to escape oppressive 
socio-economic structures in Thailand. On the other hand, Singaporean men from 
working class backgrounds marry women from developing countries such as Thailand 
as a way to negotiate and circumvent the power of Singaporean women and to 
maintain a position of patriarchal privilege.  
 Based on my informants’ migration experiences, I will explore the structures 
that they encounter on a regular basis. These structures are the legal structure, the 
economic structure and the socio-cultural structure, which  constrain and enable their 
practices within the nation-state of Singapore. I will show how these structures 
conform to Giddens’s description of a dynamic structure and his concepts on the 
duality of structure.  My informants’ migration experiences will also show a range of 
possibilities for these presumably “weak” and “passive” women. My findings also 
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serve as counter-arguments to the ideas proposed by radical feminists that marriage 
migration of women from developing countries to developed countries necessarily 
lead to women’s exploitation. I argue in this thesis that rural village women are 
knowledgeable individuals who have opportunities to use their livelihood strategies to 
negotiate, resist, challenge and circumvent the existing social structures that are 
imposed on them in Singapore. However, it is important to acknowledge that these 
women face serious structural constraints; and therefore those with the power to shape 
those constraints (e.g. policy makers, migrant wives’ husband, and others) bear some 
responsibility for the situation. It is not simply the responsibility of women to make 
good or bad choices.  These circumstances confirm Giddens’s ideas that women (and 
men) are agents – they have ‘agency’ within the structure/system. Their agency (the 
actions and choices they take) produce and reproduce the system (which in turn both 
constrains and enables their agency). 
 
II. Application of Giddens’s Structuration Theory at the Micro-Level 
of Cross Border Marriage Migration between Thai women and 
Singaporean Men 
 
1. The Change in Social Structure and Women’s Role under Global  
            Capitalism in Thai Society 
  In this section, I apply Giddens’s Structuration theory to explore on a macro 
level cross border marriage migration. By revisiting some central historical and 
social-cultural aspects in the literature of cross border marriage migration, I will 
explore the changes to the social structures of Thailand in the face of a  globalized 
economy.  I explore also the driving forces behind Thai women’s internal and 
 7
international movements from the rural villages to the cities in Thailand as well as 
other international cities. As I have suggested earlier, the phenomena of cross border 
marriage illustrates that social structure do not merely constrain human practices but it 
is also the outcome of people’s activities. From a macro perspective, cross border 
marriage migration is a practical activity that involves the ongoing and dynamic 
decisions taken by some Thai women to change their social circumstances (Giddens 
1995; Tucker 1998, p.75-76) as well as a medium by which they seek to produce new 
social structures.   
 I will show firstly that cross border marriage migration between Thai women 
and Singaporean men allows Thai women to escape from economic deprivation and 
Singaporean men to sustain the patriarchal privileges as well within the social 
structure.  
 Primarily, I will show that cross border marriage migration is seemingly the 
best among available strategies for my informants to achieve upward socioeconomic 
status and to fulfill their expected gender roles of being a dutiful daughter. I will 
summarize the social structural norms in Thailand that drive the domestic migration 
aspiration of Thai rural women from their villages to the urban cities. I will also seek 
out their rationalization for engaging in prostitution, transnational migration and 
ultimately cross cultural marriage. 
 
1.1  Feminization of Rural-Urban Labor Migration and Feminization of   Cheap 
labor in Thai Society 
 Thailand’s capitalist development in the post-World War II period began from 
the policy of encouraging foreign investment, industrialization, and tourism which 
had effect  on social structure, cultural values, and daily life (Wilson 2004, p.92-93). 
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Many scholars found that the consequence from the implementation of the 
development policy was the failure of rural economy. As a result, the Thai rural 
farming community was exposed to increasing problems of unpredictable cash crop 
markets and the growing scarcity of land available for farming as demand for housing 
commodities increased with a growing population. As a result, parents in rural 
farming families began to rely more on their sons and daughters to support them and 
to contribute to the household through wage labor in the city (Wilson 2004, p.19). 
Together with the demand for cheap labor in Bangkok’s manufacturing and service 
industries, urban wage employment presented new options for rural men and women. 
Although Thai women have extensively contributed to the economic growth through 
their agricultural labor, industrial work, and service activities (including sexual 
services), they are marginalized, exploited, and oppressed throughout the country’s 
four decades of “development” and are predominantly the victims of what Bell (1997) 
termed as “the feminization of poverty” in a  patriarchal Thai society. Ara Wilson 
(2004, p.92-93) explained that one aspect of the cultural value change is in the 
familial structure which the Thai kinship system is based on. This kinship system is 
based on the pattern of exchange obligation “bun khun” in which sons and daughters 
face different options for making good on their filial obligations to their parents. In 
the past, women repay their filial debt by taking care of their parents or guardians 
where it is the duty of the youngest daughter to look after their parents at home. As a 
result of modernization and rapid economic development, young women as well as 
men in rural villages began to migrate to the urban cities for employment. For most 
women in Thailand these days, fulfillment of their obligations of respect and gratitude 
to their parents are measured in terms of material support: cash, television sets, a 
home rather than physical care. This has become a dominant trend in Thailand 
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especially for young women, who cannot serve as Buddhist monks to earn religious 
merit for their parents like their male counterparts do. The moral forces of family 
obligations are the primary motivating factor for a  young rural women to move to 
Bangkok (Mills 1997; Brody 2006, p.138). Census data supports this trend and shows 
that between 1960-1970, females at every age increased their mobility. In fact, teen-
age women outnumbered their male counterparts as migrants to municipal areas 
(Muecke 1984, p.465).  Muecke (1984) also points out that Northern Thai women 
make this domestic migration to ‘make money, not babies’. Such decisions are based 
on the increasing dominance of instrumental-rational values of education and wealth 
as opposed to more substantive ones such as starting a family. Rapid modernization 
and urbanization within the country allowed poorly educated Thais and those from a 
lower socio-economic background to begin to acquire wealth through urban 
migration. Apart from the gender obligations of repaying their gratitude toward their 
parents, working in urban areas also allows young women and men to participate in a 
culture of modernity5. Mills (1997) contends that this opportunity to acquire ‘than 
samay’ (modern) identity and commodity consumption is also the central pull factor 
in internal migration to the urban cities among most rural youths. Thus, working in 
the city offers women the chance to pursue both a “modern woman” lifestyle and 
fulfill the role of a “good daughter” at the same time. Alyson Brody (2006, p.137) 
also argues that the decision of rural women’s migration to Bangkok is beyond 
traditional ‘duty’ to the family and a ‘desire’ for material goods and independence. 
                                                 
5A culture of modernity or a 'modern' (thansamay) life denotes a modern life in the city such as 
wearing fashionable, sexy clothing and make up. The Thai mass media posits Bangkok as the center of 
everything which is new and modern, sophisticated and charming urbanites while the mass media 
stereotyped those who live in Isan as being ‘backward’. Thus, the desire to participate in ‘modern’ 
(thansamay) life is one of the driving forces behind a woman’s decision to migrate to Bangkok (Mills 
1997).  
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Rather, it is  based around capitalist-oriented perceptions of ‘success’ which entailing 
the ability to accomplish both duty and desire6. 
 In this trend of rural-urban migration, it must be noted that Thai rural women 
usually end up with low-skilled jobs after their migration to the urban areas because 
of deep rooted gender inequalities in Thai society. For example, Thai women are in 
disadvantaged position because education and training will go to the son rather than 
the daughter (De jong, Richter & Isarabhakdi 1996, p.751-752). In contrast, poorly 
educated young men can escape poverty and achieve respectable social status and 
economic security through two honorable careers: the monkhood and the military 
(Muecke 1991, p.895). There is however no such options for the poorly educated Thai 
women.  These women are marginalized and exploited in a phenomenon known as the 
“feminization of production and consumption” (Bell 1997) in which they produce a 
huge amount of value-added commodities for the export markets while earning below 
subsistence income with minimal benefits and are often exposed to harsh working, 
impoverished and insecure living conditions. Some Thai women do make a rational 
decision to work in prostitution where for them, selling their bodies is  better than 
being exploited as cheap laborers. Many scholars (Wilson 2004, p.93; Muecke 1984, 
1991; Bishop & Robinson 1998) who work on the issue sex workers in Bangkok 
found that the majority of sex workers in Bangkok are young rural women who used 
to work in lowly paid un-skilled jobs in Bangkok such as domestic helpers and factory 
workers in the industrial sector. For these women who do make the switch, 
prostitution becomes a more attractive option to earn more money in order to survive 
in the city and to perform gender obligation as a dutiful daughter. 
                                                 
6 Alyson Brody (2006) explained that the aspiration of rural village women migrate to urban is 
‘success’ which denote by the ability to invest in land and rural production, build a home, own a ‘pick-
up’ truck, care for family by providing things for their family’s needs as well as giving financial 




1.2  Urban Migration for Prostitution  
 As shown above, many poorly educated women from the lower socio-
economic class in Thailand turn to prostitution to achieve some form of  economic 
income and to fulfill their gender roles within their families through urban migration 
(Muecke 1984, p.468).  Some scholars (Muecke 1984, Wilson 2004) argue that the 
fact that Thai women have to make such a miserable choice is one of the negative 
outcomes from Thailand’s modernization projects in its pursuit for greater economic 
development (Wilson 2004, p.68).   
 However, as prostitution is complexly shaped by social, economic and 
political conditions particular to each society (Chen 2006), it cannot be said that 
poverty alone is the only reason that young women and their families allow them to 
be prostitute. The role of the government in Thailand should be considered as well. In 
Thailand, the government depends on the female workforce in the alternative circuit 
of prostitution where women in the sex industry become a crucial aspect of a tourism 
development strategy and a main source of governmental revenue (Sassen 2002b). 
The expansion of the sex industry in Thailand was at its height in the 1960s along the 
line with the promotion of Thai tourism (Bishop & Robinson 1998, p.161; Mix and 
Piper 2003, p.54). In 1980s, statistics showed that the Thai tourism industry was 
responsible for bringing more foreign currency into the country than rice exports or 
manufacturing (Wilson 2004, p.207). This policy of tourism promotion is one of the 
main reasons why many of Thai women rural-urban migrants had entered prostitution, 
earning Thailand its infamous reputation of being the ‘brothel of the world’ (Cohen 
1982). 
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 Apart from the impact of economic globalization and state policies on Thai 
women, the socio-cultural context must also be taken into account in explaining the 
flourishing  sex industry in Thailand. As Kirsch (1982) and Keyes (1984) reckoned, 
the culture of gender relations in Thailand had been constructed by Theravada 
Buddhist assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of reality. Many scholars 
(Thistsa 1980; Troung 1990) accept Kirsch’s argument in establishing a link between 
the extensive climate of prostitution in Thailand with the cultural norms of gender in 
Thailand based on the Buddhist-influenced images of women as ‘mother-nurturers’. 
This Buddhist gender perspective permits Thai women to engage in commercial sex 
work to maintain the ideal women roles of ‘mother-nurturer’ by using their earning 
from prostitution to support natal family (Thistsa 1980; Troung 1990). However, 
Keyes (1984) argued that the reasons for Thai women’s participation in prostitution 
are influenced less by traditional Buddhist’s cultural norms of gender and more by the 
emergent materialistic culture in Thailand.  Nevertheless, the influences of Theravada 
Buddhism was not lost on Keyes. He suggested that the dominant Buddhist culture in 
Thailand could be interpreted as permitting  women to work as prostitutes because it 
does not stigmatize these women but instead allows for the possibility of redemption 
through merit-making and in the belief that they can always alter their behavior later 
for salvation (Keyes 1984, p.236).  As Muecke (1991) asserts, prostitution enables 
women to escape from poverty or a difficult home life, and it also allows them to 
accomplish their gender roles of being a ‘dutiful daughter’ by earning enough money 
to help their natal family out of poverty. As such, in regards to the lower socio-
economic status families, women’s roles have changed traditionally “mothers selling 
food” to meet to the familial needs to a more contemporary “daughters selling their 
bodies” to uphold their family’s subsistence. 
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 1.2.1 Prostitution: Does It Encapsulate only Women Victimhood? 
          Sex industry is viewed in the context of a political economy in which 
men are dominant and women are subordinate (Bishop & Robinson, 1998, p.161). 
Commercial sex workers are often seen as the antithesis to having any free choice or 
agency as they suffer from hardship or poverty, loneliness, alienation and personal 
abuse (Muecke 1991, p.893). Some scholars have however claim that women’s 
agency in prostitution  appears in the establishing of ‘romantic’ relationships with 
their clients beyond that of the conventional sex worker and client relations (Cohen 
1986; Askew 2002; Yea 2005). Sallie Yea (2005, p.457) argues that by introducing 
“romantic” elements into their relationships with GIs client, Filipina entertainers in 
Korea are able to assert a degree of agency that allows them to overcome the stigma 
attached to their labels as ‘trafficked entertainers’. Subsequently, developing such 
romantic relationships enable them to progress into a more serious  and stable 
relationship. The stable or serious relationships of emotional attachment and financial 
dependence on their men, are the beginnings  of a possible marriage. In contrast to 
Cohen’s (1986, p.124) macro-analysis that the promotion of tourism may engender 
the sexual exploitation of Thai women, micro-analysis research provided by the 
scholars above show at that level of interpersonal relationship, local women 
demonstrate their agency by exploiting and manipulating the foreigners. Thai women 
too, have learned that the ‘real relationship of her body to the international 
marketplace is that of commodization; therefore, they believe that once they have 
used their bodies to establish  romantic love with their male foreign customers, these 
customers could eventually end up giving more in terms of monthly financial support’  
(Bishop & Robinson 1998, p.164). These views are also supported by Askew (2002, 
p.253) who argues that sex workers in Bangkok’s red light district are active agents 
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with the capacity to transform their lives in their skilled romantic interactions with 
foreign men. 
 As mentioned earlier, most young Thai rural village women migrate to the 
urban cities to work as domestic workers or in the industrial sectors. However, once 
they had made a choice to become a prostitute in the various tourist establishment 
areas like Bangkok, Hat Yai and Pattaya, they are more susceptible to ideas of 
marrying to foreigners so that they could, have better socio-economic status and remit 
money home As such, prostitution may be understood as a form of women’s 
resistance to the local status quo as it offers these women better lives than working in 
a local factory or as domestic workers.  Another factor that pulls these rural women 
into prostitution in these tourist-oriented places is that these are key sites that allow 
cross-cultural encounters between the foreign men and themselves. These women 
develop into active  agents who skillfully transform sex-client exchanges into 
romantic relationships with their foreign male customers. Some of these romantic 
relationships, as suggested earlier here develop into transnational marriage migration. 
In Thai local discourse, this pattern of transformation is known as a change from Luk 
Kha Pra Cham (regular client) to Faen (partner) and finally to Khoey Farang 
(Westerner son in-laws). This is indeed consistent with the majority of my 
informants’ life histories who had engaged in the sex industry before meeting their 
husbands in their work places (red light districts) and becoming migrant wives (See 
also: Table 2). 
 
 1.3 Feminization of Transnational Migration 
  Sassen (2002a) explains that one significant impact of economic globalization 
on the developing countries’ economies is the feminization of poverty that led to the  
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international labor migration of women. This new dynamic of transnational migration 
is seen as a practical strategy to resist the poverty and economic hardship within the 
context of global capitalism.  However, the migratory flows of women in Third World 
countries to First World countries leverage predominantly on women’s  “traditional” 
reproductive and nurturing roles such as “mail-order brides,” “domestic workers,”, 
“sex workers.”, “health/elderly care takers” and “entertainers”. Lan (2006, p.149) 
explains that in a global wage labor system, the attraction for female Filipina and 
Indonesian migrant workers to continue their traditional roles abroad as caretakers, 
nurse and domestic helpers are that there are no jobs domestically that provide a 
sufficient and stable salary. It is also a family strategy for “dutiful” daughters to 
sacrifice themselves for the collective benefits of the extended family. For Indonesia 
and Philippines, women labor migration is the major sources of income for the 
country. Conversely, in Thailand, the number of male migrant workers outnumbers 
the female7. Also, among Filipina and Indonesian, domestic gendered job is one of 
various strategies to pursue the Cinderella dream as they can secure a higher wage in 
the global market and become the major breadwinner in their transnational families 
(Lan 2006, p.239). For Thai women, the prevalent strategy to pursue the Cinderella 
dream is to marry a foreigner from a First World country, in particularly with Farang 
(Western men), which it enable them to upward socio-economic mobility as a wife 
and escape from patriarchal oppression in Thai society. 
                                                 
7 In 2004, Among the number of registered Indonesian migrant workers 83% are women (Source: 
www.siteresources.worldbank.org) and 72% of overseas Filipino workers are female in which they are 
still in “traditional” reproductive work such as domestic work and cultural entertainment, health care 
and nursing (Source: www.aboutasean.blogspot.com). However, compare to Thailand, in 2004, only 





1.3.1 Feminization of Transnational Migration: Cross-border   marriage 
migration as Third World Women’s Strategy 
         The discourses concerning Third World women marriage migration 
often allude to the image of the Mail-Order Brides (MOB) which typically links these 
women with notions of women’s trafficking, women’s subservience and marrying out 
of economic desperation (Constable 2003, p.64). Some scholars see the phenomena of 
MOB as women labor migration in the form of “reproductive migrant workers” under 
the conjugal contract (Kojima 2001, p.208). However, Constable (2003, p.65) was 
critical of such a stereo-typical portrayal of MOB as Third World victims from the 
Western feminist perspectives. She argued that it lacked the voices of these Third 
World women themselves, whom may define liberation differently under different 
sociocultural context. As del Rosario asserts, the MOB system, with its promise of 
marriage to a foreigner and the possibility of a high potentiality of remittance can be 
recognized as a coping strategy for survival or ensuring the upward mobility of 
MOBs’ original families (Kojima 2001, p.205). From his standpoint, MOB may be 
considered as a way to escape the economic hardship and poverty of these women’s 
home countries. Apart from MOB system, Mckay (2003) takes the recent 
marriage migratory flows as women’s strategy to flee from the international labor 
market of domestic work or sex work. In Philippines, the increase in international 
marriage rates is relative to the increasing flows of female contract migrants, 
particularly women’s domestic labor (Mckay 2003, p.30). These labor migrant 
women deploy cross border marriage as the strategy to acquire residence and 
economic security and to elude low-skill jobs (Mckay 2003). 
 Conversely, marrying foreign men can also be the key for these women to 
reside and work in these foreign countries, often as commercial sex workers. As Chen 
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(2006) discovered,   transnational prostitution in Taiwan is managed in the form of 
transnational marriages where mainland Chinese women enter Taiwan to engage in its 
commercial sex trade as ‘Mainland brides’. Mix and Piper (2003) found that Thai 
women adopt a similar migration strategy to Germany and marry local German men 
to obtain work permits and work as sex workers there. However, they also admitted 
that some Thai women marry German men as a way to escape from existing 
commercial sex work there. As such, transnational marriage migrations occur for a 
variety of reasons. It can be seen as a strategy used by women to opt out of unskilled 
work, deskilled work, commercial sex work or it can be a strategy used to obtain the 
relevant permits needed in engaging in sex work. However, according to my 
informants, none of them marry Singaporean men just so that they could  work as a 
sex worker there. The reason is that there is no need to do so. Entry into Singapore is 
much easier for Thais as there is no need to marry a Singaporean for specific visa 
requirements as opposed to countries in Europe.    
 As my central focus is Thai migrant wives’ migration experiences, I would 
explain in the following section the history of cross border marriage between Thai 
women and foreign men. I will demonstrate how tourism-oriented prostitution in 
Thailand and transnational prostitution in foreign countries led to the increase of Thai 
women’s agency to improve their socioeconomic status. 
 
1.4 The History of Cross Border Marriage of Thai Women 
 While there had been encounters between Thai women and male foreigners 
previously, the modern history of the majority of these encounters began with the 
arrival of American military in 1962. At that time, most of the contacts between Thai 
girls and Farangs (Westerners) occurred in the bar, the night club, the massage parlor 
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and the coffee shop.  After the GIs left in 1975, Thai women marriage migration 
began to be a result of tourism-oriented prostitution. Since foreign-oriented 
prostitution suffered a short recession after the GIs left, it was soon “…rescued to a 
certain extent by the successful promotion of tourism” (FEER 1976, p.28, Cohen 
1982). According to the Tourism Organization of Thailand, the number of foreign 
arrivals in 1971 stood at 634,000 and rose to 1,591,000 in 1979. Males outnumbered 
females among these tourist arrivals by two to one. The reputation of Thailand as a 
land of “instantly available women” brought large numbers of sex-seeking tourists 
into the country (Cohen 1982). Many ‘sex-seeking tourists’ come from Europe, Japan, 
and U.S.A. and the number of Thai sex workers have drastically increased in 1990s 
and 2000s. This trend of local tourism-oriented prostitution is increasingly an 
important revenue source for the Thai government. The places where  Farang men 
and Thai women meet each other were popular tourist-oriented entertainment 
establishments where prostitution services were mostly available. Thus, the first stage 
in the development of transnational marriage between Thai women and foreign men 
occurred from their engagement in prostitution,  as workers and clients.  
 Recent studies in cross-cultural marriage migrations must also take into 
processes of globalization and regionalization since Thai migrant women have begun 
to migrate overseas, predominantly to engage in transnational prostitution. The history 
of large-scale Thai migration began during the Post World War II in the 1970s. Most 
of the Thai migrants were professionals who sought employment in the United States. 
In the oil industry boom during the 1980s, the majority of Thai migrants went to the 
Gulf regions for employment. In the 1990s, the trend of labor migration changed to 
the newly industrialized countries in Asia such as Taiwan, Brunei, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Japan. The fast growing economies of these countries needed to be 
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sustained by foreign workers immigration.  Following the first wave of male labor 
migration in Asia, Thai women’s migration became a major trend over the last two 
decades. The initial overseas destination in the 1970s was Europe, especially 
Switzerland, Germany and the Scandinavian countries (Ruankaew 2002). By then, 
transnational prostitution had become a strategy for working-class women to escape 
the economic hardships in their home country. Transnational prostitution also led to 
the occasional marriage of Thai women to the local men in these foreign countries.  
Mix & Piper (2003) study of Thai unskilled migrant women who focused primarily on 
marriage to German nationals in order to obtain residence and work permits could be 
seen against the backdrop of limited choices, or possibly involvement in romance 
between Thai women and German clients. In sum, the beginning of cross cultural 
marriage migrations in Thailand is linked to the local and international sex industry 
which allows Thai women to meet foreigners in tourist-oriented entertainment 
establishments, or to be introduced to foreign men after their arrival at the destination 
country. 
 Today, the phenomenon of cross-cultural marriage migration in Thailand 
require us to broaden our perspectives beyond its linkages to prostitution or the 
radical feminists’ women’s trafficking framework. Smutkupt and Kitiarsa (2007, p.3) 
argue that “that mixed marriage between Thai Isan women and Farang men depicts 
the notion of “gendered agency” (Constable 2005, p.13). Marrying a Farang 
husband is considered a livelihood strategy adopted by village women from the rural 
poor background. As the country is deeply embedded in the global cultural economy, 
marrying foreigner and living in international space has become a source of wealth 
for many of them…….Isan women strategically find themselves ‘marrying up’ their 
Occidental husbands in order to escape poverty and realize their ‘Cinderella 
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fantasies’ ”. In Thai society, marriages to western men have taken on the popular 
perception of good fortune or winning the lottery among rural villagers and urban 
working class (Smutkupt & Kitiarsa 2007, p.18). Seen not only as an affinal 
arrangement that benefits the household’s survival of Thai women, transnational 
marriages have become new ‘alternative circuits’ or ‘counter-geographies’ (Sassen 
2002) that provide important sources of revenue for the Thai government. For 
example, Thai authorities also view Thai Isan wives8 and their Farang husbands as a 
new found source of foreign currencies with ample financial spending power to help 
boost the country’s ailing economy (Smutukupt & Kitiarsa  2007, p.1). The study by 
E-saan Center for Economic and Business Research has also shown that the cross 
cultural marriages between women in Isan and foreign men had significantly 
bolstered the economic growth of the Isan region, bringing in the new developments 
to improve the living conditions of the Isan people9. Such substantial benefits derived 
from cross cultural marriages had led to the Thai authorities’ proposal that Isan Mia 
Farang (Westerner’s wife) should be encouraged to act as “commercial and tourism 
ambassadors” for the region to persuade their new family and friends to sell/buy more 
OTOP (One Tambon One Product) products to help the local community10. The 
transnational marriage in Thailand had shifted from the stigmatization of women 
prostitution to the reinforcement of Thai women’s agencies to escape their perceived 
poverty and their fulfillment of the gendered role required of a dutiful daughter at the 
                                                 
8 Isan, the northeastern region of Thailand, is considered as the poorest region in Thailand. 
9 E -saan Center for Economic and Business Research, Faculty of Management Sciences, Khon Kaen 
University reveals that the cross cultural marriage between Thai women and foreign men significantly 
affect  the economy in Isan region. The cross cultural marriage lead to the economic growth and 
increase the GDP in Isan region approximately 8,666 million baht, particularly,  retail and wholesale, 
automobile mechanic, consumer production which grows to 4,569 million baht. There have also been 
increases in income as well as  total employment in the region to 747,094 people (Source: 
www.thaipost.net, 11 March 2008). 
10 Source: “When Harry Weds Somsri, Business Blooms” the Nation, 14 June 2004. 
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same time. This phenomenon could be understood as ‘global hypergamy’ (marrying 
up socially or geographically) (Constable 2005). 
 Reviewing the literature on women migration, it is clear that cross cultural 
marriages can be understood as strategies by women in Third World countries to 
improve their socio-economic positioning and to achieve citizenship in other countries 
(Piper & Roces 2003). For Thai rural women, cross cultural marriage migration seems 
to be the best choices to assert their agency to renegotiate their options within the 
contextualized environments of global capitalism.  
In this thesis, I will suggest an alternative to Muecke’s argument (1984, 1991) 
that ‘modernization’, ‘urbanization’ and ‘globalization’ brought forth by a global 
capitalist system affect the status of rural women from that of a ‘mother selling food 
to a ‘daughter sells her body’.  I argue that Thai women today assert their agencies by 
shifting from a commercial sexual contract to a conjugal sexual contract which 
enables them to ‘make money as well as potentially have babies’ at the same time.  
My argument is supported by my informants of whom many are able to provide 
significant financial support to their natal families while performing their gendered 
roles of wife and mother to their foreign husbands and their children respectively. 
 I have shown that cross cultural marriage is a vehicle available to women in 
Third World countries to demonstrate their agencies. However, these women are not 
the sole agents in the production and reproduction of a system (or structure) of 
transnational marriage migration. There is a need to take into account the agency of 
actors in the First World countries, namely the men and women in the First World 
countries. Giddens’s Structuration theory illustrates how human actions in different 
socio-economic contexts are able to negotiate and reconstruct the existing structure 
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and that the strategies of humans in different societies is complementary with another 
depend on their contextualized societal structures and conditions. 
 
1.5 Cross Cultural Marriage: The Product from Human Activities in First 
World Countries 
 In this section, I will show that cross cultural marriage is also the product of 
First World men and women’s human activities, particularly men’s incentives to 
sustain patriarchal privileges. However, since I did not interview the Singaporean 
husbands of my informants, my argument on Singaporean men’s agency to sustain 
their patriarchal privileges will be based on the interviews of Thai women’s migrant 
lives in Singapore. 
  First World women assert their agency in bargaining with the existing 
patriarchal norms (Lan 2006, p.95). They do so by attempting to resist these accepted 
norms of male dominance and women submissiveness that constraint them to pre-
determined  gender roles such as mother, wife, daughter-in-law and homemaker. This 
is possible because of the widespread availability of education and stable economic 
growth in these First World countries, allowing women to be more independent.  
When these women have more economic power in both public and private spheres, 
they are able to employ better coping mechanisms to resist the patriarchal structure. 
Ironically, the prevalent strategy exercised by First World women is still confined 
within a patriarchal  structure in that they employ ‘other women’ from less developed 
countries to perform their gender roles. For example, middle and upper class 
Taiwanese women negotiate their traditional gender roles by hiring migrant domestic 
helpers to become homemakers (Lan 2006). Kojima (2001, p.204) also reveals that 
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Japanese women who are burdened by double-shift work reallocate their domestic 
work to female relatives or hire female maids and housekeepers.  
 On the other hand, men in the First World countries try to circumvent the 
bargaining power of local women in order to maintain their patriarchal privileges. 
Engaging in cross border marriage could be a strategy used by First World men to 
sustain the existing patriarchal structure by substituting marriages to local women 
with marriages to women from less developed countries. Amster & Lindquist (2005, 
p.12) provides a clear example here.  They cite the cross-border marriage practices of 
Singaporean working-class men with less well-off women in Batam11.  These 
Singaporean working-class men usually meet these women in Batam through the 
typical prostitute-client based interaction. Subsequently, these women are kept as 
mistresses or are married by the Singaporeans to reproduce the traditional patriarchal 
familial structure and masculine norms. In this manner, Singaporean men are 
empowered because women in less developed countries like Batam are more willingly 
to perform the traditional gender roles as opposed to Singaporean women.  
 The phenomenon of men seeking foreign brides could also be explained by the 
gender demographics of a particular country. For example, Japanese men who are 
facing a shortage of potential brides are seeking Filipina wives (Amster & Lindquist 
2005). Wang (2006) also illustrates that transnational marriage phenomenon between 
Vietnamese women and Taiwanese men emerge as a result of the male population 
outnumbering the female population in Taiwan. As a result, men of low qualifications 
and socio-economic status may be easily abandoned from the local marriage market. 
According to Chung (2004) and Wang (2006), Taiwanese men still wish to marry 
                                                 
11 Batam is located at the border to Singapore and Peninsular Malaysia. Since the mid-1980s, as 
Singapore has been transformed from an export-processing zone into a financial hub and global city, 
factories have been moved offshore to places such as Batam. One effect of this process has been the 
creation of the so-called growth triangle, a transnational economic zone that connects Batam, the 
Malaysian province of Johor, and Singapore (Amster & Lindquist 2005, p.8). 
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women with traditional values conforming to the patriarchal norms of the women as 
the home-keeper, doing the housework, being responsible for childbearing, taking 
care of their husbands and serving their parents-in-law.   
 It is possible to understand the phenomenon of cross border marriage as a 
product of complementary human’s activities within two cultural contexts where both 
men and women assert agency to renegotiate and reconstruct existing social 
structures. Firstly, it demonstrates the empowerment of  women from the Third World 
countries to achieve better socio-economic status. Secondly, men from First World 
countries are able to maintain the patriarchal privileges by reconstructing their social 
relations with women from different cultures and geographies who are willing to 
fulfill the traditional roles that are challenged by their local women. As Smutkupt and 
Kitiarsa (2007, p.3) confirm, transnational marriage between Farang men and Thai 
women are indeed complementary to the two idealized images provided thus far, 
namely Farang men fulfilling their exotic dreams of having traditional value-oriented 
Oriental wives while Isan women strategically ‘marrying up’ their Occidental 
husbands in order to escape poverty and realize their “Cinderella fantasies”. 
Correspondingly, Constable (2003, p.177) pointed out that the marriage of Filipina 
women and Western men is the result of two different yet complementary 
motivations: the Western men seeking ‘traditional’ marriages and the Asian women 
looking for ‘modern’ ones.  
 In Singapore, the predominantly poorly educated or lower economic status 
men tend to marry foreign brides. This is in line with the statistics showing that lowly 
educated Singaporean men in their 30s-40s remain unmarried because Singaporean 
women will not marry down (Jones 2005). Unlike local women who are more 
powerful and independent, unskilled migrant women are restricted by the structure to 
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fully rely on their husbands for permanent residencies (legal support) and money 
remittance to their families back home (financial support). Therefore, the 
economically marginalized men would be able to assert their privileged form of 
patriarchal power and renegotiate this existing marriage structure by choosing to 
marry foreign brides from less developed countries. 
 However, some of my informants who marry well-off Singaporean men also 
claimed that they meet their husband’s expectation on wife roles: traditional roles of 
homemaker, full-time housewives and caretakers in domestic sphere which local 
women would not do. Besides, most Singaporean men believe that local women are 
too liberated, demanding, and independent (Constable 2005, p.8). This implies that 
regardless of their socioeconomic status, by marrying foreign brides from less 
developed countries, local men are able to sustain the patriarchal privileges 
challenged by local women. Therefore, marriage migration of foreign brides from 
developing countries is not only women’s agency used for upward socio-economic 
status, but also Singaporean men’s agency used to sustain their patriarchal privileges 
that are challenged by local women who deny to play only traditional women 
gendered roles in the domestic realm, to be submissive wives and reliant on husbands.  
For Singaporean men from lower socio-economic status, they are more challenged by 
local women who will not marry down and will not be in the domestic sphere. This is 
the reason why majority of local men who marry foreign brides from developing 
countries are from lower economic status. 
 In the following part, I will explore the increasing phenomenon of foreign 
brides’ migration to Singapore. I will contextualize my earlier argument that cross 
border marriage can be seen as the product of human activities in First World 
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countries to the case of Singapore. I will show how Singaporean men seek to sustain 
their patriarchal privileges in the face of local women’s challenges. 
 
1.6 Cross Border Marriage Migration Phenomena in Singapore 
 Migration has been a major component of Singapore’s population growth 
through which skilled professionals, managerial workers as well as low skilled 
workers and low status immigrants serve the needs of cheap labor to sustain the 
country’s economic growth (Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000). Ng (2005) argued that 
Singapore is amongst the prominent destination countries for female migration in 
Southeast Asia, consisting largely of four groups: (1) foreign domestic workers (2) 
female “foreign talent” (3) foreign brides (4) sex workers.    
 Foreign brides have become a crucial node in the foreign women immigration 
phenomenon in Singapore.12 More and more Singaporean men turn to finding brides 
from developing countries through match making agencies, by traveling overseas or 
through online matchmaking websites13. 
 Nonetheless, as migration has been a major component of Singapore’s 
population growth and its maintenance as a globally competitive state14, the nation-
state authorities had launched rigorous immigration policies to stratify skilled and 
non-skilled labor in order to select and absorb only qualified migrants and to ensure 
that semi-skilled laborers or non-skilled laborers are transient in their employment 
                                                 
12 The Sunday times, a local newspaper reported that one in every four Singaporean men married 
foreign brides. In 2005, there were 6,250 male Singaporeans and permanent residents married foreign 
brides, which was a 10 years high. In 1998, the foreign brides from Malaysia (48.5 per cent) topped the 
chart, followed by women from China (18.9 per cent) and Indonesia (14.8 per cent) (Source: 
www.asianpacificpost.com, 10 October 2006).  
13 Source: www.asianpacificpost.com, 10 October 2006. 
14 Singapore state has been very careful to absorb only foreign talent which often appears in daily 
media and minister’s speech. As Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong has emphasized the strategy of 
‘gathering global talent’ and ‘making Singapore a cosmopolitan city to create an oasis of talent’, also G 
Shantakumar, a consultant demographer rationalize that “These migrants are people who bring with 
them a lot of talent and perhaps money. Who does not want money?” (Today, 2 February 2007).  
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stay in the country (Kitiarsa 2005). With regard to cross border marriage migration, 
the state only opens its doors actively for the union between high status and 
qualification equivalent expatriates15. Generally, these consist of a coupling of the 
local women and the expatriate men.  However, local men (predominantly poorly 
educated men) renegotiate this existing marriage structure by choosing to marry  
foreign brides from less developed countries since they find it difficult to marry local 
women. In response to this reconstructed system, the state exercises its power to 
control the influx of “unwanted” marriages and the immigration of “unwelcome” 
migrant brides. Thus, marriage migration of working class women is closely 
controlled in the highly restrictive environment of Singapore.  
1.6.1 Thai Foreign Brides in Singapore  
          As there is an increasing demand for foreign brides from less developed 
countries among poorly educated or working class men in Singapore as well as 
proximity and easy entry requirements between Singapore and Thailand, Singapore 
has become a preferred destination among working class Thai women who want to 
achieve upward mobility by cross border marriage.  
 Cross border marriage between Singaporean men and Thai women is 
inevitably embedded in sex-oriented tourism. Hat Yai, a distinctive permissive space 
for commercial sex is the equivalent for Singaporean and Malaysian men to 
Westerner-oriented sex zones in Patpong and Pattaya. In Hat Yai, Malaysian and 
Singaporean men engage in forms of sexual and recreational activities limited in their 
own countries as they possess higher purchasing power due to the differentials in 
                                                 
15 In 2006, Singapore government directly funding 1 million SGD, so-called ‘Partner Connection Fund’ 
to support dating agencies that come up with what it called new ‘social interaction opportunities’ for 
educated and professional singles  (Source: www.asiaone.com, 14 February 2008). Recently, these 
Singapore dating agencies set up overseas offices launch inter-city meet-ups to find matches for single 
and eligible clients across the border. One of dating agencies, It’s Just Lunch launched the Branch in 
Bangkok with the concept of inter-city dating to get its Singaporean and Thai clients acquainted with 
each other (Source: www.todayonline.com, 19 March 2008). 
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foreign exchange rates(Askew & Cohen 2004, p.93-96). Askew and Cohen (2004, 
p.99-100) found that the majority of Thai sex workers in Hat Yai come from north 
and northeast Thailand. These women engage voluntarily in sex work where 
relationships with clients often develop beyond the basis exchange of sex for money 
into that of the ‘mistress’. However, I found that the relationships between 
Singaporean men and Thai women in this permissive sex zone also develop into cross 
border marriage migration of these women to Singapore. 
 Besides encounters in Hat Yai, Thai women are also able to enter Singapore 
without visa requirements on cheap and convenient transportations such as rail, bus 
from Hat Yai or budget airlines. Although there are no official figures available, Thai 
foreign brides are also one of largest ethnic groups of foreign brides in Singapore. 
This can be easily observed in the many places in Singapore that offer opportunities 
for interaction between Singaporean men and Thai women. In past ten years, there has 
been an increase in Thai Discotheques16  in Singapore from 1 to more than 10 Thai 
Discotheques all over the island. At Thai discos, Singaporean men can specifically 
look for Thai young and pretty ladies. Majority of waitresses are Permanent Resident 
Thai migrant wives who are either married to or divorced from Singaporean men. 
Singers and dancers are Thai work permit holder as well as countless young Thai girls 
who work as undocumented freelance sex workers. The majority of Thai migrant 
wives in Singapore are women from the northeastern province and the northern 
provinces of Thailand, who have migration motives based on economic desperation.  
 From a macro-level analysis, Thai women’s transnational marriage migration 
is a result of inequalities present in global capitalism. Cross border marriage 
                                                 
16 Thai Discotheques means a distinctive Thai style disco in Singapore. At Thai discos,  singers and 
dancers are Thai, but they sing English, Mandarin and Thai songs. Interestingly, it is the place where 
majority of employees are Thai or can speak Thai. It is also the place where Singaporean men can find 
undocumented sex workers from Thailand who come by tourist visa. 
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migration becomes an alternative strategic method for Thai women to have the chance 
to escape poverty and unskilled work at home, to acquire economic capital and to 
fulfill gender obligations of remitting money back home to their families. At the same 
time, Thai women’s transnational marriage migration also complements the strategies 
of men from First World countries in sustaining a patriarchal structure in their local 
contexts.  
 
III. Application of Giddens’s Structuration Theory at the Micro-Level 
of Cross Border Marriage Migration between Thai women and 
Singaporean Men 
 As I have noted earlier, Giddens argued that a structure is dynamic as it is 
constituted by the human’s activities which result in both constraining and enabling 
qualities of human’s practices. In reference to the phenomenon of cross border 
marriage migration in Singapore, the nation-state tends to welcome only the 
immigration of foreign talents or expatriates  to produce Singaporean babies rather 
than that of the working class women from developing countries who are considered 
as not to be economic contributors. As unskilled transnational migrants, most Thai 
migrant wives’ lives will be highly restricted by the institutional structures in 
Singapore. As such, I will also focus on the periods after marriage migration by 
exploring at a micro-level, the Thai migrant wives’ individual experiences with the 
different structural contexts in Singapore. I will apply Giddens’s ideas on ‘dynamic’ 
structure and the ‘duality’ of structure to interpret the interplay between Thai 
women’s agency and Singapore’s immigration legal structure, economic structure and 
socio-cultural structure. Once the Thai migrant wives start living in Singapore, their 
mobility and lifestyle are restrained by the various structures that are manipulated by 
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the nation-state and their  husbands, each elements having different structural motives 
and resources at hand.  Yet, any structure is also dynamic because it allows the actors 
involved to negotiate, reproduce, circumvent the structure and ultimately create 
change to benefit them. As my aim is to point out Thai women’s agency within the 
institutional structural constraints of Singapore, I will show that Thai women have 
resources that they are able to make use of in making their choices, in acting 
independently to counteract, resist and negotiate the dominant structure to benefit 
them. 
 
IV. Approaches to Transnational Flow of Thai Migrant Wives in 
Singapore:    Graduated Sovereignty and Flexible Citizenship  
  To explore the power relations of state and transnational migrants, Singapore 
offers a distinctive case study due to its small size and tight regulation over its people 
causing others to term the tight regulative controls as “state fatherhood” (Heng & 
Devan 1995) and a “state of excess” with the one-party dominated government ruling 
through powerful state measures and pragmatic policies (Yao 2007).  The 
excessiveness of the nation-state regime appears in the policies and laws which 
control and intervene in the nature of Singaporean’s lives. The state also uses harsh 
immigration laws and policies to attract and benefit professional and skilled workers 
while strictly regulating the numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. This 
unequal treatment of individuals in Singapore is not new to nation-states in the region. 
To maintain their economic competitiveness and political stability, nation-states in 
Southeast Asia are no longer interested in securing uniform regulatory authority over 
all their citizens and people (Ong 2003, p.42). Ong uses the concept of ‘graduated 
sovereignty’ to describe the flexible management of sovereignty, in which different 
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parts of a nation-state’s population are subjected to different forms of controls and 
enjoy different sets of rights in the face of globalizing and regionalizing transnational 
challenges. Citizenship is not fixed but also negotiated through social, economic and 
cultural capital (Ong 1999, p. 215-216).  Thompson and Zhang (n.d., p.6) use 
Singapore as example to point out that graduate sovereignty allows the nation-state to 
sustain the demands of global capital by classification of immigrant. They (Thompson 
and Zhang, n.d., p.6) contend that “Singapore’s system of transnational municipal 
governance entails engagement with subjects through a hierarchy of reciprocal rights 
and responsibilities. Citizens are at the pinnacle of this hierarchy, followed by 
permanent residents, employment pass holders, work permit holder, and a variety of 
more temporary visitor granted social visit passes and tourist, business, and similar 
visas”. 
 The above-mentioned scholars’ works demonstrate that state sovereignty has 
been reinterpreted to meet the requirements of global capitalism. However, the 
mobility of people in a global political economy does not encompass only high-level 
executives or managerial workers but also working class groups, subalterns, women, 
children, refugees and so on. In Singapore, foreign brides from developing countries 
are perceived as a group of unskilled immigrants and as economically unproductive 
followers of their Singaporean husband. In the light of this assessment, the state 
considers it appropriate to exercise control over the immigration of these groups of 
women. In this thesis, I extend the concept of ‘graduated sovereignty’ to explore how 
the state regulates its subject’s activities and identities according to their class, 
ethnicity and gender, By studying Thai working class foreign brides in Singapore, I 
seek to explore how the authorities of the Singapore state classifies foreign brides as 
migrant and controls the mobility of these women through its legal, economic, socio-
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cultural regimes. Aihwa Ong terms this flexible citizenship. However, Ong (1999, 
p.112) only points out the strategies of flexible citizenship among professionals, 
business elite and growing middle class migrants who have material and symbolic 
resources readily available to their own advantage. On the other hand, less elite 
groups such as working class women are often depicted in a disadvantaged position 
that are constantly under the regulation of state regimes. There are scholars who 
extend the strategy of ‘flexible citizenship’, to the non-elite groups as well. Nonini 
(1997, p.215) applied Ong’s concept of ‘flexible citizenship’ to the non-elite groups 
by exploring the mobility of Malaysian Chinese male laborers in Japan and Taiwan. 
Lan (2006, p.239) reveals that lower-end migrant women also manipulate the strategy 
of flexible citizenship to enter into the global labor market and bypass government 
restrictions. Lan (2006) asserts that Filipina and Indonesian transnational domestic 
workers make use of domestic gendered job niches to secure higher wages in the 
global market and become the major breadwinner in their transnational families. Ong 
(1999, p.153-156) also explored the gender aspects of flexibility beyond the global 
labor market by looking at the mobility working class women in South China. 
Nonetheless, the flexible accumulation of working class Thai women is still within 
the context of sexual and class exploitation. Unlike their male migrant counterparts, 
their experiences of mobility continue to be under the constraint of male domination 
in activities such as prostitution, being a mistress, concubine, or marriage to the 
traveling businessman. As such, the network capital accumulated by the working class 
migrant women depends predominantly on personal charm rather than professional 
connections. 
 In my view, the concept of flexible citizenship can be used to explore the 
distinctive ways which transnational migrants of different classes, genders and ethnic 
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backgrounds manipulate their conditions to maximize their chances in the global 
economy. As such, I do not agree with Ong’s (1999) argument that only upper or 
middle class migrants can benefit from the strategy of ‘flexible citizenship’ by 
holding passports from multiple countries to facilitate their transnational business ties 
and social lives in the accumulation of economic, social and cultural capital. 
According to Ong, working class groups generally pay the price of global capitalism. 
Other scholars have used flexible citizenship to apply to non-elite groups but continue 
to link them with existing trans-local gender relations through the power of male 
mobility vis-à-vis women along with sexual and gendered exploitation  to produce an 
impression of passive women. In this thesis, I will expand the concept of ‘flexible 
citizenship’ to explore how Thai women manipulate the cross border marriage 
migration and to argue that these women are not merely passive victims of sexual and 
class exploitation, but there are also opportunities for them to 
challenge/circumvent/maneuver the structural constraints.   
 
V. Methodology and Informants 
 In this research, I carried out ethnographic fieldwork in Singapore during 
December 2006 - February 2007 to elicit the personal experiences of Thai migrant 
wives in Singapore. I began my fieldwork by serving as a volunteer English Teacher 
at Friends of Thai Workers Association located at Golden Mile Complex17 every 
Sunday. Through my involvement with this association, I had many opportunities to 
assist various groups of Thai migrants such as Thai male workers, Thai migrant 
wives, Thai migrant adopted children in Singapore. With time, I have become well 
acquainted with many of them. I have also participated in many Thai government-
                                                 
17 Golden Mile Complex is the gathering place for Thai migrant workers (Wong 2000, Kitiarsa 2006). 
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sponsored events for Thai people in Singapore such as Labor Day, Election Day, 
Father Day, and so on. I have occasionally visited these Thai migrant women’s 
homes, spending time together with their families and friends for leisure as well as 
various religious activities. I also frequently attend a variety of their social outings, 
such as shopping trips, birthday parties, disco dancing, karaoke, BBQ, picnics in 
parks at Sentosa and East Coast Park and hanging out in many restaurants. 
 For my primary data, I conducted 2-3 hours in-depth and open ended-recorded 
interviews with 23 Thai migrant regarding their life histories before and after 
migration to Singapore. Being their friend and sister (Phi-Nong)18 after some time in 
the field, I have ascertained the actual stories of their happiness and hardships in our 
personal conversations. My informants came from various regions across Thailand: 5 
from the North, 9 from the Northeast, 4 from the Central, 1 from the South, and 4 
from metropolitan areas. My informants have an average age of 35 years old. The 
oldest is 47 and the youngest is 21. They have a low level of educational attainment 
and come from poor family background. Most of them finished only primary (10), 
secondary (5), vocational schools (5), and bachelor degree (2) from non-recognized 
university in Thailand. The majority of them married Chinese Singaporean men, only 
2 married Malay men and 1 married an Indian Singaporean. Nine of Thai migrant 
wives had been married and divorced or separated in Thailand before they met their 
Singaporean husbands. Almost all of those who had married with Thai husbands have 
children in Thailand (See also: Table 1). Interviews were conducted in a private and 
quiet setting, usually at their residence, workplace, coffee shops and restaurants in 
Singapore. To protect the anonymity of informants, I have used pseudonyms for all 
                                                 
18 In Thai, the relationship of sister is ‘Phi-Nong’ (Older sister-Younger sister), which all my 
informants always call themselves as ‘Phi’ and call me ‘Nong’ if they are older than me. However, 
‘Phi-Nong’ relationship refers to the close relationship which is far more than teacher and students as I 
always do many activities with them outside the class. 
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interviewees. I collected an unsystematic sample of research participants by using 
snowballing method.  I also did focus-group discussions with 11 Thai migrant wives 
of Chinese Singaporean men to gain more extended information and to exchange 
knowledge and thoughts across class (classified by their husband’s occupations), 
occupations and personal backgrounds among these Thai migrant wives (See also: 
Table 4-6).  
 
VI. Organization of Thesis 
 For the following chapters, I use the narrative analysis of migration 
experiences of Thai migrant wives in Singapore to examine the dynamic nature and 
the duality of structure by showing how various societal structures impinge on their 
transnational lives. I will also show that women to some extent have room to exercise 
their agency to negotiate these structures while some are unsuccessful within the 
divergent condition which they confront. I divided the structures into the Immigration 
Legal Structure, the Economic Structure and the Socio-cultural Gendered Structure. 
 
Chapter 2: The Dynamics and the Duality of Immigration Legal Structure 
 In this chapter, I adopted Giddens’s theory of Structuration in arguing that the 
legal structure is dynamic as it is constituted of human social activities who posses 
structural resources and motives which they continually use to make rational choices 
to reproduce the structure. I use Thai migrant wives’ migration experiences to show 
how global capitalism is tied to gender stereotypes. I will also demonstrate how the 
immigration legal structure, reproduced by the state and the Singaporean husband’s 
activities impose restrictions on working class migrant wives’ experiences. 
Nevertheless, I also show the duality of structure which focuses on the agency of Thai 
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migrant wives who use ‘female reproductive resources’ and ‘transnational socio-
cultural resources’ available to them for negotiating with other actors in order to 
reconstruct, challenge, and circumvent the legal structure imposed on them. 
 
Chapter 3: The Dynamics and the Duality of Economic Structure 
  In this chapter, I use Giddens’s Structuration framework to show the dynamic 
nature and the duality of the economic structure. In reference to the economic 
structure and the experiences of Thai women, Thai rural village women who engage 
in rural-urban labor migration are generally exploited in the context of urban 
employment and impacts of the forces of global capitalism. However Thai women are 
also active agents who make choices on what to do within such situations. They use 
cross border marriage migration as livelihood strategy to escape from economic 
desperation in Thailand. After marriage migration, not all transnational migrant wives 
can achieve upward mobility as the economic structure can be reproduced to enable 
but also constrain their activities. With this in mind, I will demonstrate how the 
economic structure in Singapore shapes and constrains the Thai migrant wives’ 
economic activities. As women’s agency is the central focus of this thesis. I will show 
the variety of their livelihood strategies that argue that these women are conscious of 
their surrounding contexts and are able to negotiate and reconstruct within the 
constraints of the economic structure so that they gain economic resources and 
achieve upward mobility in their migration trajectory. However, some Thai women 
also fail to do so as the economic structure is overlapped with the legal/state structure 
which rigorously restricts unskilled/low educated migrant women. 
 
Chapter 4: The Dynamics and the Duality of Socio-cultural Gendered Structure 
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In this chapter, I showed that Thai transnational migrant wives, their practices 
are shaped and constrained by two different socio-cultural gender structures, one 
encountered during the stage of marriage migration decision making in the country of 
origin and the other in their transnational lives in the receiving country. I argue that 
although they cannot escape the constraints of the gender structure, this structure is 
dynamic and dualistic as it can be maneuvered to benefit the actors. However, I also 
showed that Thai migrant women’s experiences are not free from the gender structure 
and traditional gender relationship.  The emergence of deviant gender identity and 
gender relations is my focus here. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
  At the macro level of Giddens’s theoretical framework, it shows that cross 
border marriage migration is the outcome of both First World men’s and Third World 
women’s activities in negotiating and reproducing structures. However, I also use 
Giddens’s duality of structure at the micro level to understand the dynamic nature of 
structure as well as the inseparable relationship between social structure and human 
practices. For Thai migrant wives, after marriage migration, their transnational lives 
are constrained by the various structures, namely the immigration legal structure, 
economic structure and socio-cultural structure in Singapore. In each category, I 
demonstrate that the structure is indeed dynamic as it is constituted through complex 
human activities. The structure could be reproduced to constrain or enable human’s 
practices since each individual has both structural motives and capabilities. These 
structures tend to limit the options and practices of Thai migrant wives as a result of 
gender stereotypes existing within the global capitalist system. Yet, I also show that 
working class women have agency and are knowledgeable about their condition. They 
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rationalize their choices and act in a variety of ways to reproduce, negotiate or 
circumvent the structures. As I argue in this thesis, marriage migration studies must 
venture beyond the discourses of foreign brides viewed merely as working class 
women victimized in positions of subservience .To some extent as I argue in this 
thesis, they have a variety of means to circumvent and renegotiate the structures by 
using the resources available to them in the context of their life situations as Thai 
migrant wives in Singapore.  
 
Chapter 2 
The Dynamic and the Duality 
of Immigration Legal Structure 
 
“In the first place, I thought my life would be more comfortable if I was 
married [to a Singaporean man], but I was wrong. When I came here, I did not get 
any identification cards, I had to lie on the bed for the whole year because my 
husband and I did not have high education” (Mai, 32). 
 
 “Singapore is ruled by Communism, so I dare not to make any decision. 
Unlike in Thailand, I cannot do anything I want here because everything must ask the 
permission from the state. I think my thought and action are limited” (Yim, 34).  
 
The narratives from Mai and Yim showed that their experiences of being 
migrant wives in Singapore differ somewhat from their expectations before migration. 
This is because life after migration is limited by the legal structure in Singapore.  
In this chapter, I apply Giddens’s theory of Structuration to explain that the 
legal structure in Singapore is not the sum total but it is dynamic as it is constituted by 
human social activities capable of creating change  within the system. By using Thai 
migrant wives’ migration experiences, I will show how the legal structure imposes 
restrictions while at the same time enabling Thai migrant wives’ practices. While the 
state and the Singaporean men may possess greater ‘resources’ within the legal 
structure, Thai migrant wives are also knowledgeable actors capable of effecting and 
negotiating this structure. My focus is on this duality of structure in the legal system. I 
will show how Thai migrant wives use resources such as ‘female reproductive power’ 
and ‘transnational socio-cultural network’ available to them in their negotiation with 
other actors to reconstruct, challenge and circumvent the legal structure imposed on 
them. 
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I.  The Dynamic of Immigration Legal Structure: The Ambiguity of 
 Migrant Wives’ PR Entitlement 
 “I find it is difficult to get PR (Permanent Resident). I waited for 5-6 years. 
Not everyone get it easily. It depends on “Heng Suai”1. For me, my pathway is 
unsmooth. I could not get PR because my husband had no money and got low 
salary……..Getting PR is uncertain; some women still cannot get it although they 
have been here for 10 years” (Chin, 43). 
 
Chin’s narrative seems to differ from the immigration laws which specify the 
conditions of PR attainment for migrant wives: after foreign brides register for their 
marriage certificates, they can apply for a Long Term Social Visit Pass (Green Card) 2  
for 3 months, 6 months and 1 year respectively. After holding the LTSVP for 2 years, 
they can apply for permanent residency when 
 (a) she has resided continuously in Singapore for a period of not less than two years 
immediately preceding the date of the application; 
(b) she intends to reside permanently in Singapore; and 
(c) she is of good character. 3 
Subsequently, after being a permanent resident for two years, they are eligible 
to be naturalized as a Singapore citizen. However, the statement from Chin (43) 
shows that the conditions of PR attainment seem to be ambiguous and uncertain in 
relations to migrant women who marry working class local men. They regard the  
attainment of their PR status as a matter of “good or bad luck” rather than a result of 
their legal marriage. In the past, shifting from LTSVP holder to permanent resident 
                                                 
1 For Chin, she uses the word “Heng Suai” as the condition of getting PR. While “Heng” means good 
luck, “Suai” means bad luck. However, in this context “Heng Suai” means the bad operation of 
Singapore bureaucratic process regarding PR entitlement. 
2 LTSVP is for foreigners who visit Singapore for the purpose of social visit or attend short business 
negotiations and discussions who require a longer stay (Source: www.ica.gov.sg). 
3 Source: Singapore Constitution law, Part X Citizenship, Article 123 Citizenship by Registration 
which subject to any woman who is married to a citizen of Singapore. 
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for Thai migrant wives was definite and simple regardless of wives and husbands’ 
qualifications. The state granted permanent resident to migrant wives as long as they 
are legally married to Singaporean men. This was supported by the findings from  my 
focus groups discussion. From my participants who had married Singaporean men 
during the 1980s and 1990s, I found that they had achieved their PR status within 6 
months of their marriage although their husbands have low educational levels and low 
income (See also: Table 6).  Recently married Thai women however found that this 
condition of two years residency does not assure the successful approval of their 
permanent resident applications. There are some migrant wives who can achieve PR 
status faster, some slower and some not at all although they have the same 
qualifications, particularly those who married working class men in Singapore. 
 The ambiguity and uncertainty of PR entitlement show the dynamic of 
immigration legal structure as it is reproduced by the actors’ motives and practices. In 
the phenomena of cross border marriage migration, I point out 3 significant actors 
namely the state, the Singaporean husband and the Thai migrant wife who have their 
own structural resources to negotiate with other actors and have capabilities to 
reconstruct, change and challenge the legal structure all the time. The enabling and 
constraining qualities of the legal structure in regards to the Thai migrant wives’ 
practices depend on each actor’s structural motives and capacities. 
 
1.  The Reconstruction of Legal Structure by the State Actor   
The first actor that constitutes the legal structure is the ‘state’. The state actor 
encompasses other institutional actors instantiated in the form of Member of 
Parliaments, immigration authorities, law makers, armed forces, civil service, courts, 
police and so on.  These state actors have political resources (sovereignty) to construct 
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and implement rules and laws that could enable and constrain the rights and freedom 
of the people within the state territory. 
The state’s immigration laws and policies on PR are designed in part to 
facilitate the immigration of foreign brides in Singapore. For the migrant wives, the 
successful achievement of PR status meant that these women could reside in 
Singapore permanently and more importantly, enjoy almost the same rights as the 
citizens such as government subsidies of medical services, education and public 
housing. From a demographic standpoint, institutional actors of the Singapore state 
tend to view cross border marriage between Singaporean men and foreign brides as 
the solution of a falling birth rate leading to a potential lack of human resource.  It 
seems that granting PR to these migrant wives benefits both the state and the women 
themselves. However, the legal structure is not only employed by the state to facilitate 
the influx of foreign brides, it is also manipulated  to constrain the practices of these 
migrant wives. As Nonini (1997, p.324) assert, “Diasporas, like any cultural 
formations, are grounded in internal hegemonies and systems of inequalities. The 
power associated with diasporas mobility can be coercive, subversive of exiting 
structures or both, depending on whether these powers promote capitalist and/or 
state interests”. By this I draw on Ong’s (1999) concept of “graduated sovereignty”, 
to shows that the motivation of state actors’ practices to reproduce social orders or 
transform immigration legal structures (Parreñas 2005, p.5) by placing different level 
of constraint or enabling along the classification of foreign brides embedded in the 
economic rationalities of globalization.  
The authorities in Singapore impose a wide range of legal constraints on the 
categories of acceptable marriage partners and places tight control over citizenship 
rights of the Singaporean men’s foreign spouse. As Ong (1999, p.215-216) explains, 
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the state has introduced elements of “graduated sovereignty” to meet the challenges of 
globalization by subjecting different parts of the population to different forms of 
controls and rights.  Because Singapore experience a large transnational flow of 
people (Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000), it manages the transnational mobility of 
immigrant by placing potential applicants through a highly selective process 
implemented by its immigration laws and policies. The rationale for this highly 
selective process is in line with the state’s strategy of ‘gathering global talent’ and 
‘making Singapore a cosmopolitan city’ (Prime Minister God Chok Tong, quoted in 
The Straits Times 30 August 1997; Yeoh, Huang & Willis 2000, p. 151; Thomspon & 
Zhang n.d.). As such, it aims ideally to absorb only foreign talent or expatriates as PR. 
However, this is not possible since most of the blue collar jobs in Singapore are taken 
up by individuals with lower educational background from the surrounding 
developing countries such as Bangladesh and Thailand. There is therefore a need for 
two distinct sets of immigration laws and policies for these foreigners. Ong calls this 
“flexible citizenship” or different levels of citizenship rights. In Singapore, foreign 
talent achieve permanent residence or citizenship4 easily while workers of a less 
talented nature, known also as guest workers receive  only transient status such as 
work permit. However, there is a new phenomenon for the Singapore government to 
consider. Foreign brides from developing countries with low educational levels and 
skills have become a major trend in immigration patterns recently. Ng (2005, p.106) 
explains that in the context of the most dominant and pervasive ideology of economic 
imperative, “female talent” is the only group which could be regarded as contributing 
to the advancement of women in Singapore while excluding low skilled migrant 
                                                 
4 In 2007, Singapore welcomed 63,600 Permanent Residents (PRs) and 17,300 new citizens. By 
comparison, just 760 more babies were born. So As Deputy Prime Minister Wong Kan Seng urged 
Singaporeans to open their “doors, minds and heart for those who are capable and talented will go to 
places with better opportunities and where they feel warm welcomed” (Today, 28 February 2008). 
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women. As such, privileged treatment is given to high-income, skilled, educated 
immigrant women while the immigration of foreign brides from developing countries 
has to be controlled stringently. These foreign brides from developing countries  are 
considered as migrants who do not fit into  the state immigration policy of creating an 
“oasis of talent”. Besides, the transnational flow of non-elite migrant wives is 
stigmatized under gender stereotypes that they are assumed to be dependent on the 
Singaporean men (Piper & Roces 2003, p.15). These migrant wives are perceived as 
women who cannot contribute to the economic growth and hence become a burden to 
the state. Therefore, the state exercises its power in the immigration legal structure by 
using permanent residency entitlement as the instrument for grading migrant wives 
and placing constraints on practices of these working class foreign brides.  
The state grades the migrant wives as follows: migrant wives who are 
naturalized citizens are at the top of the hierarchy and do not have to renew their 
visas. This category is followed by permanent residents who have almost the same 
rights and privileges as citizens if they are employed while full-time housewives must 
rely on their husband’s for the visa renewal. For those who are of the non-PR status 
and hold the LTSVP, they can live and work in Singapore for a substantial period but 
must constantly renew their visas. Unlike permanent residents, their rights are very 
limited as they are not allowed to work unless they had applied for a work permit. For 
Thai migrant wives who still have no legal or PR status and enter on tourist visit pass 
with their marriage registration, they only have rights to re-enter the country as often 
as they want and can extend their visas to stay in Singapore for a longer period than 
normal tourists to Singapore do5. Therefore, they can come to Singapore without any 
worries unlike other Thai women who are prohibited to come to Singapore too often 
                                                 
5 Normally, Thai women are given a limited period of stay as a tourist in Singapore for 2 weeks to a 
month. 
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and are detained at immigration checkpoint. However, their residency rights are 
limited as they can only reside in Singapore for a short period of time and must go 
back and forth between Thailand and Singapore.  
For the following part, I will demonstrate how the certain institutional actors 
within the state, namely the immigration authorities, are flexible in their management 
of sovereignty and their manipulation of the immigration legal structure to grade 
migrant wives in their PR attainment. Here, the state enables selected migrant wives 
to enjoy rights as local women while working class migrant women are disadvantaged 
by traditional gender and class stereotypes as they are graded at the bottom rung of 
the state hierarchal structure of citizenship through a consideration of the 
qualifications of these migrant wives and their Singaporean husband’s qualifications. 
 
1.1  The Constraint of Legal Structure by State Actor: The Classification of 
Migrant Wives by Women’s Qualification  
Since the condition of two years of residence in Singapore does not guarantee 
the eligibility of PR attainment, the state immigration authorities have legitimate 
power to be selective in giving PR status to foreign brides. One of the criteria used to 
select migrant wives for PR is the qualification of migrant wife. First, by considering 
their education qualification, foreign spouses with highly recognized education 
attainment such as university degrees receive their PR status in less than 2 years.  
Many Thai educated migrant wives are able to achieve their PR status within 3 
months while those who have poorly educated have to wait at least or longer than the 
stipulated 2 years.  
Apart from education attainment, the condition (c) as shown earlier is that she 
is of good character. In terms of good character, her background is considered for her 
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PR approval. The immigration officers consider the records of any unlawful conduct 
as the main criteria to judge their moral/immoral character. For example, Nam (33), is 
a migrant wife whom the immigration authorities judged as lacking good character. 
Nam is still a LTSVP holder although she has been in Singapore for six years and is a 
mother of her Singaporean child. Nam said that the reason might be because she was 
caught overstaying when she was working illegally as a sex worker in Singapore.  
Thus, her PR status is not approved and she has been treated since as an alien wife6. 
Another example is the case of Mod (34), who is unable to get PR because she held 
the wrong type of work permit in the past. Before marrying a Singaporean man, Mod 
worked as a sex worker and met her Singaporean husband at her workplace. Initially, 
her Singaporean husband, a senior engineer in a leading company here brought her to 
Singapore under the foreign domestic worker work permit because he had no 
intention of marrying her at that time. Even though she was not married to him, she 
lived together with him and he continually renewed her work permit. However, she 
found herself pregnant unexpectedly. She was required to deliver her child in 
Thailand7 as the immigration office in Singapore rejected the renewal of her work 
permit and the doctor in the Singapore hospital told her to deliver the child in 
Thailand. After giving birth to a girl in Thailand, her husband wanted to marry her to 
reunite the family but as it turns out, he was told by the immigration authority in 
Singapore that he could not apply a PR for her although they had registered their 
                                                 
6 With the new immigration laws, foreign spouse who hold LTSVP can work under work permit. 
Luckily, Nam’s husband knows someone who can assist her to get a job and she also can speak Malay 
and English fluently. Thus, now she works as a cook in a hotel. She hopes that being work permit 
holder, she will be eligible to receive PR in the near future. 
7 Source: Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (Chapter 91A), Conditions of Work Permit/Visit Pass 
for Foreign Worker: Fourth Schedule, Conduct 9. “The female foreign worker shall not become 
pregnant or deliver any child in Singapore during the validity of her Work Permit/Visit pass”. 
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marriage in Thailand8. Because of the nature of her previous work as a domestic 
worker in Singapore, the state grades her at the bottom rung of its flexible citizenship 
hierarchy and restricts her to marry any Singaporean men legally in Singapore. 
However, her husband decided to buy a house for Mod and their daughter in Phuket9 
so that he can at least fly back and forth to visit them.  
The above cases show that immigration laws and policies depends on the 
reflexivity of the state institutional actors in constructing them to allow or impede the 
legal status of foreign brides according to its structural functional motives. The state 
uses its legitimate power to grade foreign migrant wives for PR entitlement by 
considering the women’s qualifications which discriminates women of lower class 
orientations. Domestic workers who are considered as lower in the class structure are 
not spared either. In this manner, women with low education and skill-levels are 
assumed as non-economic contributors and thus constrained by the legal structure to 
wait longer and harder for their PR status if they are at all eligible for it. Additionally, 
those with previous offence records are totally restricted from PR considerations as 
they are considered as lacking of good character to become a Singaporean or any 
Singaporean’s wife. 
 
1.2  The Constraint of Legal Structure by State Actor: The Classification of 
Migrant Wives by Husband’s Qualification  
                                                 
8 Singapore’s immigration policies and employment practices restrict domestic workers’ reproductive, 
marriage, and sexual rights. Singapore’s immigration policies prohibit migrant domestic workers from 
marrying or cohabiting with Singaporean citizens or permanent residents. Domestic workers may spend 
years working in Singapore, and despite finding partners, are unable to exercise their right to marry a 
Singaporean unless they move to another country (See also: Employment of Foreign Manpower 
Act(Chapter 91A), Conditions of Work Permit/Visit Pass for Foreign Worker: Fourth Schedule) 
(Source: www.hrw.org/reports/2005/singapore1205/6.htm). 
9 Phuket, a province in Southern part of Thailand is the top destination among tourists.  
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 Apart from the migrant wives’ qualifications, the state also considers the 
husband’s qualifications in their entitlement for PR status. As such, the migration of 
women from developing countries is discriminated on gender grounds because these 
migrant wives are perceived as their husbands’ dependants/followers. Thus, the state 
must ensure that a husband must have enough capability to provide for her financially 
or they will become a problem for the state.  
 As a result, the state check on their husbands’ wealth to ensure that they have 
the financial capability to support their foreign brides by scrutinizing  their Central 
Provident Fund (CPF) contributions and their income tax payments10. The state will 
generally approve the PR applications of those whose husband have been continually 
paying their CPF contributions and income taxes. On the contrary, the state will 
suspend those migrant wives’ PR status if (1) their husbands never or lacked the 
capability to contribute to their CPF or income tax; or (2) if their husbands’ incomes 
are under the prescribed mark; or (3) if their husbands are bankrupt; or (4) if their 
husbands are too old (older than 55 years old) and had already taken their CPF funds 
out. As such, class discrimination do not just end with the migrant wives but their 
Singaporean husbands are also subjected to same stringent control of the state. 
Migrant women who are unskilled and marry  working class men then have more 
difficulties, fewer chances and have to wait longer for their PR as opposed to those 
who marry professional/upper and middle class Singaporeans.  
 However, if their husbands are completely unqualified through a lack of 
income on their part to apply for their wives’ PR status, the state will alternatively 
force the migrant wives to engage in wage labor as a prerequisite for achieving their 
                                                 
10  To apply for Permanent Residency, sponsor’s Income Tax Notice of Assessment for the last 3 years 
and Sponsor’s CPF statement showing monthly CFF contribution for the last 12 moths must be 
produced (Source: www.ica.gov.sg). 
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PR or citizenship. For example, Kim (33) was obliged by the state authorities to prove 
that she can support herself financially before giving her a PR status. Kim who 
graduated from Primary 4 in Thailand used to be sex worker in Hat Yai; where she 
met her husband, a 55 years old Chinese Singaporean who is a freelance musician. 
She had been married to him for 3 years since. 
 
“I cannot get PR because my husband has never reported his monthly income, 
so he is so-called unemployed, in fact my husband already has everything, house and 
car.  After marriage, he begun to contribute to CPF but it’s too late11. The 
government wants me to work under work permit and prove that I can survive by 
myself then I will get PR. In the past, I never worked I just stayed at home, helped my 
husband carry musical instruments when he had performance. I never look for a job 
because I thought that my family does not have any financial problems. But when I 
tried to apply for PR, ICA (Immigration Checkpoint Authority) rejected my 
application. Then, I also applied through Member of Parliament but I still could not 
get it. Then, ICA said that I’d better have a child, but it is impossible because my 
husband has been already old and got diabetes. Recently, I renewed my LTSVP, and 
ICA told me that I have to work because ICA will not renew my LTSVP anymore. 
Therefore, they told me to find a job and issued a letter allowing me to work under 
work permit so that I can apply for PR later on. 
When I work here [a cloth shop at Golden Mile Complex], I am very worn out 
because it is a long hour work. I prefer to stay with my husband at home. I have to 
leave home since 8.30 a.m. and finish at 9 p.m. I arrive home around 10 p.m. I feel 
that I do not have time for my husband. I feel pity him because he is already old. Yet, 
my husband encourages me that I have to endure and he will find a way to open a 
small shop so that I can help him and if he owns business, he can apply PR for me in 
three years” 
 
For Kim’s case, the state requires her to work to prove that she can support 
herself financially and will not be a burden to the state since her husband is deemed 
legally as not being able to provide for her financial security.  However, for Kim, 
working under a work permit put her in a vulnerable and disadvantaged position 
because she gets less pay and has to work for long hours. Besides, she wants to be a 
full-time housewife rather than a work permit wage worker. Although the state allows 
                                                 
11 To apply for PR for spouse of a Singapore citizen, “CPF contribution history” for the last 12 months, 
and sponsor’s and applicant’s (if applicable) Income Tax Notices of Assessment for the last 3 years 
which it is prohibited to contribute CPF retrospectively (Source: www.ica.gov.sg). 
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Kim to work, she is unable to receive equal pay as other PR women get12. Kim’s 
experiences show the ambiguities and uncertainties of immigration policies regarding 
PR entitlement. Under the strategy of ‘flexible citizenship’, the state selectively places 
constrains on the freedoms of these migrant wives’ practices from a case to case basis. 
The dynamic legal structure here can be understood as the product of the Singapore 
state’s practices based on economic rationality and gender discrimination. 
 In the following part, I will focus my discussion on  the ‘Singaporean 
husband’, a principal actor who also uses the legal structure to enable and constrain 
the migrant wife in regards to her PR status. 
 
2.  The Constraint of Legal Structure by Husband Actor 
In this section, I argue that the Singaporean husband has structural power to 
allow or prevent the authorization of their migrant wife’s PR by the state. In this 
respect, being legally married does not automatically give a migrant wife her PR 
status. Migrant wives must rely on their husbands to proceed with their PR 
applications. The state rationalizes its legitimization of such a practice based on 
gender stereotypes that migrant women are their husband’s dependents as well as to 
prevent foreign brides from exploiting the local Singaporean men13. Hence, by giving 
this power to the Singapore men, the state can prevent to some extent any possible 
intentions of exploitation from the foreign brides as their husbands have the power to 
                                                 
12 The minimum wage for PR women is 50 SGD/day while non-PR women get less than 50 SGD/day. 
13 In Singapore, public discourse of foreign wives can be found in daily media such as “Foreign brides 
marry Singapore men with ulterior motives, such as for money or just to get permanent residency or 
citizenship”. Some local lady appealed the government to protect local men to find foreign brides by 
"Why not give a large bonus to the men who marry local spouses, like the national-service allowance 
or baby bonus?” (Sources: http://www.littlespeck.com) 
/content/lifestyle/Ctrends/Lifestyple021126.htm). Associate Professor Paulin Straughan also pointed 
out public discourse of foreign wives in Singapore “We think that these women are here to exploit our 
men, they’re just here to take their money and run off, you should have a few cases like this, but on the 
other hand you also have women who feel this is the best chance for them to get out of a poverty cycle 
and help their families back home” (Source: Channel News Asia, 13 November 2005). 
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regulate their migrant wives’ financial and legal security. However, as long as they 
remain a non-PR, their continued presences in Singapore render them vulnerable to 
abuse, discrimination and exploitation by their Singaporean husbands (Ng 2005; 
Association of Women for Action and Research 2007).   
Thus, the Singaporean husband has the legal structural power and his practices 
results in the enabling or constraining of the immigration laws and policies on their 
migrant wives. There are some cases of Thai women who are still non-PRs since their 
husbands never proceed with their PR application. Nim, a 42 undocumented 
hairdresser laments, “I come to Singapore by stamp in and stamp out. I can come here 
one month and renew one month, then I have to go back and reenter again. I cannot 
get LTSVP, the ICA letter said that they cannot give me LTSVP because of my 
husband lack of qualification. My husband does not want to ask help from Member of 
Parliament. He does not make enough effort because he has low education and is 
already old. I see my friend whose husband does not do any jobs, but she still can get 
PR. Compare to my husband, who  never make an effort, so, I do not know what I can 
do. Everyone who has problem will see MP, but he never does that. When I first come 
here, I planned to open a barber shop with my friends. However, since I am not PR, 
now I only wait until Golden Mile close then I will go back to Thailand permanently 
because I cannot work in Singapore anymore”. Nim’s case shows that her practices 
are restricted by the legal structure which is a result of her husband’s practices. Thus, 
a migrant wife’s PR entitlement is subject to her husband’s practices and motives.  In 
some cases, when the husbands’ incomes are below that of the  requirement for PR 
applications, these men are eager to do extra works to raise their salaries so that they 
can contribute to their CPF funds in order to be eligible to apply PR for their wives.  
Guk (28) is able to achieve her PR status because of her husband’s endeavor: “If my 
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husband did not work overtime, I could not get PR quickly. His salary is only 1,200 
SGD and got only 900 SGD left after paying CPF. So, he had to get up since 5 a.m. to 
increase his pay to 2,000 and got 1700-1800 left after pay CPF, which is eligible to 
apply PR for me.  
Nonetheless, there are also some husbands who never apply PR status for their 
wives as they are afraid that their wives will run away once they have some form of 
legal independence. For these women, they have no other choice but to endure and 
stay with their husbands. It shows that the Singapore husband is a knowledgeable 
agent who has structural motives and can reflexively use his structural resources to 
negotiate and reconstruct the legal structure in order to constrain or enable their wives 
practices. For example, the Singaporean husband has legal structural power from the 
state to restrict or permit the applications of their Thai migrant wives’ PR status 
according to his personal motives. 
Thai migrant wives encounter the dynamic legal structure in the forms of the 
state and their Singaporean husbands. Both the state and their husbands are 
knowledgeable actors who possess structural powers and motives to manipulate the 
immigration legal structure in constraining the migrant wives’ practices. In the 
following part, I will explain the consequences of the legal structural constraints on 
these Thai migrant wives. 
 
3.  The Consequences on Thai Migrant Wives’ Activities under the 
Reconstructed Legal Structure 
3.1 Wives’ Identities are Tied to Husbands 
“When I got PR, I feel less scared. I feel like I almost get drowned when I 
have no PR.  If my husband died and I still have no PR, it would make everything 
worse than now because I cannot work and it will be difficult and troublesome to seek 
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help from government because the government will not help me immediately” (Buo, 
42). 
 
The statement from Buo shows that due to the legal constrains, she lacks a 
sense of independence and security as her identities of citizen, worker, and self are 
overshadowed by her primary gender roles of dependent wife (Ng 2005). To put it 
simply, her identity is that of her husband’s dependent and must completely rely on 
her husband for any legal and economic securities. 
During the time when migrant wives are void of any PR status, they suffer 
“existential angst”, namely they feel anxious and insecure about their status and 
cannot make independent choices regarding their own identities and roles . Many Thai 
women feel insecure and unconfident about their identities when they arrive at Golden 
Mile Complex14 and see that other Thai women are able to work while they are 
restricted to do. As a result, Thai women with LTSVP (green card) holder status see 
themselves as a person who is permitted to stay in Singapore for 6 months or one 
year but can do nothing” and their legal status is analogous with the Thai saying, “Ma 
Tae Tuo, Pai Tae tuo” (when you come with the empty hand, you leave with the 
empty hand). This represents the status of being constrained as an “alien” when they 
are non-PRs and is regarded only as a dependent wife. As Yim, a 34 years old Thai 
migrant wife, recalls her experience of being LTSVP holder when she felt that her 
only identity is tied to her husband  and the domestic realm “……at that time I wanted 
to help my husband’s business (a drink stall in a primary school canteen) to ease my 
boredom and loneliness. But, whenever I went to that shop, I had to bring mother in 
law along and was unable to stand in front of the shop. I had to stay behind the shop 
because teachers in the school said that I was unable to work, and they always 
                                                 
14 Golden Mile Complex is the gathering place for Thai people in Singapore. It is the place where sell 
Thai products in various Thai style shops. Majority of people who work here are Thai speaker which 
are Malaysian who can speak Thai or those who have PR and work permit. 
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questioned me that I was a maid rather than the owner’s wife. Ultimately, when I got 
PR, I sensed that I obtain the freedom to work and dared to stand in the public again 
without any concerns. Now, I enjoy my work and I am the only person who is 
responsible for the shop and I dare to talk to customers, and tease students”.   
 Because their identities are generally tied to their husbands, I found that 
migrant women who are in the bottom rung of the flexible citizenship hierarchy are 
women who live without their Singaporean husband for most of the time. Although 
the rights of these Thai migrant wives who hold tourist visas are very limited as they 
need to go back and forth between Thailand and Singapore, they are still less 
restricted than those who are divorced and widowed. Nim (42), a Thai migrant wife 
who enters the country by tourist visa and needs to go back every two months 
confirms this: “When I lived in Thailand, my life was very poverty-stricken. In the 
past, I had no saving and money remittance, I spent every penny for day-to-day living. 
However, my life has improved since I come here. In the past, my income still cannot 
afford my home rental. But, because I have my husband and he has a home, I can live 
with him, no need to spend money on home rental. So, I can work here and earn 
money to remit to my parents 10,000 baht per month”. 
Nim felt that she was still luckier than wives who are LTSVP holder and had 
already divorced their Singaporean husbands. Non-PR divorcees who never worked 
before and had never contributed to the CPF fund are in the lowest rung of the flexible 
citizenship hierarchy. When their marriages fail; they can no longer stay in 
Singapore15 (Ng 2005) and must go back to Thailand permanently. They have no 
eligible right to appeal for legal aid in divorce proceedings as it is available only for 
Singapore citizens and permanent residents (Ng 2005, p.103). So, they tend to end 
                                                 
15 In case of divorce, migrant women can guarantee themselves by employment or their Singaporean 
children who are older than 21 years old must guarantee them. 
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their marriage by going back to Thailand permanently rather than proceeding with 
some forms of lawsuit. As they lack the language skills to communicate with 
authorities as well as support from their kins and communities, they cannot access any 
forms of help from the state and cannot afford to hire any lawyer to petition the 
divorce decision. Besides, divorcees who have PR status but are unemployed and 
have never contributed to the CPF fund are also vulnerable because if their ex-
husband remarry, their PR will be cancelled automatically. In these cases, these 
migrant women have no other choice except returning to Thailand since their 
Singaporean husbands cannot have two foreign wives at the same time.  
 
3.2 Being Confined in Domestic Sphere 
“……at this point, what I am afraid most is I cannot work because I’m already 
old and still have no savings. If I live in Thailand I can do some jobs, but in 
Singapore I can do nothing and the money that I got from my husband is not enough” 
(Kai, 38).  
 
Kai’s narrative is one of the several complaints of the Thai migrant wives 
towards the legal structure in which being LTSVP holders, their rights and choices in 
Singapore are limited. Many Thai foreign brides who married working class 
Singaporean men take marriage migration as a means to get a job in Singapore so that 
they can earn money to improve their socio-economic status. Nonetheless, the state 
does not view their employment as their primary needs and make it quite inconvenient 
for them to find work. Although the state allows foreign wives to work under a work 
permit16, many Thai migrant wives are still unable to get paid jobs because they lack 
                                                 
16 Foreign spouses of Singaporeans need not apply for a LTSVP with ICA, before being eligible for 
work permits. This would make it administratively easier for them to get a work permit (Source: 
www.mom.gov.sg). 
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of the necessary language skills as well as the education qualifications17. They can 
only be un-skilled workers and there are only limited types of jobs that they can do.  
However, Thai women generally do not want to work under the work permit as 
employers generally prefer to hire PR women due to the limitations of foreign 
employee quota and they are required to pay monthly levy fees of SGD240 which is 
docked from their salaries. Thus, they would be inclined to become full-time 
housewives or illegal workers because working under a work permit means nothing 
for most of these Thai migrant wives.  
When migrant wives are prohibited to work in the public domain, they confine 
themselves at home and this made them feel more isolated. These migrant wives 
generally feel isolated and lonely because they are confronted by language barriers 
which restrict them from building any meaningful relationships with their neighbors. 
Most of them also live in the typical Singaporean “HDB” flat (The Housing and 
Development Board) where people “tend” to concern only with their own affairs and 
are reluctant to involve  themselves with the activities of other fellow flat dwellers 
(Phan 2007).  This puts the migrant wives in a situation of being confined and isolated 
in a “square” room within the domestic sphere. Mai describes her sufferings in the 
early stages of life in Singapore: “During the time I didn’t have PR, I just lie on the 
bed for the whole year; I did nothing in a square room. I felt weary and lack of 
freedom. My life was repeated. What I did and ate, I had to do it again and again. I 
could not do other things” (Mai, 32). 
“For me, the longer I live in Singapore the more crazy I will be. One day has 
24 hours; I don’t know what to do. I only count time passing by minutes, hours, days. 
                                                 
17 Foreign spouses of Singaporean can work under an S Pass or Employment Pass instead of applying 
for a work permits. However, any application for an S Pass or Employment Pass would be assessed 





I could not do other activities. I don’t understand the TV shows. I see the same movie 
again and again until I get sick of it. I only sleep and eat in the square room. When I 
go outside, I cannot understand what people are talking about. I do not get used to the 
food. I have to endure to stay here. I think that in next two years if I still cannot get 
PR, I will go back to Thailand because it is useless to stay still”(Kai, 38). 
   
 The effects from legal structural constraints limit them to their domestic 
domains and they soon developed a sense of restriction and confinement that make 
them feel more oppressed. 
 
3.3 Being Confined in Singapore 
The geographical proximity between Singapore and Thailand should be an 
advantage for Thai migrant wives who could easily visit their natal homes to feel a 
sense of emotional closeness with their families and make them feel less isolated (Cai 
2003).  Nonetheless, because of the ambiguities concerning the requirements of their 
PR entitlement, they confined themselves to Singapore  during the period of waiting 
for their PR status to be confirmed and this often proves to be a miserable period for 
Thai migrant wives. A prevalent misperception among Thai migrant wives is that 
home visit would imply the intention to live transiently in Singapore which then 
caused the postponement of their PR status approval. As such, many Thai migrant 
wives choose to confine themselves in Singapore because they assumed that they will 
get their PR easier if they do not go out of the country. In fact, immigration laws18 in 
Singapore never specify that the frequencies of home visits could be an indicator of an 
intention of not wanting to live in Singapore or wanting to leave the country 
However, with limited language skills, they dare not enquire this fact from the 
immigration officers. Among my informants, I found that in the beginning of 
migration, they often visit their homes as one of the significant adaptation strategies. 
                                                 
18 Source: Singapore Constitutional Law, Part X Citizenship, Article 123 Citizenship by Registration.   
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However, when they cannot achieve their PR status after some time, they dare not go 
back  home as they think that that is the result of their frequent  home visits. As some 
of these migrant wives explain: 
 “In the first place, going home is one of my adaptation, but now I realize that 
I cannot go home frequently because I know what I should do to gain PR” (Daeng, 
21). 
“Last year I often go home, so I still cannot get PR. This year I try not go 
home (Kai, 38)”. 
“When I have just married, I have not had any cards yet. I cannot go home; 
otherwise, it will be difficult to get PR (Orn, 29)”. 
“When I had no PR, I was very weary. I missed my father but I could not go 
home (Guk, 28)”. 
 
Notably, this self-assumed false belief is only prevalent among working class 
Thai migrant wives as they are normally face a waiting period of more than 2 years to 
receive their PR status. 
 
3.4 The Consequence on Thai Pregnant Women  
 The state also use its legitimate power to regulate the practices of migrant 
pregnant women, especially Thai migrant wives who are classified by the state as 
“lacking of good conduct” due to their previous outlaw records. The constraint over 
women’s practices appears in the experiences of Thai women during their pregnancy. 
For instance, many Thai migrant pregnant wives who were domestic worker 
previously or were detained/caught in Singapore had their visa renewal rejected by the 
immigration officers and are declined by the doctors in the Singapore hospitals to 
deliver their child. Likewise, Nam, a 33 years old women, from the central part of 
Thailand recounted the time when the state placed constraints on her when she wanted 
to deliver her child in Singapore: “At that time, ICA forced me to give birth in 
Thailand by denying the renewal of my LTSVP. I was still unsure about the reason, 
but I guess it is because I was arrested for the charge of overstay, so they dare not 
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allow my kid to have Singapore citizenship automatically”. This particular state’s 
practice makes migrant woman feel very insecure about her and her child’s legal 
status as her husband must bring them back to Singapore and guarantee that their 
child is indeed legitimate. Emotionally, it makes her feel more frustrated as her 
husband’s physical and emotional support is important for her during her pregnancy. 
Ironically, Nam used this chance to control her reproductive body by doing tubal 
ligation without asking permission from her husband because she already has 2 sons 
with her ex-husbands and did not want to have anymore children beyond the birth of 
her third child. It is fortunate for Nam since her husband was responsible enough to 
bring them back to Singapore and certified his daughter’s status there. As such, her 
daughter achieves dual Thai-Singaporean citizen. Nam however is still unable to get 
her PR and currently holds a LTSVP.  
In sum, the legal structure, particularly in reference to PR attainment 
significantly affects Thai migrant wives’ transnational lives because it enables them to 
achieve secure legal, socio-economic status to live in the country permanently and to  
work in Singapore in order to accumulate wealth to remit money back to their left 
behinds. However, Thai migrant wives’ migration experiences also show that as 
working class migrant wives, they suffer from the dynamic legal structure that is the 
outcome of the actors’ activities which has individual structural motives and 
capacities to reconstruct the legal structure and place constraints on their activities. I 
have focused on the activities of the state and Singapore husband in which the state 
practices flexible citizenship to classify transnational migrant wives and selectively 
places constraints or enables their practices according to economic rationality and 
gender norms. The Singapore state gives rights and benefits to talented migrant wives 
or wives of skilled Singapore husband while selectively constrains the working class 
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women. For the Singaporean husbands, they have legitimate structural power as they 
can choose to give or not give their migrant wives financial and legal security. 
Therefore, working class migrant wives are in a doubly disadvantaged positions 
discriminated by class and gender inequality.  
However, Giddens’s duality of structure (1984) also shows that people’s 
capacities, like those of these migrant wives are not completely constrained by 
structure or norms. Thus, I will also focus on the agencies of these Thai migrant 
wives. I will show that although their activities are restricted by the legal structure, 
Thai migrant wives possess the resources to challenge, change and circumvent these 
legal constraints in order to survive in this transnational space. 
 
II. The Duality of Legal Structure Women’s agency: Negotiating, 
Challenging and Circumventing against Legal Structure 
In the phenomena of cross border marriage migration, we cannot only view 
migrant women from developing countries as passive actors or victims but also as 
active agents. These migrant wives possess their own structural resources which is 
used to negotiate with other actors and to reconstruct the legal structure to enable their 
opportunities and practices. I will demonstrate the migration lived experience of Thai 
women in Singapore to illustrate that they do not simply surrender to the legal 
structure or voluntarily act within the constraints. Rather, they are reflexive actors that 
are able to negotiate and maneuver within the immigration legal structure through the 
use of their available structural resources.  
1. Women’s agency: The Negotiation between the Actors: Migrant Wife, 
Husband and State Actors 
 “Although my husband has absolute power which I must rely on him for legal 
document and financial status, it is only in the public domain. I am a foreign migrant 
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who come with one luggage, but I am clever to use the power that I have. I take care 
of my husband for everything, for instance, if I said his cloth is not nice, he will not 
wear at all. I think I have more power at home. When I have a fight with him, I always 
threaten that I will divorce. My husband cannot prohibit me from what I want. If I 
want to work part-time, he must allow me. I said that I want to earn money, if he 
cannot help me, he has no rights to disallow me (Mai, 32)”. 
   
 As I have discussed earlier, structures are not static but dynamic as they are 
made up of actors who posses ‘resources’ and operate with the power to negotiate 
with other actors and constitute/reconstitute the structure for constraining or enabling 
practices. Although the legal structure constrains migrant wives to completely rely on 
their husbands, it operates only in the public arena.  Like Mai(32),  Thai migrant 
wives also posses various kinds of ‘female’ labor resources (sex, reproduction, 
domestic work, romance, love, companionship so on) which they reflexively use to 
negotiate with other actors to reproduce structures that could enable  their practices. 
 I found that there are many Thai migrant wives who use their female 
reproductive resources to gain PR faster, namely having a Singaporean child to get 
their PR status approved by the state. From my informants’ accounts, the state 
(Immigration authorities) will suggest  those Thai migrant wives who have difficulty 
in achieving their PR status because of their husband’s qualifications to have a baby 
to facilitate the process19.  For example, Kim (33) whose husband never contributed 
to the CPF fund or paid any income tax before was advised to have a baby. 
Unfortunately, she is unable to use this method as her husband has diabetes. However, 
having a child is the recommended strategy among those who have problems with 
their PR attainment. This shows that Thai women reflexively negotiate with the state 
to change the legal structure’s constraints with the use of their female reproductive 
                                                 
19 I found that there are many Thai migrant women who attempt to get pregnant as they misapprehend 
that they will definitely achieve PR. In fact, having a baby in order to gain PR faster is only applicable 
for those who already register for marriage certificate and those who do not have any illegal record or 
used to work as domestic worker in Singapore before. 
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powers,  hence satisfying the state’s demand for more human resource20 in exchange 
of her legal security. Singapore, as with most developed countries in Asia, has a major 
problem in declining birth rates and seeks to extensively boost its birth rates through 
various family planning schemes21. As such, the state is inclined to act favorably on 
those who can produce the much needed human resource which is scarce in the 
country. 
Conversely, there are many Thai women who refuse to have baby in exchange 
of legal security. This might be because they view work as their priority and 
childrearing might impede them from performing any forms of paid employment 
since they have no relatives to help look after their babies and cannot afford to hire 
nanny. Some Thai migrant wives complained that they feel insecure in their marriages 
so without kids, they are able to leave their husband anytime. There are however other 
cases like Guk (28) as well: “my daughter also asks me not to be pregnant again.  So 
I decided that I will not have another kid because I love my daughter very much. I can 
give her everything that she wants. My husband does not know that I take 
contraception pill because I am afraid that he will hate my daughter”. Guk refused to 
use her reproductive resource to have a baby in exchange of her legal security since 
she prioritizes her role as a loving mother to her daughter.  However, Guk 
alternatively uses other forms of her available female labor resources (sex, domestic 
work, romance, love, companionship and so on) to negotiate with her husband in 
                                                 
20 Singapore needs 50,000 yearly new born to sustain Singapore’s economy and to meet defense and 
manpower needs (Source: “Let the 'Forgotten Class' bring in their foreign brides” The  Straits Times, 
31 October 1999). 
21 The substantial schemes are Baby Bonus which between 2001 and 2004, the cash gift was $500 per 
year for a couple’s second child, and $1000 per year for a couple’s third child; there was also a co-
savings component where the state would match parents’ savings in a special fund for education, up to 
$6000 for a couple’s second child and $12000 for a couple’s third child, over a period of six years. 




order to reproduce the structure that would enable her legal security. Guk (28) who 
turn to love as an alternative means asserts that: “If my husband did not work 
overtime, I could not get PR quickly. ………. I knew my husband loves me, but he also 
make me feel bored. He takes care of me in everything, buy me everything that I want, 
but he never gives me the happiness that I wish for”.  Because he loves his wife, 
Guk’s husband attempts to work harder and longer to make his salary meet the 
requirements for  CPF contribution so that he will be eligible to apply PR for her. In 
this case, it shows that women are also active agents who have female structural 
capacities to negotiate with the state and their husbands until they ultimately achieve 
their PR status.. 
 Besides, there are some cases where Thai women not only negotiate with their 
husbands but through their husband also manage to negotiate with the state to enable 
her PR attainment. Chin (43), whose husband never contributed to the CPF or pay 
income tax managed to achieve her PR status eventually. Chin’s husband tried to 
appeal through the Member of Parliament22 (an institutional actor of the state) in 
various constituencies until she received PR in his forth attempt through a Member of 
Parliament from another constituency. Chin’s case is a  good example of 3 
knowledgeable actors (state, husband, migrant wife) who use their available resources 
to negotiate with each other and reconstitute the legal structure. Although working 
class migrant wives like Chin have no resources to negotiate with the state, she can 
                                                 
22 Today, apart from family financial problems such as health-cost issues while others could be related 
to CPF matters, lobbying for spousal PR status continues to be a common feature at Meet-the-people 
sessions name of opportunities for Singapore citizens to meet member of parliament of his 
constituency. They are usually held once a week and require citizens to bring documents of 
identification. Many citizens see the meetings as opportunity to resolve problems that they are having 
with the bureaucracy. After a request has been made, the MP will write a petition letter to whichever 
ministry, statutory board or any concerned parties to appeal on behalf of the resident (Sources: “Let the 




negotiate with the state through her husband who has citizenship and political 
resources such that his vote is significant for the state’s actors political power and 
stability.  
In sum, the immigration legal structure is always dynamic as it is constituted 
of various actors who posses particular resource, diverse motives and particular 
structural capacities to negotiate with each other and can reproduce the structure. For 
Thai migrant wives, they are active actors who posses female labor resource to 
negotiate with other actors to turn the legal structure to function enabling their 
practices. Apart from female labor resources, Thai women also possess transnational 
socio-cultural resources which they use as a means to circumvent the constraining 
functions of the legal structure in order to enable their practices. 
 
2. Women’s agency: Negotiating for Employment Opportunity 
 The immigration laws and policies do not prioritize the employment rights for 
working class migrant wives and place certain legal constraints on their employment 
opportunities. Nonetheless, employment is very crucial for working class migrant as 
they need to support their family and their left behinds financially. As such, these 
women attempt other channels by using their socio-cultural resources to circumvent 
these restrictions and thus enabling them to earn money to support their family.  
Some non-PR Thai migrant wives opt to become an illegal worker to resist the 
legal constraints of employment. Although there are severe penalties for those who 
become undocumented workers, Thai women circumvent the legal structure by using 
their ethnic social network and enclave spaces to facilitate them to work illegally. 
Thai ethnic enclave spaces that offer these migrant wives a variety of jobs are Golden 
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Mile Complex23, Geylang24, numerous shops owned by Thai people in Singapore, 
parks and places nearby Golden Mile Complex. In these places, they can work as 
undocumented barbers, cooks, waitresses, hairdressers and street vendors that is 
beyond the state’s intervention and surveillance. Some undocumented workers 
explained that they must be “hu ta tong wai” (vigilant of being inspected or caught by 
police) in order to survive and their Thai counterparts also assist them in being 
vigilant to any surprise police’s inspections. 
Generally, these migrant wives who choose to do so will work as an 
undocumented worker only for a short time because they are afraid of being deported. 
At the same time, there is no long term appeal of such illegal jobs as  they get lower 
wages than the PR holders25.  On the other hand, some Thai migrant wives turn to 
other illegal jobs which are less risky and less weary but pays better. For example, 
some become self-employed workers by making Thai local food such as ‘Naem’ (sour 
pork) which other Thai workers would help them sell at various Thai working class 
workplaces or residences such as the various construction sites and apartments in 
Geylang. Some become “huai tai din” (underground lottery)26 sales agents27, money 
lenders, or freelance masseurs, hairdressers, manicurists, domestic helpers and so 
on28.  
                                                 
23 Golden Mile Complex is the multi-storey building on Beach Road in Singapore which is the 
gathering place for Thai migrant workers (Wong 2000; Kitiarsa 2006). 
24 Geylang is the red light district in Singapore where there are many Thai prostitute work there. 
25 Non-PR holders earn SGD30 for 10 hours while PR holders generally receive SGD50. 
26 The huai taidin is run parallel with government lottery. Player bet against the prize numbers drawn in 
the government lottery (Phongpaichit et.al 1998). In Singapore, huai taidin also use the prize numbers 
in Thailand. 
27 Sales agent job is to accept bets and pass them up the line to jao mue yai (big hosts). They are 
remunerated through commission on the revenue they generate. Their can make high income through 
the accessibility to a potentially large clientele (Phongpaichit et.al 1998). In Singapore, jao mue yai can 
also be Thai and Singaporean who work at Golden Mile complex. 
28 For freelance beautician and domestic helper, the employment is win-win situation between Thai 
employer and employee. It is more flexible, easier and cheaper for employers to hire Thai women. It is 
also flexible for employee as they do not have to concern with any legal matter. 
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These Thai migrant wives use their socio-cultural resources that are beyond 
the state’s surveillance, namely a Thai migrant personal network that provides illegal 
jobs via the use of mobile phones and personal contacts in Singapore. These strategies 
allow them to circumvent the legal structure so that they can work and earn money 
without concerning with legal conditions or documents such as work permit or PR 
status. Ruk (34), a part-time illegal money lender who manage a high income proudly 
explained her strategy: “I ask my debtor to have something for pawn then I lend them 
money and I charged very low interest rate. Here, the duration is 14 days, others take 
20%, but I take only 10%. I only lend acquaintances because I am afraid of being 
caught. However, I can make an excuse that they cannot pay for the drinking bill and 
they want to continue drinking, so I have to take their stuffs. It’s quite safe to do this 
because I am not a full time money lender; I just lend 4-5 Thai migrants who I am 
quite accustomed to”.  
 
3. Women’s agency: Negotiating to Survive without Singaporean men 
 For working class migrant wives, the legal structure in Singapore is rooted in 
gender stereotypes about them as women having to rely totally on their husbands, 
particularly for non-PR migrant wives and unemployed ones. The legal status of these 
women ties strongly with the presence of the Singaporean men as they need their 
husbands to guarantee their PR or LTSVP renewal so that  they are eligible to reside 
in Singapore. Therefore, unemployed Thai divorcee and widow who lack the presence  
of a Singaporean husband actor will be graded at the bottom of the hierarchy and are 
restricted very harshly by the legal structure. However, the stories of Nid and Nok 
reveal that women have agency to reflexively avoid the legal constraints of gender 
stereotypes and accomplish their primary aspirations of migration in the first place. 
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Nid, a 48 years old woman from Isan, had separated although not divorced 
from her Singaporean husband for 15 years. At that time, she decided to go back to 
Thailand permanently with her son. However, when her husband passed away 3 years 
ago, she decided to bring her son back to Singapore for a better life. Her son, a 13 
years old Singaporean is eligible to own his father’s HDB flat when he is 18 years 
old. But now, she has to share a flat with her brother in-law and his Vietnamese wife. 
Nid speaks of an alternative strategy by accomplishing a “good mother” role so that 
she could eventually circumvent the legal constraints placed on her PR status:  
 “Now, I am a 3 years long LTVSP holder because my son is Singapore 
citizen. I cannot apply for PR yet because I need my husband’s relatives to guarantee 
me and appeal the Member of Parliament. However, I do not get along well with 
them. So, I have to wait until my son is 21 years old, so that he can guarantee me. 
Although I got money from charity organizations and government after my husband 
died, they only look after my son, but not me. I endure to live here for my son because 
it is better for him to live in Singapore. When I live in Thailand, I was not stressful 
because I can work. On the contrary, my life here is very depressed. I cannot work 
and I don’t have anyone who will help me to take care of my son. However, I have to 
earn money to support my family, so I decided to work as an undocumented cook at 
Golden Mile, but it turned out that I had no time to take care of him. He became 
spoiled and followed his bad friends. I had to bail him out more than 10 times until he 
was confined in a rehabilitation centre for one year. He tried to escape, so he has to 
be there for another 3 years. Thus, now I have changed to work as a “huai tai din” 
sales agent at Golden Mile Complex, which I can earn more than SGD 1,000 per 
month. It is a well paid job, less risky and I have time to look after my son. My son 
makes me feel very stressful. I have to pick him up every Friday and see him off every 
Sunday. When I go to the rehabilitation centre, I feel depressed because I can do 
nothing for the whole day. I want my son to grow up as a good man because I cannot 
take care of him forever. Now, he got me, but in the future if he commits any crimes, 
and he would be jailed and I cannot help him anymore”. 
 
Nid’s narrative shows that although the state constrains her rights as she has 
no husband to guarantee her PR status, she could leverage on her role as a  mother to 
her Singaporean son and renew her LTSVP. However, she needs a PR status together 
with her employment rights so that she can be a single mother and breadwinner to 
support her family. Thus, she challenged these legal constraints by becoming an 
illegal cook. However, without PR, she earns less money but works for long hours 
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and could not perform her role of a mother to her son .Because of this, Nid decided to 
work as illegal Huai taidin sales agent, which is a secret social space known only to 
Thai people and out of sight from the state surveillance and legal constraints.  
The problems of migrant widows are akin to unemployed PR migrant 
divorcees who suffer harsh legal constraints as they are living without the guarantee 
of a Singaporean husband actor. . For migrant divorcee, they must still be sponsored 
by their ex-husbands or they must be contributing to their CPFs income taxes to be 
eligible for their PR renewals if they already had their PR status.  The experiences of 
Nok, a 45 years old ex-migrant wife of a Singaporean man shows the legal constraints 
impinged on her life without her husband’s guarantee.  It shows also that Nok was 
able to evade these legal constraints by using her channels and social networks to 
reside and work in Singapore under the Thai migrant’s secret enclave zone: 
 
“I have migrated to Singapore for marriage more than 20 years and I got PR 
after marriage 3 months. Yet, I agreed to divorce my husband last 6 years. However, 
last two years, I unexpectedly got the letter from ICA stated that my PR was already 
cancelled. This is because my husband remarried with a mainland Chinese woman. 
So, he could not guarantee two women as his wives at the same time. Although I 
worked as a cook at Thai food stall, I never contributed to CPF. Then, when my PR 
was cancelled, I felt very shocked and nervous because it was too late for me to begin 
saving in CPF account. Since then, I have realized that I must go back to Thailand 
certainly but it was not the time yet. I still had no enough money to open a small 
business and I was too old to find a job in Thailand. So, after my PR was cancelled, I 
decided to work illegally as a cook by coming in and out as tourist. I learned how to 
do this by seeing from other Thai women. When I go out from the country, I will stay 
in Hat Yai where I got my friends who help me regarding accommodation and my 
friends here helped me to get a job as a beer sales promoter at a coffee shop around 
Geylang.  I have tried to save money until now I am ready to go back and settle down 
in Thailand at the end of this year (2007).   
 
The narratives from Nok and Nid showed that Thai migrant wives in 
Singapore are reflexive actors who negotiate and challenge the legal structure as well 
as the prevalent gender stereotypes. They use their ethnic socio-cultural resources, 
namely livelihood strategies and personal migrant networks to enable their practices 
 69
of working, earning money and surviving in Singapore while circumventing the 




 In this chapter, I focus on the dynamic immigration legal structure in the 
context of cross border marriage migration. In the immigration legal structure 
concerning marriage migration rules, each actor possesses resources and has structural 
motives and capabilities to negotiate with other actors and to manipulate the legal 
structure that either places constraints or enables the independence of human’s 
activities. In the final analysis, I argue that for Thai migrant wives, the immigration 
legal structure is always dynamic and does not only limit their activities but it is also 
manipulated by them to enable their practices. 
In reference to the phenomena of cross border marriage migration between 
Thai women and Singaporean men, the dynamic legal structure consists of activities 
of 3 main knowledgeable actors; the state, the Singaporean husbands and the Thai 
migrant. The state uses its sovereign power to create and implement laws and policies 
that enables as well as constrains selected migrant woman’s activities based on 
economic rationality and traditional gender stereotypes. The husband is also another 
actor who can act to enable or constrain  Thai migrant wives’ PR status as he has 
legitimate structural power in the form of his rights as a citizen to give his migrant 
wife’ legal and financial security. His status as a Singapore citizen also grants him 
certain political resources to negotiate with the state. I have also shown the agency of 
Thai migrant wives in reconstructing and challenging the legal structure. Thai migrant 
women possess ‘female reproductive resources’ and ‘ethnic socio-cultural resources’ 
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to negotiate with other actors and to circumvent the legal structure imposed upon 
them thus enabling their achievement of their migration aspirations.  
 As the legal structure is dynamic, Thai women experience different challenges 
and varied degree of success in their negotiation around these challenges. Some 
women may encounter more difficult circumstances to negotiate or circumvent  but 
they managed to pull through whereas some encounter failures despite several 
attempts. Thai migrant women who marry Singaporean men with low income and 
education or in low skilled jobs will find it harder to get PR than those who marry 
Singaporean men with high income and education or in high skilled jobs. However, 
Thai women who marry lower class Singaporeans can negotiate the legal constraint 
by using various forms of negotiation through their female reproductive resources 
such as negotiate their husbands to work harder in order to achieve minimum income 
requirement for PR approval; appeal to the relevant authorities or members of 
parliament to assist or expedite with their PR applications or choose to have children 
in Singapore. However, these channels only apply to those who marry Singaporean 
men younger than 55 years old. Still, Thai women who marry those who are older 
than 55 years old and with low-skilled jobs can negotiate the legal/state constraint by 
becoming work permit holders. They find work through their ethnic-socio cultural 
resources, such as the Thai migrants network and once they secure employment, they 
will be eligible to apply for their PR’s.  In contrast, the high income, high education 
and skilled jobs of the husbands will not help their applications if these women have 
ever had illicit activities recorded against them or past holder of work permits 
(particularly domestic workers).  It can be concluded that it might be easier for 
women who have marriage migration process (never worked in Singapore) than 
women with migration marriage pattern (previously in low-skill jobs) to obtain PR’s. 
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Nevertheless, there are still some cases in which women challenge the legal structural 
constraint by using their personal or migrant networking, job/language skills to be 
able to live, work, earn and send money back home without Singaporean men’s 
assistance or the state approval of their PR’s. 
 
 





The Dynamic and the Duality of Economic Structure 
 
 In this chapter, I use Giddens’s ideas on the duality of structure to focus on 
aspects of the economic structure on the marriage migration process. I will show how 
the economic structure in Thailand shapes the lives of Thai rural women, pressurizing 
them to engage in a rural-urban labor migration. I will show how this migration 
eventually leads to their exploitation as they take on various forms of urban 
employment. In the phenomena of cross cultural marriage between First world men 
and Third world women, it is also important to highlight agency of these Thai rural 
women. I argue that Thai rural women have the capacity to circumvent, challenge and 
reproduce the economic structure to gain resources for their lives and natal families. 
  I will focus on these Thai rural women’s ‘livelihood strategies’ throughout the 
migration process, from their initial rural-urban migration to their migration to 
Singapore as Thai migrant wives. Using the migration experiences of my informants, 
I will show how they challenge and negotiate the exploitative economic structure 
throughout these various stages of their lives.  I will also consider how the economic 
structure in Singapore necessarily overlaps with the legal/state structure to constrain 
or enable these migrant women’s activities.  
I shall begin with the migration trajectories of Puk and Daeng, 2 Thai migrant 
wives in Singapore who originates from the poverty-stricken rural village of Isan.  
 
Case Study 1: Puk (35), a Thai migrant wife from Mahasarakham, a province in 
Northeastern of Thailand 
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 “I was born in Mahasarakham province. After I graduated from High 
vocational Certificate, I worked as an accountant in my village. I earned very little 
only 3,000 baht per month which was not enough, so I had to move to Bangkok. 
  
 After moving to Bangkok, I got a job as a QC (Quality Control) worker at a 
computer parts manufacturing factory in Bang-Pa-In industrial estate. At that time, 
my life was only about work. I got up at 5 a.m., work overtime and go home between 
11p.m. to 1 a.m. everyday and still worked overtime on weekends. I always did not 
have enough sleep. I could not stop working because if I stopped, all the work coming 
along the line would pile up in front of me.  During the night, I felt so sleepy until I 
shed my tears but I could not sleep. The factory became my home because I ate and 
slept there. The owner always forced worker to work overtime because they already 
got the orders from clients. Working in factory was very terrible. You know two of my 
colleagues died because they smelled petrol too much. At that time, if I did not work 
overtime, I would be broke at the end of the month and had to borrow money from my 
friends. Every month, I paid installment for my fridge, T.V., wardrobe and everything 
which is docked from my wage. So, I could hardly send money home and I could not 
become rich. My life was repeated like that everyday. 
 
 Then, I wanted to have better life. I did not want to live in Thailand anymore. 
My life was very alienated and repetitive as I had to work very hard. I did not want to 
be poor anymore and I wanted to have a shortcut to be rich faster. Coincidentally, I 
had a friend who married Western man in Singapore. I told her that I wanted to work 
in Singapore and had a foreign husband. At that time, I was still young only 26 years 
old. Then, my friend invited me to come to Singapore and she brought me to “No.5” 
pub on Orchard road. I met my husband at that pub, I said hello to him and we 
exchanged our phone numbers. Unexpectedly, my husband also likes Thai women 
because at that time, he had Thai girlfriend who worked as a masseuse in Pattaya. 
Yet, he told me that he did not love her, he just felt pity for her and that woman 
already had children. When I went back to Thailand, we kept contact by phone.  
 
 During 3 months of contacting period, he called me three times a week. I did 
not go anywhere because I had to wait for his call. When he had long holiday, he 
would visit me in Thailand. Sometimes he also bought me the air ticket to visit him in 
Singapore. Besides, he constantly sent me money to spend. After that I told him that if 
he liked me, he should marry me because I could not wait for him for too long. If he 
was too slow he would lose me.  After we agreed to marry, I just packed my stuff and 
came here with one luggage and my parents still did not know about my decision. But 
I dare to come here because my husband had a car, a home, so I was sure that my life 
would be comfortable. At that time, I still did not love him, but I gradually love him 
because he always take care of me…….. I heard from my husband that he like Thai 
women because Thai woman is not ‘hi-so’1, unlike Singaporean women who require 
car, condo, (good) career from men. For Thai women, we are very easy-going and 
good at doing housework. Therefore, Singaporean men get bored of local women. You 
know, husband does not have to hire a maid because Thai woman can do everything. 
Not only Singaporean men, Farang (Western) men also like Thai women because 
Farang women never take care of their husbands. They never ask their husbands what 
                                                 
1 Hi-so literally stands for High Society. In Thai, it denotes upper class people in Thai society or people 
who have socio-cultural capital as upper class. 
 74
food they like, or what they want. This is the reason why foreign men like women from 
our country because we are good at housework. They (foreign husband) take care of 
us, but we (Thai women) also take care of them. 
 
Case Study 2: Daeng (21), a Thai migrant wife from Roiet, a province in 
Northeastern of Thailand 
 “I was born in Roiet province. My father was a farmer and my mother was a 
full time housewife. In the past, only my eldest sister sent money home, but it was very 
little. When I was 16, my mother said that I should not study anymore. I cried for the 
whole day because I wanted to study. I called my sister and told her that I wanted to 
study, but she said that she had no money. Therefore, I decided to work and study at 
the same time.  I began to work at a karaoke shop in the village since I was 16. I 
worked until 2 a.m. and got up at 6 a.m. to go to school. I slept only 4 hours everyday 
for 3 years. I spent money from working (around 100-150 baht per day) for living 
expenses, tuition fees and my niece’s milk, and my parent got all the money from my 
sister’s remittance. My family was extremely poor at that time. Sometimes, my sister 
wrote a letter to tell me that she could not send money home, but she was sure that I 
would not leave my niece to go hungry and die. When I read the letter, I did not know 
whether I  should laugh or cry. Then, I had to drop my study and decided to find a job 
in Bangkok so that I would have money to continue my study. If I still lived in Roiet, 
my life would not be better because I had no savings. If I lived in Bangkok, I would 
earn more money and have some savings like other Isan people who go to Bangkok to 
find a job after graduating from secondary or high school. 
 
 In the first place, I planned to work in the cloth factory like my sister, but I 
had no skills to do it. Then, I met one friend who worked at Ratchada. She knew that I 
used to work in a Karaoke bar, so I might be able to work in Karaoke bar. I did not 
hesitate to work in a Karaoke bar. Working at a karaoke bar in Bangkok was different 
from Roiet, I had to adapt myself to survive. When I see the male customer, I had to 
compete with other girls to approach him and get tips from him. I worked from 7 p.m. 
until 1 a.m. everyday. However, I earn around 20,000-30,000 baht per month on 
average.  I also took drug because I was very tried from work, but I always remind 
myself that I had to save money, so I did not get addicted like my friends. At that time, 
I wanted only money from man. I realized that all men only want to have sex with me, 
so I just want his money in return. I think that there is no true love anymore. If he 
loves  me or wants me, he can just give me money. 
 
 Once I went to “Hollywood” pub in Bangkok, I knew the waiters there and 
they knew that I wanted to ‘catch’ a male client. If he helped me to introduce a male 
client, he would get a percentage cut from me. One night, the waiter brought me to my 
husband and his friends’ table. I tried to flirt with him, ask for his number and speak 
English with him. I wrote my name and phone number and gave it to him. I asked him 
when he was going back and invited him to go out for a night meal, but he just smiled 
and refused. So, I think that I could not ‘get’ him, so I just said good bye and kiss on 
his cheek. I thought his look was worse than his friends, so must be easier to get. After 
two days, he gave me a call and I suspected that was  probably because of my kiss.  
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 After that we constantly keep contacting each other.  I wrote a letter in Thai 
and he would bring the letter to be translated at Golden Mile Complex. He also sent 
me text messages and call me everyday and wrote me a letter twice a month. After two 
months, he visited me in Thailand again. I spent time with him for 5 days and he 
bought me everything that I wanted. Before going back to Singapore, he gave me 
20,000 baht and told me that he was very happy to spend time with me and asked me 
to stop working at karaoke bar. He said he knew that I am a good girl and it was 
necessary for me to do this kind of work because of my family. I told him directly that 
I had to work in karaoke bar because I wanted to study, I have a niece and my family 
was very poor. However, although he asked me to stop working, I still worked in the 
karaoke bar because I was not sure about our relationship. I would be in trouble if he 
stopped giving me money or  just disappear because I still have to remit money home. 
I told him to call me in the evening before I went to work.  Sometimes he checked on 
me but I pretended that I was very sleepy. After he sent me another 20,000 baht, I 
decided to stop working. I also felt bored with my work as I had to fight with other 
women to go out with male customers. I decided to stop working and just wait for 
him. He visited me every other month and proposed to me for marriage after 9 
months. He told me that he loves me because he saw that when I visited my home, I 
would go straight away to hug my parents and every time I would buy food or toys for 
my niece.  He told me that he knew I did not tell lie. He was very impressed when he 
saw me kissed and hugged my niece who was very small and cute since he had never 
seen this scene before. I brought him to visit my village for one week, I brought him 
travelling around Roiet during Songkran Festival when people were very happy, 
enjoy and love each other. He said that he likes this way of living and understands my 
real person.   However, after we got engaged, I felt that I didn’t love him yet, but I 
had to do it, otherwise he would not visit me. After he transferred 300,000 baht to my 
bank account, I am sure that he is serious with me, so I decided to marry him, but I 
don’t love him yet”. 
 
 The narratives from Puk and Daeng show how Thai rural village women use 
their livelihood strategies to negotiate and circumvent exploitative economic 
structures in the context of a fast modernizing and globalizing Thailand.  They show 
that these women do not succumb easily to the gender inequalities and discriminations 
that surround their lives but that they are active agents in using and manipulating their 
available resources to gain and accumulate wealth. 
 
I. Rural-Urban Labor Migration: A Livelihood Strategy to Survive 
from the Failure of Rural Economy 
“Kert ma chiwit ni bo khoei aai, 
Bo yan khuam aai, Yan yang diao khue ot tai” 
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(PostToday, Thursday 5 June 2008, C3). 
(Translation from Isan Dialect: “Since I was born, I never feel shy.  
I am not afraid of shame, yet the only thing I am afraid of is starvation”.) 
  
 The above quotations sum up succinctly the convictions of Isan people who 
affected by poverty-stricken economic conditions in the rural villages and are 
determined to fight for their survival and better living conditions. Puk and Daeng are 
among these young Isan people who had experienced the rural-urban migration and 
the struggles for searching out new opportunities by migrating to the urban cities. It is 
summed up by a general statement that most of these migrant wives made that “my 
life must be better, my life will not be starving anymore”. 
 The economic structure functions to allocate limited resources among 
individuals in society. However, under the Capitalist economy, poor people in remote 
areas seldom fare as well as their city-counterparts.. Rural village households are left 
vulnerable to the global competitive markets ushered in by Thailand’s developmental 
policies that are intended to drive the country forward. This forces young Thai rural 
villagers into a ceaseless pattern of rural-urban labor migration to support their 
households. 
 The pattern of young women rural-urban migration must be analyzed in the 
broad historical and social contexts of Thailand. In the past, a typical Thai rural 
village family makes a living by family farming and food production. However, the 
change in economic structure leads to the failure of the rural economy which traps 
these families into a cycle of poverty. They cannot survive on traditional forms of 
farming alone because of the emerging factors such as the low prices of agricultural 
products, the unpredictability of the cash crop markets, the scarcity of land for 
farming and the growth in the demand of commodities driven by an increasing 
modern way of life even in the rural areas of Thailand.  When farming could no 
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longer sustain their families,, Puk and Daeng attempted to get paid work in their 
villages by becoming a waitress and an accountant respectively but their wages still 
fell below that which is necessary for their family survival needs. Like Puk and 
Daeng, young villagers from the northeast and the north of Thailand must migrate to 
metropolitan areas to support their left behinds. These young male and female 
migrants from the  rural villages create a mobile unskilled or low-skilled labor force 
for the factories, construction sites, domestic homes, various small scale businesses, 
taxi companies and to security guard firms(Wilson 2004, p.75-76) in Bangkok and 
other urban areas in Thailand.  
 However, gender inequalities in a patriarchal Thai society make the economic 
structure more oppressive for Thai rural women. For example, a son is more likely to 
receive familial support for continuing his education rather than a daughter if she 
wants to do so. When young Thai rural village women migrate to the urban areas, 
they usually end up as cheap laborers. Bell (1997) describes these phenomena as the 
‘Feminization of cheap labor’ and the “the feminization of poverty”, conditions he 
attributes to the Asian economic miracle. They end up being subordinated in the 
patriarchal market economy that is present in the factories, in small sweatshops, larger 
industrial enterprises and commercial sex work.  Like Daeng and Puk, the majority of 
my informants suffer from a long term vulnerability to exploitation in the city since 
their jobs in Thailand involves low wages and long strenuous hours of work (See also: 
Table 2). They complained that they lead deprived lives doing these insecure jobs, 
overtime work and yet they are still unable to improve their natal family living 
conditions. They regard their lives in the cities in Thailand prior to migrating to 
Singapore as the most unmemorable time of all. However, all of my informants refuse 
to become the passive victims trapped in an endless cycle of poverty. In the next 
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section, I will focus on how these Thai rural women use cross border marriages as a 
strategy to access to economic resources and improve their living conditions. 
 
II. Cross Border Marriage Migration as Livelihood Strategies to 
Escape the Oppressive Economic Structure in Thailand 
 Like Daeng and Puk’s narratives, there are many successful stories of cross 
border marriages between Thai women and foreign men, especially western men 
(Farang) which is probably the easiest and fastest way to improve these women’s 
socio-economic status2. Living in new countries supported by the wealth of these 
foreign men enable them to have access to what they lacked in the past.  They usually  
receive financial support from their affluent husbands and have opportunities to work 
legally and earn substantially high incomes compared to their previous jobs in 
Thailand. This primarily informs their aspirations to meet foreign men from wealthy 
nation-states. Marriage to Singaporean men is also considered as that means to enable 
them to upward socio-economic mobility. 
 However, as I have highlighted in the previous chapter, the analysis of cross 
border marriage between women from developing country and men from developed 
country are often related to radical feminists’ discourses on women’s trafficking or 
stereotypical notions of “mail-order brides”3. These approaches mainly views migrant 
women as passive victims who are ‘sold’ to men (Constable 2003, p.64). To some 
                                                 
2 Today, In Thailand, there are many ‘how to’ books available in bookstore and the articles in 
newspaper, magazines  which suggest Thai women how to become ‘Mia Farang’ (Westerner’s wife) as 
it is a shortcut for Thai rural women to improve socio-economic status. 
3 Mail-order brides is defined as ‘women who find their spouses through the mail, introduction service 
agency, catalog, or it may also be initiated through introductions made by a friend or relative’, 
‘women who marry out  because of economic desperation  rather than romantic love’, ‘another 
economic exchange in the form of powerful men who buy brides, victimized women who sell 
themselves’, ‘the relationships are based on ‘unequal political and economic relationship between 
developing and industrialized nations between the sexs on a worldwide scale’(Glodava & Onizuka 
1994; Constable 2003, p.64-71). 
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extent, this might be true since the process of marriage arrangement is conducted by 
some commercial marriage brokerage firms or mail-order bride agencies. At times, 
women may be exploited or conned into marriage by agencies who provide false 
information regarding their future spouses. Nevertheless, Constable (2003, p.84) 
argues that women trafficking should not always be seen as the primary factor in such 
marriages as they could be based on romantic love as well. Departing from these 
various conclusions, the narratives from  Daeng and Puk show that although their 
migration trajectory is based on unequal political and gender economies based on 
material motives and economic desperation, they have individual agency that are not 
necessarily grounded by the context of “real” romantic love. They show a certain 
degree of power to strategize to exert control over such public and private 
performances of their “romantic” encounter with the foreign men, their period of 
courtship and their abilities to persuade these men into marriage. I argue that their 
agencies in these cross border marriages should be regarded as a prominent feature of 
women’s active choices that goes beyond the conventional conclusions of cross 
border marriages as gender exploitation. 
 .  For the following part, I will demonstrate that there are two kinds of livelihood 
strategies which these Thai women use to accomplish cross border marriage 
migration. I categorize them into two idealized types which I will term as “marriage 
migration” and “migration marriage”: marriage migration is the strategy used by Thai 
women in Thailand to find foreign men so that they can achieve eventual migration to 
their potential husbands’ countries; and migration marriage is the strategy used by 
Thai women who deliberately travel overseas to find their potential husbands so that 
they can migrate to these countries. Both of these ideal types show that Thai women 
are active agents in the phenomena of cross border marriage migration. 
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 a) Marriage Migration 
     The first type, marriage migration is the migration process taken by one of 
my informants Daeng. She was originally from Isan and chose to work as a prostitute 
in Bangkok. Her prostitution job in Bangkok gave her the opportunity to meet her 
husband as a client first and subsequently got married to him and migrated to 
Singapore. The majority of my informants met their husbands in tourist-oriented 
entertainment establishments such as discotheques, karaoke lounges, nightclubs, 
massage parlors, bars and snooker club. These places results in the majority of the 
typical encounters between Thai working class women and foreign men. These are 
also places where the Thai women deliberately and actively initiate contact with 
foreign men or Singaporeans in the context of this thesis. There are cases where Thai 
women meet their potential husbands without engaging in prostitution. Some of my 
informants meet their husbands by chance at their workplaces such as the factories in 
Bangkok when their husband were doing their overseas postings. Some met their 
husbands through the social networks of their relatives, friends or acquaintances. 
Some meet their husbands through networks that specifically introduced Thai women 
to these Singaporean men who travel to Thailand to find Thai women. Generally, this 
various encounter trajectories prove less problematic for the Thai women to 
successfully migrate to Singapore as migrant wives as compared to the trajectories 
encountered by the second strategy of “migration marriage”. Next, I shall discuss the 
second idealized type of cross border marriage migration below. 
 b) Migration Marriage 
 The second pattern of cross border marriages can be seen in the strategy 
employed by Puk. Puk, like Daeng was also from Isan and she migrated to Bangkok 
to work though not as a prostitute. Unlike Daeng, Puk chose to  travel to Singapore to 
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find Singaporean men to marry as she was disillusioned with the exploitative 
economic conditions in Thailand. 
Puk’s narrative shows an alternative strategy taken by Thai women who wants 
to marry foreign men. Apart from meeting these men at popular tourist-oriented 
entertainment establishments in the big cities in Thailand such as Bangkok, Hat Yai 
and Pattaya (Cohen 1982), some women take the initiative to approach foreign men in 
these men’s own countries. For Thai women, Singapore is a favorite destination 
because there are no tourist visa requirements and it is also makes more economical 
sense with the availability of cheap transportations like bus coaches or budget airlines. 
Among my informants, 6 of them actively made this calculated move to come to 
Singapore and target the Singaporean men. This pattern of “migration marriage” 
requires the access to transnational networks to make the contacts possible.  Some 
Thai women extend their stay in Singapore by getting their acquaintances in 
Singapore to guarantee their visit. Some stay on through student passes (by taking 
language course) or extended tourist visas to become undocumented street vendors or 
sex workers in Singapore. After arriving in Singapore, these women will try to find 
local men to marry through their available social networks so that they can become a 
legal migrant. Among my informants, their transnational networks often are Thai 
women who already married to foreign or Singaporean men in Singapore and would 
willingly introduce them to single men or bring them to the various places where they 
can meet them, for example a night out at the local bars, nightclubs, Thai 
discotheques and local pubs along the famous entertainment districts in Orchard road,  
Clark Quay and so on. These social networks of matchmaking represent the women’s 
agency since they are able to find out for themselves the men’s personal backgrounds 
and have alternatives to choose the best man for themselves.  The experiences of  
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Som’s (40), is a case in point: “I illegally come to Singapore to work as a street 
vendor. Then, I thought that I could live and work in Singapore if I had marriage 
certificate. I asked my friend who has already married here to introduce me local 
men. Then, there were 2 guys who come to meet me, one is my present husband. 
Although another guy is a business man, and has a house and car, I chose my 
husband who is older and poorer. I chose him because he can speak Thai which at 
least I can communicate with him and he used to ordain as a monk in Thailand so he 
should be a nice man. He told me that although he was poor but he got a house. For 
me, if I married to a Chinese man at least he must have his own house because I know 
there will be some problems  living with in-laws.” 
c) Women’s Strategy in the Process of Courtship and Staying in Contact 
     During the process of courtship and contacting period, women use their 
livelihood strategy to deliberately develop the relationship with foreign men to 
conjugal context which enable them to leave prostitution and upward mobility. 
 Although Puk and Daeng employed different strategies to meet their husbands, 
the subsequent process of courtship and staying in contact before the final stage of 
marriage shows similar strategies. 
After meeting Singaporean men either in Thailand or Singapore, they engaged 
in a process of courtship. During this process, both parties must come to a consensus 
over the arrangement on how to stay in constant contact. This is especially important 
for ‘relationship-at-a-distance’ (Cohen 1986) since any break in contact could mean 
potential entries of rivals for the Thai women as well as the Singaporean men. As 
such, they must attempt to maintain a personal and intimate relationship across the 
border. The arrangements to stay in contact can be initiated either by the Singaporean 
men or the Thai women. These include calling each other at a regular basis, sending 
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text messages or scheduled visits to one another’s country. Eventually, after the 
Singaporean man believes that the Thai woman he is going out with does not only 
want their money, he will intensify his romance and intimacy with her. At this stage, 
the prevalent strategy used among Thai women is to tell their Singaporean men about 
their hardships in Thailand (If they are working as prostitutes, they will tell of how 
working in the sex industry is necessary for their own and their families’ survival). In 
more cases than not, the Singaporean men will support them financially so that these 
Thai women could stop working in low-skilled jobs or commercial sex work. During 
this period, both parties generally perform traditional gender roles to sustain the 
relationship. For example, Thai women who worked in the commercial sex industry 
are asked to behave well in order to maintain the men’s dignity through ceasing work 
as a prostitute  in exchange for the financial support given in return. However, once a 
particular actor fails to perform his or her expected gender role such as the 
Singaporean man stopping his financial support or finding out that the Thai woman 
had lied to him, the relationship will be over. This period is not only the manifestation 
of a simple economic exchange of financial support but it is also the exchange of 
traditional gender role performance. The Singaporean men must become a source of 
present and potential financial provider while the Thai women must perform the 
expected submissive gender roles in return such as remaining faithful sexually and 
emotionally. Most Singaporean men use their mobile phones as a form of surveillance 
and routinely call to check on the girls’ stories and whereabouts and their findings 
will inform the decisions on whether their ongoing or future economic support should 
continue. It is thus important to understand this period of courtship and contact 
beyond the domains of romantic love. Like all forms of conventional romantic love, it 
involves the economic structure, more prominently demonstrated in the relationships 
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between working class Thai women and Singaporean men.  Thai women want to 
marry Singaporean men and are in a hurry to do so because they think that these 
Singaporean men can help alleviate them from economic hardships. Like Puk, Thai 
migrant wives will usually make the first moves to accelerate the marriage process by 
claiming the difficulties involved in maintaining a long distance, cross-border 
relationship. Among my informants, most of them were involved in a hasty marriage. 
The shortest waiting period was 14 days while the longest was 3 years and the 
average was between 2-9 months.  The relatively hasty marriages of my informants 
show that both ideal types, the ‘marriage migration’ and ‘migration marriage’ are a 
result of ‘calculated moves’ played out in the courtship and contact periods that  are 
part of these Thai migrant wives’ strategies in the phenomenon of cross border 
marriages.  
 Today, the economic condition in rural village shapes Thai rural women’s 
experience to engage in rural-urban labor migration. However, their trajectory does 
not stop at being cheap labor, unskilled worker or commercial sex worker in 
metropolitan area but move to transnational practices of cross border marriage 
migration as livelihood strategies for escape from poverty and hardship. This is the 
reason why majority of Thai migrant wives in Singapore (especially at Golden Mile 
Complex) are women from remote area in Thailand, particularly women from 
Northeastern (Isan) and Northern region. However, not all Thai migrant wives in 
Singapore are successful to escape from poverty and upward mobility as the economic 
structure is dynamic and is reproduced to function constraining or enabling these 
migrant wives’ economic activities. 
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III. The Constraining and Enabling Effects of the Singapore Economic 
Structure 
 The two idealized trajectories of cross border marriage migration patterns 
present the strategies of Thai working class women to access economic resources and 
to improve their socio-economic condition. However, not all Thai migrant wives are 
capable of using cross-border marriage migration to Singapore as means for their 
upward mobility.   
 The migration experiences of Thai migrant wives in Singapore also show that 
their economic practices are constrained by the state structure. Since the state and the 
economic structures of Singapore do inevitably overlap, the state’s policies on PR 
attainment serve to restrict the economic participation of some of these migrant wives.  
This is further intertwined when the state takes as its key consideration, the economic 
conditions of the Thai migrant wives and their Singaporean husbands in its decision 
on the granting of PR status. Other conditions such as family planning are also 
involved as well. Thus, it is generally easier for Thai migrant wives who adopt the 
above-mentioned strategy of “marriage migration” (though this depends on their 
economic status as well) to achieve their PR status since the state considers this as an 
act of family reunification. As such, the state will issue PR status for these “qualified” 
women so that they can live and work in Singapore4. In contrast, it would be more 
problematic for those working class Thai women who adopt the strategy of “migration 
marriage” - traveling to work as low-skilled workers in Singapore in the hope of 
marrying local men. They are viewed as migrant workers who are taking advantage of 
                                                 
4 This is only applicable to Thai women who marry to middle/upper class Singaporean men who tend 
to qualify for their wives’ PR application. However, for those who are married to working class men is 
another story as the legal structure is used to constrain their practices by the state actor. (See also: 
Chapter 2 The Dynamic and Duality of Immigration Legal Structure) 
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the Singaporean men to gain economic resources, particularly those are involve with 
legal/illegal prostitution or domestic work.5  These women are usually restricted from 
their PR attainment. This shows that the economic structure in Singapore does not 
allow women from developing countries to achieve upward socio-economic mobility 
through marriage unless they meet certain educational and economic qualifications.
 In the following part, I will use the experiences of my informants to show how 
their economic activities are constrained and regulated by the nation-state within the 
economic structure of Singapore. 
 
IV. After Marriage Migration: Thai Migrant Wives’ Economic 
Activities under Singapore Economic Structure 
 “I only think that the country is rich, so my husband should be rich too. But I 
never realize that some people are lucky while some are not. Before marriage, my 
husband told me that his salary is around 3,000SGD, and I think that it’s a lot in Thai 
baht. And if I went there and helped my husband, we might earn around 100,000 
baht”   (Mai, 32). 
 
 The statement from Mai emphasized her belief that cross border marriage 
migration with Singaporean men will enable her to achieve upward socio-economic 
mobility (See also: The socio-cultural gendered structure). However, Mai is among 
many of the Thai migrant wives in Singapore whose husband has low education levels 
and more importantly income levels that are only enough for their daily subsistence. 
The economic situation of her husband does not allow Mai to gain wealth by being 
                                                 
5 I refer to Thai migrant wives who migrate to work as domestic worker and illegal workers who were 
caught by Singapore authorities. With their records, they will be constrained to get PR by the state. 
However, those who used to be illegal workers and never been caught, the state still allow them to get 
PR as they have no unlawful conduct record. (See also: Chapter 2 The Dynamic and Duality of 
Immigration Legal Structure) 
 . 
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totally dependent on her husband. Mai needs to work in order to survive under the 
Singapore economic structure.  
The Singaporean national economy is rigorously controlled by the state in 
order to increase its capacities for economic growth (Brown 1998, p.51). Repressive 
policies towards its population could be portrayed as the ‘discipline’ necessary to 
secure the sacrifice which was the concomitant of development progress (Brown 
1998, p.39). Yao (2007, p.15-16) called the political-economic system in Singapore as   
“Supply-side Socialism”. This means that the state has no natural resources, so it tries 
to ‘maximize the ability of all human beings’ to ‘help to make the national economy 
more competitive’ by subjecting the people to the strenuous logic of the market or the 
‘Darwinian survival of the fittest’. As such, Singapore depends on a meritocratic 
philosophy based on economic rationality to reward the disciplined, the adaptable and 
the intelligent.  
 The economic structure in Singapore requires the population to participate in 
workforce for sustaining economic growth and competitive advantage.  In this regard, 
the state actively encourages the entry of women into labor workforce activity 
(Davidson 1996, p.123) while has resolutely shied away from giving its citizens any 
handouts that may dissuade them from seeking work. In reference to cross border 
marriage migration, the state do not deny the permanent residency for foreign brides 
of Singaporean men who can benefit the economy by contributing to their CPF funds 
and income taxs while restricting those whose husbands cannot afford to do likewise. 
For foreign brides, the state requires them to work so that they will have legal security 
through employment which they can renew PR status without husband’s presence. By 
paying their CPF and income tax, they are able to renew their PR status without their 
husband’s involvement so that it secures them economically in cases of divorce. 
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However, if their husband is not qualified economically to apply the PR status for 
their wives, the state requires these foreign brides to work under the work permit 
scheme before giving them their PR. In this respect, they become disadvantaged 
economically as they receive less pay than those who are already PRs.  Therefore, 
these foreign brides have no choice but to engage in paid work for their legal and 
financial security in Singapore (See also: The Dynamic and Duality of Immigration 
Legal Structure).  
 Besides, the economic conditions of most Thai migrant wives’ husbands also 
drive them to engage in paid employment. The fact is that most Thai migrant wives in 
Singapore predominantly marry working class Singaporean men who have relatively 
low levels of educational. Their incomes are more likely to be enough only for their 
daily subsistence and are unable to support their wives and family financially. As 
Davidson (1996) commented, most of the Singaporean married women must work out 
of financial necessity because of the rising costs of living and women’s financial 
contributions to the lower income families are even more important in this respect  
(Women in Singapore: A Country Report 1995, p.15-16). However, this need to 
contribute economically to their families is even more actue  among foreign brides. 
As transnational migrant women, they are not only responsible for their families in 
Singapore but are  also obliged to send money to support their natal families. As Guk 
(28) puts it: “Only my husband income is just about enough for two persons. My 
daughter in Thailand is growing up everyday and I need money to provide her for 
education and living”. With most of their husbands’ economic situations in 
Singapore, it is unavoidable that they engage in paid employment. Yet, with the 
meritocratic nature of the economic structure in Singapore, they are only able to work 
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in unskilled or low skilled jobs where they remain poor even though the work is hard 
because of low wages. 
In Singapore, the logic of the Darwinian notions of the ‘survival of the fittest’ 
is reflected in the nation-state’s political ideology of meritocracy.  This means that an 
individual economic well-being is entirely dependent upon an individual’s efforts. 
However, a meritocratic society is inevitably elitist which leaves certain groups 
behind, particularly the poor working class group who have been left out of the 
successes of the state (Lee 2001). In Singapore, this is all tuned towards the economic 
rationality of its state structure, where education is based on one’s ability, jobs based 
on one’s education and pay based on one’s performance. As such, the lowly educated 
people within the population usually ends up being unemployed or employed with 
low wages. Besides, through the CPF, a system derived for distribution for mandatory 
savings among Singaporeans, those low-income self-employed people and casual 
workers who do not contribute to their CPFs are outstripped from the state welfare 
assistance (Davidson 1996, p.122).  Wong (1979) also pointed out that the workers 
who are either not covered or inadequately protected by the CPF scheme do not have 
adequate financial retirement resources and these are predominantly women and the 
Malays. Similar to these migrant wives, the problem of a meritocracy society is that 
without education and language skills, people end up with the low wages and engage 
in labor and dead end jobs such as cleaner, waitress and so on. These women work 
strenuously in order to support both their natal and conjugal families but still cannot 
improve their standard living. According to Dao (28) ,“although Singaporean work 
hard for the whole lives, they won’t be rich, they can own only one small flat. The rich 
persons in Singapore are only Lee and Goh”.  
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 Additionally, since Singapore is fast becoming an ageing society, the state is 
concerned with the burden of caring for the elderly and this might obstruct theist 
economic growth. Therefore without any welfare handouts, the government leaves the 
elderly with no choice but to work to sustain themselves. Such an economic structure 
portrays a scenario that poor people cannot stop working and they remain poor until 
the end of their lives6. The picture of these elderly people who work at hawker centre 
or at kopitium”7 frightened and has become the chief concern among working class 
Thai women as it shows that they must work hard in unskilled jobs until they are old. 
This is contrast to the elderly in Thai rural village who do not have to work outside 
their home when they are old. Thai elderly take on the main responsibility of bringing 
up their grandchildren at home as their off-springs are obliged to take care of them 
because parent’s gratitude is the most crucial factor in the Thai family relations. 
 Within the Singapore economic structure, working class Thai migrant wives 
operate economically by working laboriously in low-skilled or unskilled jobs to 
support their family and left behinds. They work until they are old but remain poor. 
So, it can be argued that for some migrant wives who marry working class 
Singaporean men, they are still trapped within the cycle of the ‘feminization of 
poverty’. Nonetheless, women are not always passive victims of the economic 
structure which restrict them from upward mobility. They develop alternatives to 
                                                 
6 Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew addressed the problem of an ageing society at a dialogue. As Lee 
said that “We've got to educate those about to retire: Don't retire, work. Retirement means death”. 
'Maybe if we had not started family planning, it would not have been so bad. But then we would not 
have (economic) growth. This is Mr. Lee also defended Singapore's Central Provident Fund (CPF) 
scheme which prolonged the minimum age to take out the CPF (Retirement means death, The Stratits 
Times, 14 January 2008). 
7 Auntie works at kopitium literally means the old lady who works as waitress and cleaner at coffee 
shop. This depiction is sort of cultural shock for Thai people who come to Singapore because it hardly 
see any elderly people work as cleaner, waitress in coffee shop in Thailand, however, it is quite 
common in Singapore. 
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ignore, challenge and negotiate the economic structure through their livelihood 
strategies until they are able to achieve and gain adequate economic resources. 
  
V.  Women’s Agencies toward Singapore Economic Structure    
   In this section, based on women life experiences, I will discuss the livelihood 
strategies of Thai migrant wives who are able to negotiate with the repressive 
economic structure of Singapore. 
Aihwa Ong (1999) argued that it is predominantly the business elites and 
growing middle classes in Asia that benefit from a global capitalist system by 
employing the strategy of ‘flexible citizenship’ in which they hold passports from 
multiple countries to facilitate their transnational business ties and social lives. 
However, I will show that working class women are also capable of using the strategy 
of ‘flexible citizenship’ for economic success in the climate of global capitalism. Thai 
working class migrant wives negotiate and reconstruct the economic structure to 
enable them to gain access to economic resources by using their livelihood strategies 
such as: adding the work element into their traditional gender identities and gender 
roles, escaping from low wages work through personal migrant networks as well as 
night jobs and escaping from lifelong poverty through their transnational livelihoods. 
 
1. Reconstructing Gender Identities and Gender Roles 
“In the past I thought husband must take care of me, then I realize that if I 
want to have family with him, I have to help him and earn money on my own”(Sri, 29) 
.  
 “Only my husband’s income, it was not enough for the whole family. If my 
husband works alone, my family will die. ……….. My life was more difficult when my 
kids were still young. So, I worked even though I had no PR yet, I worked at Phuan 
Thai supermarket at that time, luckily my boss understood my situation” (Chin, 43). 
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 The narrative from Sri and Chin show that their gender roles and identities 
have shifted in the process of marriage migration. Through marriage migration, Thai 
migrant women hope that they can achieve upward socio-economic mobility by 
receiving financial support from their affluent husbands as well as having opportunity 
to work and earn high incomes in Singapore. This may be true for very few Thai 
migrant wives who marry the middle/upper class men. Living under the economy of 
‘Supple Side Socialism’(Yao 2007), people must always be involved in the labor 
market for social redistribution due to the meritocratic nature of market capitalism 
which tends to reward only the privileged or educated people more often than not 
(Yao 2007, p.16).Indeed, Thai working class women who marry working class 
Singaporean men realize that they cannot survive by being a husband’s follower or a 
dependent wife. They reconstruct their gender identity and gender role to that of a 
hardworking worker, independents wife and sometimes a ‘breadwinner’ who can earn 
more than their Singaporean husband. They realize that they cannot gain economic 
status through their marriage but by entering into the labor force. Like Chin,  many of 
these Thai migrant wives attempt to find paid work through the migrant networks in 
Singapore. Thai working class migrant wives in Singapore generally view the 
transnational wife identity as housewives in domestic realm as well as workers in the 
labor force. While this may be nothing new to most women in urban societies, my 
informants claim that it is ‘a unique identity of Thai migrant women’ ,one that departs 
sharply from their previous notions of the role of a wife back in rural Thailand. 
 
2. Negotiating the Meritocratic Economic Regime by Transnational Migrant 
Network 
 93
 With low education and job skills, the economic structure in Singapore places 
Thai working class migrant wives at the bottom of its hierarchy. Nonetheless, Thai 
women have their own channels to enable them to earn good income. Although 
Singapore has no existing policies to improve the migrant wives’ language and work 
skills, Thai migrant wives seek to learn and improve their language and job skills 
through their Thai women ethnic networks. For example, many women learn 
hairdressing skills from hair salons owned by other Thai women.  They hoped that in 
their old age, they will not end up with low wage labor job like many of the working 
class Singaporean elderly. Som (40) recounts her experiences of going to a salon to 
learn hairdressing skills: “I go there everyday to learn hairdressing, because I don’t 
have education, I cannot speak the language here but I do not want to be auntie 
cleaner at kopitium when I am old. I think at least I have many friends here, so I can 
become freelance hairdresser which I can earn 10-20 SGD per customer. My flat has 
3 rooms so I will use one room to open this service”.  Golden Mile Complex is also 
the place in Singapore that offers white collar jobs for Thai PR women who lack 
sufficient language skills and qualifications to work in the private and public sectors 
of the economy in Singapore.  These women can earn a better income by working in 
the various offices such as the money remittance services, travel agencies, job 
placement agencies which require Thai-speaking employees.  Still, due to the limited 
vacancies in these companies in Golden Mile Complex, there are relatively few Thai 
working class women are able get work as white collar workers.  The majority of 
them work in pink collar jobs8 at the supermarket, shops and restaurants. Some of 
these women do part-time jobs at the barber shops, the Thai discotheque and KTVs 
dotted around Singapore. Others are able to start small businesses. For example, some 
                                                 
8 Pink collar jobs refer to jobs in the service industry typically taken up by women. 
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women sell Thai food or import Thai popular products and sell them to the Thai 
immigrant workers. These products include amulets, clothes and so on (See also:  
Women’s agency: Negotiating for Employment Opportunity). Some of them use their 
savings or wages to invest in real estates or start  businesses back in Thailand. These 
women who do so would usually ask their relatives to take care of such businesses. 
These include small-scale money lending service, office rental and farming business. 
By doing these additional jobs or investments, they can earn more and have savings 
even if they work in unskilled jobs here in Singapore. This shows that flexibility in 
economic capital accumulation is not only available for elite groups who have the 
necessary economic resources but also that such flexibility is also possible for 
working class/non-elite transnational migrants, who have their alternative channels 
and livelihood strategies to accumulate economic, social and cultural capital. 
 Personal transnational migrant networks allow for alternative ways to 
negotiate the Singapore economic structure, without which Thai migrant wives are 
more likely to end up with low-wages for the long-term.  
 There are however some existing occupations in Singapore which offer a 
higher income (from salary plus tip) even if these migrant wives lack the necessary 
professional and language skills. These higher income occupations that are prevalent 
among Thai working class migrant wives are beer sales promoter and masseuse. 
However, these occupations often bring them into conflict with their husbands. Thai 
migrant wives often rationalize their decisions to engage in these occupations as a 
result of necessity since their husbands cannot support them and they are still obliged 
to support their left behinds who are still waiting for their help.  
 
3. Rationalization of Working in Night Work or Working as Entertainer 
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 “I must work in any kinds of jobs that I can do. I don’t care if others blame me 
about what I do because others do not give me money and the person who feed me is 
myself. I just know myself what I am doing rather than care about other people’s 
feeling” (Dao, 28).  
  
 Like many Thai migrant wives, Dao is unable to find any paid work that is 
enough to support her left behind. Thus, she decided to work as a beer sales promoter 
in the Thai disco, an occupation which is considered deviant from her expected 
gender roles of a ‘good wife’. 
Among the Thai migrant wives in Singapore, many turn to rely on the 
provision of erotic entertainment and companionship such as beer sales promoter, 
female hostesses, waitress staff and masseuse in male entertainment places. to earn as 
much money as they can. Although they do not provide any sexual services as part of 
their jobs, they are still considered as deviants because they are engaged in 
entertaining and pleasing the male customers.  Such activities by traditional gender 
norms should be avoided for married women. However, these Thai women ignore 
these gender expectations and roles because of their economic necessity. My 
informants who engage in these jobs  claim that they never go out with their 
customers and that they only please the male customers in exchange for money. 
However, they also claim that many of the Thai migrant wives are  willing to go out 
with the customers and have sex in exchange for money. Mai (32) rationalizes her 
decision to do part-time work as a beer sales promoter at night in the Thai disco: “My 
husband cannot prohibit me. I tell him that I want to do a part time job, and he must 
allow me.  I want to earn money, my parents are still so poor and waiting for my 
money. If he cannot help me, he also cannot prohibit me. I don’t care what other will 
say because my parents are  still hungry”.   
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4.  Strategizing Transnational Spaces, Singapore as Workplace and Thailand 
as Real Home 
  “I live in Singapore only for work. If I don’t work I don’t know what I am 
here for” (Mai, 32). 
 “I live here [Singapore] because I don’t have money. All Thai people want to 
live at home [Thailand]. My home in rural village is my real home because I have 
relatives there” (Buo, 35). 
 
Buo and Mai’s comments resonate most Thai migrant wives’ expectations of 
returning home in the final stage of their marriage migration to Singaporean men. 
Although they migrated to Singapore to settle down with a new family, they still hope 
to return home at the end of the day. . This partly due to the constraining effects  
imposed on them by the economic structure in Singapore. It requires its population to 
work hard perpetually but Thai working class migrant wives are aware that they are 
unlikely to achieve any decent economic status in Singapore even in old age. As such, 
they tend to view  Singapore as their work place even though they have a conjugal 
family here. They intend to live in Singapore only for work and to save money so that 
they can return home and have comfortable lives in the future9.  
For Thai migrant wives, being “ready” to return home usually means that  they 
have enough money to survive in Thailand by running some businesses or that their 
children in Singapore are financially independent so they can return home without any 
concern. As such, they hope to spend their retirement in their home villages and to 
have enough money to set up some small businesses such as restaurants, barber shops, 
farms, fishery farms, money lender businesses, real estate rentals and so on. They are 
determined to return home regardless of their husbands and children’s consensus 
                                                 
9 Among my 34 informants, only Kat (41) and Yam (47) intend to live in Singapore for the whole life. 
Kat gives the reason that because she married her husband since she was 17 and has been in Singapore 
longer than Thailand. Therefore, she has no close relatives and friends in Thailand. For Yam, she said 




because they can always fly back and forth between the two countries to visit. 
However, for those whose husbands agree to retire in Thailand with them, they plan to 
sell or rent their HDB flats and use the money to live comfortably in Thailand. 
This determination of returning home one day is the reason why the majority 
of Thai migrant wives do not naturalized themselves as Singapore citizens, especially 
those women who are able to who work and contribute to their CPF savings and 
renew their PR status based on their own merits. To these women, the advantage of 
the Singapore economic structure is the CPF scheme, a scheme where the Singapore 
government imposes mandatory savings that they can withdraw from when they go 
back to Thailand permanently10.  For those who have never contributed to their CPF 
and have no savings, they can still have money from selling their HDB flats. As such, 
even if they are only considered unskilled workers in Singapore, they will be 
considered as successful migrants who can achieve upward socio-economic mobility 
when they bring their money back to Thailand.  
In sum, international migration has created a range of subject positions that 
allow individuals to negotiate the durability and mutability of class boundaries across 
borders and locales (Lan 2006, p.245). Being transnational migrant wives, they are 
able to rationalize and strategize so that they can receive the benefits of these two 
different geographical spaces of Singapore and Thailand. For working class Thai 
migrant wives, Thailand may not be a good place for employment, but it is a good 
place for those who have money. Singapore is a prime destination for work but it is 
not the place where they can have better living conditions and staying means that they 
                                                 
10 According to CPF broad, the person can apply to withdraw CPF in full when he/she do not hold a 
valid Singapore Work Permit/Employment Pass or have renounced your Singapore Permanent 
Residence; and he is a) 55 years old or above, or b) below 55 years old but above 50 and have not 
worked in Singapore in the two years before application, or c) physically or mentally incapacitated 
from ever continuing in any employment or found to be of unsound mind (Source:www.cpf.gov.sg) 
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have to work hard for the rest of their lives here. As Dao (28) remarks: “If I live in 
Singapore, I cannot be rich and I have to live in a small flat for the whole life, but if I 
go back to Thailand, I will be rich, at my home village, I got big land and I just spend 
money which I earn from here”. 
 Although the working class migrant wives’ economic practices are constrained 
by the economic structure in Singapore, they are able upon their return to challenge 
and reconstruct the economic structure in Thailand that will enable them to gain 
economic resources in order to improve their and left-behinds socio-economic 
conditions through the various types of ‘livelihood strategies’ available to them as 
migrant wives. The marriage migration of Thai women in Singapore could be seen as 
the product of Thailand development process. Cross border marriage and marriage 
migration of Thai rural women is one form of alternative livelihood strategies to 
escape from poverty, to upgrade their socio-economic status and to shift from 
prostitution. Ten years ago, people would assume the upward economic mobility of a 
poor rural family was related to their daughter’s prostitution.   Nowadays, the ironic 
statement among Thai people represents the women’s livelihood strategies of cross 
border marriage that “In a rural village, if you see any big house, the daughter is 
certainly married a ‘Farang’ while in the family whose daughter marry a ‘Thai’ man 
, the house is certainly very different in size”. 
 
Conclusion 
 The trajectories of Thai women migration from rural-urban labor migration to 
transnational marriage migration show the livelihood strategies of Thai working class 
rural women. The Thai global capitalist economic structure may discriminate these 
women into vulnerable position of exploitation but they can actively use transnational 
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marriage migration as a livelihood strategy to escape the Thai exploitative economic 
structure.  
 Singapore economic structure is strictly regulated by the nation-state for its 
survival. The economic structure of Singapore works dynamically with the state/legal 
structure and gendered structure, for example there are some intersections between  
the state’s immigration policies and the state’s manpower policy. The case of PR 
attainment serves to restrict the economic participation of some migrant wives or 
previous work permit holders are restricted from PR attainment even their marriage 
with Singaporean.  In the destination country like Singapore, some working class Thai 
migrant wives are successful in upward their socio-economic mobility since they 
marry middle/upper class Singaporean men. However, women who marry working 
class Singapore men still achieve upward socio-economic status in home country 
(Thailand). Their successful stories often derive from the legal/state structure grant of 
their PR’s which enable them to work, live, and entitle them to other rights in 
Singapore.   However, those who marry affluent Singaporean men might fail to 
succeed in Singapore as well because their right are constrained and enabled by the 
legal/state structure. Thai migrant wives who mary low income men but adopt the 
strategy of “marriage migration” have more chances to receive PR status than those 
who marry professional men but apply “migration marriage” strategy. The state 
disallows low-skilled migrant workers to upward socio-economic mobility through 
marriage regardless of their husband’s class; however, it allows low-skilled migrant 
wife to achieve PR if they marry men who can support them financially and even 
enable some chances for women who marry men with low-education, low income and 
low-skill job. This implies that the gendered structure is important here. Regardless of 
the length of relationship, women who has the marriage migration process or migrate 
 100
as husbands’ follower have better chances in obtaining PR’s more than those who 
migrate as independent migrant workers but have nuptial relationships later with 
Singaporean men. 
 Singapore economic condition also requires the migrant wives’ participation 
in paid employment, particularly for the low income families. However, as migrant 
wives from low income families, it is difficult for them to do ordinary full-time 
unskilled jobs because of the constraint of gendered roles as wife, mother, homemaker 
as well as petty wage earner. In this context, PR women have more chances to find 
alternative higher paying jobs with Malay/Mandarin language skill, cooking skill or 
basic computer skill. Some ignore the gendered roles of a good wife/mother/daughter 
in-law by working as entertainers. However, for migrant wives who are only work 
permit holders, it is more difficult for them to negotiate the economic structure as they 
have limited choices and earn small wages and are unable to remit money home. Then 
again, Thai migrant women have the agency and find other alternatives to negotiate 
the economic structure and the state’s constraint. They do the job without PR 
necessity through their social network or do unusual job such as underground lottery 
sellers, freelance masseuses/hairdressers/maids.  Their trajectories of Thai migrant 
wives show that they are active and knowledgeable agents in this process of marriage 
migration. Working class women are not totally passive or are victims but have the 
opportunities to challenge, ignore or negotiate the state/economic constraint and to 
achieve the expected gendered roles of a dutiful daughter or a good mother of the 




The Dynamic and the Duality  
of Socio-cultural Gendered Structure 
  
 An online discussion forum among Singaporean men focused on the 
comparisons between Singaporean women and Thai women. I shall quote some 
comments on the reasons given by various Singaporean men on why they choose to 
marry Thai women as opposed to their local ones: 
  “I'm Singaporean and married to a Thai wife. I stopped dating Singapore 
women some 6 years before I got married, and for good reasons……..The biggest 
problem with Singapore women is in their deluded mindset. They always think that 
they are better, and hence deserve better - which is of course light years from the 
truth on both counts. They're a sorely misguided bunch who expect endless chivalry 
and pampering, but at the same time they overzealously assert themselves as men's 
equals, or worse, superiors” (Aniyaseo, October 6, 2006). 
  “The feminists will, no doubt, accuse these men of exploiting foreign women 
but, when you're looking to start a family, the last thing you need is a wife who is 
greedy, materialistic and selfish”1. 
 These Singaporean men’s opinions are by no means unique. A popular TV 
documentary Get Real2 sought to find out why there is an increasing number of 
Singaporean men marrying foreign brides. Some of these Singaporean men’s reasons 
are as follows: 
 “Some Singaporean females are simply arrogant, especially those with high 
education levels”. 
 “Singaporean women demand for the 5Cs – condo, car, credit card, country 
club and cash”. 
                                                 
1 Source: www.mangosauce.com, Singapore’s babe drought intensifiers, 3 October 2006. 
2 Get real. Series 2. Episode 37, Are Singapore women hard to love?  Channel NewsAsia. Singapore : 
MediaCorp News, 2005. 
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“Foreigners make better wives, because they are more domesticated, less 
arrogant or materialistic”3. 
All of the voices of these Singaporean men shown above indicate that 
Singaporean men marry foreign brides for patriarchal reasons. They harbor traditional 
gender expectations and norms that in their opinions, could be found on foreign Asian 
brides but not on their Singaporean female counterparts.  
In this chapter, I will focus on the gender issues encountered by Thai migrant 
wives within the socio-cultural dimension in Singapore. I will use Giddens’s ideas on 
the duality of structure to explore Thai migrant women’s experiences of negotiating 
the socio-cultural gender structure in Singapore. In doing so, I argue that the socio 
cultural gender structure must be considered together with an overlapping web of 
patriarchal power relations in the nation-state, religion and family within Thailand and 
Singapore. The result is the emergence of different expected gender relations and 
roles experienced by these Thai migrant wives. As Butler (1989, p.6) argues, “…it 
becomes impossible to separate out “gender” from the political and cultural 
intersections in which it is variably produced and maintain”. The dominant cultural 
models of gender are not universal constructs and do not operate in the same manners 
everywhere because these consists of “specific experiences and situations of particular 
groups or individuals within that social context” (Moore 1994, p.83). Parreñas (2005, 
p.5-6) following Giddens’s approach argue that ‘practice cannot escape structure, 
cannot float free from its circumstances’ (Parreñas 2005, p.5). Similarly for Thai 
transnational migrant wives, their practices are shaped and constrained by two 
different socio-cultural gender structures located before marriage in Thailand and 
after marriage in Singapore. However, as with their experiences within the state and 
economic structures, these women are active agents who  have the ability to negotiate 
                                                 
3 Source: www.littlespeck.com Singapore Girl losing out in love. Seah Chiang Nee. 
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and counterbalance these twofold socio-cultural gender structures. This shows that the 
socio-cultural structures of gender in Singapore and Thailand too are dynamic in 
constraining these Thai women’s practices while allowing at the same time, these 
women to negotiate and challenge the structure to their advantages. 
First, I begin with demonstrating the circumstances under which the socio-
cultural gender structures in both Thailand and Singapore shape and determine the 
gender relations, identities and roles of these Thai migrant wives. 
 
I. Socio-Cultural Structure of Gender in Thai society: Gender 
Relation and Gender Role of Dutiful Daughter 
 I start first with some aspects of the gender structure in Thailand, namely 
aspects of Thai masculinity in relations to Thai women’s experiences of subordination 
and their gender role as a ‘dutiful daughter’. Apart from the economic challenges 
faced by Thai working class women, these two aspects of the gender structure just 
mentioned also shape Thai women’s decisions in choosing cross border marriage 
migration as an alternative to negotiate the gender structure in Thailand. 
 Based on my ethnographic fieldwork, I found that the majority of my 
informants had encountered experiences of  subordination under the various notions 
of Thai masculinity before their marriage migrations to Singapore. They generally 
view Thai men as womanizers, financially irresponsible men who are addicted to 
gambling and alcohol, men who use violence against women and men who cannot 
become breadwinners for their households. Their concepts of Thai masculinity is 
analogous to cultural perceptions and norms of the Thai men as the village tough (nak 
leng). The idea of “Nak Leng” portrays past notions of a powerful man who provided 
the necessary protection in the village when no government authorities were able to 
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exert control over these rural areas. “Nak Lengs” worked hard and played equally 
hard, were supportive of their friends, fierce to their foes and were also famously 
known as great womanizers. However, their behaviors in more modern times are also 
associated with vices such as gambling, drinking with cronies, womanizing and 
having minor wives or mistresses (Thorbek 1987). These negative Thai masculine 
traits attribute for the majority of Thai women’s experiences of subordination and 
poverty. The outlook is one in which Thai women suffer silently while their husbands 
or boyfriends continue to play, drink and womanize without any attempts to work 
hard, save money or sacrifice for their families or their futures. 
 Apart from Thai women’s subordination to Thai masculinity, they are also 
obliged to perform their gender roles of ‘nurturing”. In Thai society, gender relations 
in the family are interconnected with the Theravada Buddhist belief of women as the 
mother-nurturer as a result of their exclusion from monastic roles (Kirsch 1985). The 
ties binding parents and children are constructed by the asymmetrical reciprocity and 
deep-rooted morality of bun khun or meritorious acts of parents towards their 
offsprings (Rabibbhadana 1984; Mills 1997) because parents are the ones who gave 
their children life. This places children in a position of strong obligations towards 
their parents that cannot be repaid or reciprocated within a single lifetime. Children 
not only owe their parents due obedience and respect but also material assistance. 
However, men can demonstrate their gratitude by ordination whereas young women 
are excluded from this activity altogether. Because Thai women are excluded from the 
monastic position, the weight of filial piety and family obligations falls more on 
women than men. As such, doing housework, helping and looking after parents and 
siblings are ways to repay their gratitude. However, with the change in Thai rural 
village economy today, the preferably way for these women to fulfill bun khun 
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obligations for Thai rural women is to support their parental household financially. 
This obligation serves as their primary aspiration to leave their home villages to find 
work in the urban cities in Thailand and depending on the subsequent opportunities, 
migrate overseas.  
Lieba Faier (2007) points out that Filipina migrant entertainers in rural Japan 
stresses their agency in their marriage by showing that they are free to form intimate 
and romantic relationships of marriage, romance, courtship regardless of financial, 
familial, or other concerns. Filipina women assert that they ‘love their husbands’ to 
counter the stigma associated with sex workers4 and would do anything for money or 
marry for escape the poverty and maintain moral sense of self as good Catholic. 
Conversely, for Thai women, they can marry without socio-culturally constructed 
their practices as ‘love’, rather they describe their feeling and practice involved in 
their marriage organized around generalized reciprocity to satisfy their filial 
obligation toward parents (Bun khun). To Thai women, they have agency to make 
choices although their marriage contract derives from the necessary economic 
circumstances overlap with socio-cultural gendered structure5. Romantic love in 
marriage is not mandatory for moral sense of self in Thai Theravada Buddhism, rather 
repaying parent’s gratitude is the ultimate way to achieve the moral sense of self and 
legitimate their social behavior. This is the reason why my informants frankly say that 
the primary reason they choose to marry Singaporean men are because of material 
                                                 
4 Filipina women who go to Japan on entertainer visas are widely perceived as prostitutes in both Japan 
and Philippines because of the relationships between Filipina migration to Japan and Japanese sex 
tourism to the Philippines (Faier 2007, p.154). 
5 Given an example of the material exchange in cross cultural marriage phenomena as Michael 
Schemman (2007), a German-Canadain university professor, tell a real-life account of his eventful love 
stories between himself and Iuu, a young Isan lady and ex-bar girl from Udon Thaini. He was madly in 
love with her, and finally was marry to her. He gave the following comment, which shows his genuine 
perspective concerning the mixed marriage between Farang men and Isan women: “Let us remember 
that Thai marriages, or at least Isan ones, are not based on the notion of romance and love forever 
until death does us part, but economic survival, sex being merely part of the contract’ (Schemmann 
2007, p.129, Smutkupt & Kitiarsa 2007, p.10). 
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exchanges6 rather than romantic love. They have expectations that foreign husbands 
can give financial support for her and her natal family. Therefore, unlike Filipino 
women, the rationalization of Thai migrant wives from poor family purposely find 
foreign men to marry is based on cultural gender obligations as a ‘dutiful daughter’ in 
the Thai Theravada Buddhism context.  
Thai rural village women change gender role from ‘mother sold food’ to 
‘daughter sells her body’ in order to survive in exploitative global capitalist and 
development by being commercial sex worker in the city. However, today Thai 
women use the strategy of ‘daughter sells her body in marriage contract’ which fairly 
legitimate in Thai society. This because she take this strategy as a way to accomplish 
dutiful daughter roles by ‘making money’ for their natal families as well as ‘having 
babies’ at the same time by changing commercial to conjugal sexual contract of cross 
border marriage migration. This can broader the perspective to look at cross border 
marriage that not only the political economy condition but also overlap with socio 
cultural belief which aspire women’s decision of cross border marriage. 
 After migration, the act of sending remittance is the only possible way for 
these Thai migrant wives to accomplish the ‘nurturer’ and ‘dutiful daughter’ roles 
which include saving face/prestige of her natal family through showing that the 
daughter is able to upward socio-economic mobility. They do not end up to be 
prostitutes like many other Isan girls. This ability to remit money home is one of the 
most significant decision factors that determine whether a migrant wife stays in 
Singapore or returns home to Thailand. As Dao (28) explains: “I knew other 4 Thai 
women who marry Singaporean men at the same time as me, but they already went 
                                                 
6 Based on my informants, they said that they decide to marry Singaporean men although has short 
period of courtship or purposely find Singaporean men to marry because they perceive Singaporean  
men is rich, their lives and natal family will not be poverty-stricken anymore. 
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back to Thailand. Only I  still live here because the others cannot stand that they 
cannot work here. If they go back to Thailand, they can work at least. Here it is 
difficult to ask our Singaporean husbands to support our natal7 families.  So, 
although they go back and work as factory worker and earn little money, it is better 
than they cannot do any job and have no money here”.  
 The performance of the role of a “dutiful daughter”is a crucial aspect of 
conforming to the gender structure in Thailand for these Thai migrant wives. To a 
large extent, this role is performed throughout the entire migration process.  However, 
being transnational migrant wives, their gender relations and roles are also determined 
by the gender structure in Singapore, which may at times proved contrary to their 
gender expectations back in Thailand. 
 
II.  Socio Cultural Structure of Gender in Singapore Society: Chinese 
 Familial Pattern of Modern Singapore  
 I focus particularly on the Chinese family as the majority of Thai migrant 
wives generally marry into Chinese Singaporean families and had experienced gender  
subordination within this domain. Therefore, Singaporean men that I discuss in this 
section refer mostly to Chinese men. Also, due to the fact that many Thai migrant 
wives especially my informants marry Chinese men of a certain age, those that are 
older and are still steep within the Confucian traditions of male dominance.  
 Kinship and family structure is one source of women’s oppression as it is an 
institution embedded in particular social meanings constructed by ideological norms, 
and power relations. In the following part, I will show that Thai migrant wives’ 
                                                 
7I translated the original words of the informants, ‘por-mer-pi-nong-tee-bahn’ (lit. father mother older 
sibling younger sibling at home) as ‘natal family’ because only ‘family’ is unclear in English and can 
include in-laws). 
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practices are shaped and determined by Chinese Confucian familial structure. I will 
show how the Chinese kinship structure in Singapore acts as a source of women’s 
oppression based on traditional constructs such as Confucian values.  
 In the context of Singapore, the familial structure overlaps with other 
structures such as the nation-state, economy and religion.  Together, the convergence 
of these structures determine the hierarchical gender structure in Singapore. With the 
emphasis on economic rationality by the nation-state,  the family has taken on 
renewed importance as an intermediary between individual and the state, and has 
become an important instrument for achieving economic goals (Kuo 1987, p.11). In 
Singapore as in most developed countries, the state has functional interests on the 
types of family that its citizens construct. The state justifies its interventions into the 
family by drawing connections between the wellbeing of the family and the wellbeing 
of the nation8. For example, the state authorities in Singapore encouraged the 
formation of the extended family structure based on the Confucian value of filial 
piety. As such, it is not uncommon that newly-weds in Singapore adopt patrilocal 
residence in the early stage of their marriage lives9. From a legal point of view, the 
wife is transferred from her natal family into the family which she marries to (Salaff 
1996).  
 In line with its economic development plans in the early 1960s, the state also 
released women from their traditionally subordinated gender roles.  Rather than just 
                                                 
8 The  ideal of “Asian family” is defined as nuclear family formation by marriage between man and 
woman, children resulting from this union (not more than four); well-educated mothers who return to 
work after childbearing are particularly desirable; care giving for both young and elderly should be 
done with households, but can be replaced by foreign domestic workers.  The state regulates this 
desirable form of family through a variety of specific programs by two powerful institutional tools 
which directly affect people’s everyday life: HDB and CPF such as placing marriage as precondition 
for the purchase of public housing (HDB flats). This is an effective instrument since Singaporeans 
(close to 90%) own and live in HDB flats and paying by CPF (Teo 2006). 
9 This is also because many Singaporean cannot afford to have a flat of their own until they are 
financially established. This family ideology in Singapore work through housing policy  by 
encouraging the primary kin to live together or at least to live nearby in order to strengthen the family 
ties (Kuo 1987). 
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performing the traditional female roles of childbearing and housekeeping, the state 
actively encourages women to participate in the labor force and to become essential 
contributors to the country’s economic growth (Quah 1994, p.187; Devasahayam & 
Yeoh 2007).With their new-found economic and social independence, women began 
to challenge traditional Confucian family values and the hierarchical gender 
relations10 (Kuo 1987, p.12). The balance of power in decision making in the 
households shifts as such and lessons the authority of the men and the power of the in-
laws. However, traditional Confucian values that affirm the dominant position of men 
and the subordination of female into traditional women’s roles of wife/mother (Quah 
1994) did not go away. Singaporean Chinese men still found the need to maintain 
their patriarchal power rooted in Confucianism; a philosophy of ethics that commands 
husbands to be righteous to their wives and wives to be ‘obedient’ to their husbands’ ( 
Quah 1994, p.181). Because these traditional Confucian values are increasingly being 
challenged by their Chinese counterparts, Singaporean Chinese men sought to 
maintain the structure of male dominance by marrying foreign brides from developing 
countries. In Singaporean men’s opinion, foreign brides are much more willing in 
performing traditional expected gender roles that the Singaporean women turn down. 
As such, migrant wives’ gender roles and identities are already fixed such that they 
adhere to that of a wife/mother/daughter-in-laws/caregiver/homemaker. Besides, these 
foreign brides are also restricted in challenging their husbands’ patriarchal power as 
they lack the necessary resources such as a decent paying job and the language skills. 
Hence, they must rely on Singaporean husband for their legal and financial security.  
 To put the above arguments into its proper context, I argue that Thai migrant 
wives are subordinated firstly under the Confucian Chinese familial structure due to 
                                                 
10 Nowadays, Singapore graduate women are likely to challenge the traditional ‘Asian Family’ by 
adapting the popularized DINK (Double Income, No Kids) family model. 
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the post-marital residence with their husband’s families. The patrilocal residence 
brings about significant domestic tensions such as “mother-in-law problems” within 
these familial structures (Nagata & Salaff 1996, p.134). In Confucian Chinese family, 
the gender identities and roles of daughter-in-laws is inevitably subjected to her 
mother-in-law’s authority until the mother-in-law dies or no longer actively 
participates in family affairs. The position of Chinese daughter-in-laws is also by no 
means secure because she is never completely accepted as a full member of the 
husband’s family (Kuo 1987).  As an ideal Chinese woman’s gender roles consist of 
being a “docile, subordinated and domesticated wife and daughter-in-law” (Kandiah 
1987, p.15) women without the necessary resources are totally powerless without a 
supportive family and community. For example, Yim (33), a Thai migrant wife in 
Singapore alluded to the domestic tensions embedded in the hierarchical gender 
relations of a Confucian-oriented Chinese family: “living with Chinese family, either 
you go crazy or you will be rich”.  Another example of this domestic conflict with the 
mother-in-law comes from Chin (43): “Although I have problems with my husband, I 
can talk with him, but I can’t stand when mother-in-law intervenes  and I cannot 
argue with her”.  For Singaporean women, they can solve this in-laws problem by 
keeping a distance from their in-laws. Together with their husbands, they can reject 
the extended family model and embrace a nuclear one by buying a new HDB flat11 as 
they have income and are eligible to buy these HDB flats as citizens. However, for 
foreign brides, their choices tend to be more limited as they are restricted from paid 
work, legal status or if they are allowed to work, they earn relatively low incomes. As 
such, most of these Thai migrant wives have no or little opportunities to move out 
                                                 
11 Source: Get real. Series 2. Episode 28, In-laws: love them or hate them [videorecording] / Channel 
NewsAsia. Singapore : MediaCorp News, 2005. 
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from their husband’s extended families unless their husbands decide and have the 
ability to do so. 
As mentioned earlier, another of the significant aspects of Confucian values is 
filial piety which denotes the natural duty of children to provide the physical care of 
aged parent, or what is known as filial nurturance (Kuo 1987, p.11). However, with 
the demand put on  women’s participation in the labor force,  Singaporean women 
tend to avoid this traditional role as primary caregivers of the elderly since they are 
rarely available to perform physical care-giving tasks during the day (Mehta 2000, 
p.250). Singaporean women who could afford to do so generally transfer this gender 
duty of serving their mother-in-laws to non-family care workers (mostly other non-
Singaporean women who work as domestic workers). In doing so, they are able to 
avoid the potential disputes with a live-in mother-in-law concerning the division of 
housework (Lan 2006, p.103-104). For foreign brides, their options are restricted as 
Singaporean men expect their non-Singaporean wives, especially those who have no 
jobs to become homemakers and care-takers of children and the elderly. This situation 
that Thai migrant wives find themselves in occasionally leads to the oppression of 
daughter-in-laws by parents-in-laws. A plausible reason for this oppression could be 
traced to the traditional idea of care-giving in Chinese societies towards the elderly, 
one that is associated with the hierarchical concept of “serving” rather than the more 
egalitarian notion of “caring” (Lan 2006, p.103). As a result, many Thai migrant 
wives, particularly those who are full-time housewives view their gender roles in the 
Chinese family as maids rather than wives. Being treated like maids also made them 
develop a sense of non-recognition and non-belonging in the family. In fact, it could 
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be argued that their gender identities and roles are akin to that of ‘mui tsais’12, the 
traditional unpaid domestic servitude of very young girls in Singapore prior to the 
1930s. These “mui tsais” could either be well-treated as adopted daughters or 
prospective daughter-in-laws or subjected to severe abuses within the domestic 
context of traditional authority and filial piety (Wong 1996, p.119). Fon (47) explains 
the way her parent-in-laws treat her: “I think Chinese parent in-laws think that they 
can exploit Thai daughter-in-law easily. I used to argue back and said that I am not 
Filipino maid” while Dao (28) questions her gender identity in her nuptial family: 
“…I was very tired because I raised 2 nephews, did all housework and look after his 
parents. I could not go anywhere during two years of marriage. I never went shopping 
and just stayed at home. He treated me like I was a maid rather than his wife. I think 
that he married me because he wanted me to be a cheap maid during the day and 
become his wife in the night”. 
While Confucian family values tend to result in the subordination of these 
Thai migrant wives to their mother-in-laws, it is important to note that the 
Singaporean husband is a key actor in deciding whether these Thai migrant wives are 
subordinated within the familial realm. He could empower his Thai migrant wife to 
avoid being submissive or restrict her completely to be submissive to her in-laws. As 
Noi (34) explains, “the only thing that my husband asks from me is to take care of his 
mother. However, I always have problems with my mother-in-law because she did 
nothing and use me to do everything for her. But my husband told her that I am his 
                                                 
12 The ‘Mui tsai’ means the purchase and adoption of young girls sold in China by impoverished 
peasants to agents who brought them to Malaya and Singapore. They are given the employer’s family 
name and would be married off to a man of the employer’s choice when she grew up, unless she was 
retained in domestic servitude by the employer. Food, clothing and shelter was provided in return for 
the domestic services rendered. However, in the 1930s coinciding with the regulation and eventual 
abolition of the mui tsai trade and the massive entry of women migrants into paid domestic service 
began (Wong 1996, p.119). 
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wife, not a maid. In the beginning, I cried everyday because my mother-in-law always 
said that her son spent money to pamper me. But I was lucky because my husband 
always protected me, otherwise I would be so oppressed”.  However, Dao (28) who 
also encounter problems with her mother-in-law is more oppressed because she 
lacked her husband’s protection: “They treated me like I was their maid, I do all 
housework, child- raising for their grandchildren, and taking care of his parents and I 
could not go anywhere. I told my husband that I was very tired with all housework, 
but he did not help me at all. He also does not give me money consistently”.    
The narratives from Noi and Dao show that patrilocal residence and Confucian 
family value may lead to women’s subordination by women. Through these case 
studies, it shows that the mother-in-laws have structural power to subordinate or 
oppress their daughter in-laws through the Singaporean men’s permission. While 
domestic conflicts are inevitable, whether it leads to oppression of these Thai migrant 
wives or not depends on the husband’s individual practices (whether the husband 
takes his parent side, ignore the conflict/choose to move out/ or protect his wife). 
From my informants, the majority of them have experiences of subordination from 
their mother-in-laws because their husbands never protect them and allow their 
mothers to do so. This could be due to these Singaporean men’s fear of conflicts with 
their mothers or that they have similar gender expectations as their mothers that their 
foreign brides should be responsible for all the domestic work in the house .As such, 
while the socio-cultural gender structure in Chinese Singaporean families has shifted 
for some Singaporean women to a more balanced pattern of gender egalitarian, it 
remains limited for foreign brides have to exercise constraint, submission and 
subordination according to traditional Confucian Chinese familial norms.  
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 Apart from hierarchical gender relations in the Chinese family, Thai migrant 
wives also experience discrimination based on further gender, class and ethnicity 
differences both in the private and public realms. Ruk’s and Pin’s experiences of such 
form of discrimination will be documented below: 
 “When I worked in a Karaoke, my husband’s best friend asked me whether I 
need to go out with customers who are interested in me. I felt very sad and don’t 
understand why she asked me like that. In Singaporeans’ mind-set, they look down 
Thai women as Phu Ying Ha Gin (Prostitute)13 while Thai men are laborer, when you 
speak Thai at Geylang, you are always Thai prostitute.” (Ruk, 34). 
 
“Most of Thai women here live in a big family. If husband’s families see us 
just stay at home, they say nothing but they speak and do sarcastically to us. They 
think that we want to catch our husband. Sometimes not only husband’s parent in-
law, but they also influence their relatives to hate us. But if we work outside home, 
they will be satisfied and treat us well because we don’t have to ask money from our 
husbands. However, in fact, we are not lazy and very hard working. But sometimes we 
cannot work because we don’t have an opportunity [due to PR problem and lack of 
language and job skill]. We try to struggle as much as we can. We try to endure as 
much as we can.  Thai wives who live here are the toughest women in Singapore” 
(Pin, 36) 
 
 The narrative from Ruk and Pin strongly affirms that most Singaporeans 
generally stereotype working class Thai women as sex workers or poor women who 
migrate to their country to exploit the local men with material or permanent residency 
wants. PuruShotam (2004, p.210) pointed out that the commonsense idea of place of 
origin can and does provide social distinctions. A common stereotypical view of 
Thailand as a country is that it is a land of free sex, teeming with red light districts 
and prostitutes. This has formed the majority of the public prejudices against Thai 
migrant wives and hampers better understanding of the complicated hardship behind 
their lives. This also generates domestic tensions in the forms of unreasonable 
distrust, discriminating behaviors from their in-laws, friends and relatives of their 
                                                 
13 Literally, “Phu Ying Ha Gin” means a lady who works to earn living. 
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husbands. Thai women often report similar experiences of such discriminations in 
their conjugal family: 
“My mother-in-laws always watch  every step that I take. In the first month, 
she always stared at me when I used the washing machine and microwave. She 
thought that I never use washing machine in Thailand before. I want to say that I used 
more modern machines than what she uses now. I am wondering that if I am 
Singaporean women, she will stare, follow and teach me like this or not” (Daeng, 21). 
 
“Until now I don’t know why my parent in-laws have not accepted me as their 
daughter-in-law. When I visited them during Chinese New Year, they never greet me 
or smile. They never accept my Ang Pao (red packet with money in it given for good 
luck)” (Guk, 28). 
 
“I think my mother-in-laws are bias towards Thai women. At the beginning, I 
cried many times, because she always behave and say something like I want to exploit 
her son. Sometimes she says that she will not allow me to sell this house, she will 
protect this house until she dies. She listened to her friends who instigate that I was 
planning to sell the house” (Noi, 34). 
 
  “I cannot get along with my husband’s family. I think I already done my best 
and I don’t know what I have done to make them unhappy. When they see me, they 
shut the door with a bang in front of me” (Chin, 43). 
 
 Although the socio-cultural gender structure of gender is dynamic in allowing 
local women to challenge the patriarchal Chinese family, Thai migrant wives continue 
to live under subordination and discrimination in the domestic realm. However, it is 
not just the patriarchal Chinese family that contributes to the tensions that Thai 
migrant wives face. They also encounter a “clash of culture” between the socio-
cultural gender structures of Chinese Singaporean families and Thai families in which 
they are unable to satisfy both sets of expected gender roles at the same time. 
 
III. Transnational Socio-cultural Gender Structure in Family: The 
Clash between Singapore and Thai expected Gender Roles 
  “In Chinese family, they hope that the wife will do the duties of child-raising, 
cooking, staying at home and waiting for their husbands to come home but Thai 
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women  cannot do like that because their parents in Thailand  are still poor” (Yim, 
34).  
 
According to Hong (1979:56), inter-ethnic and inter-religious marriages are 
more prone to marriage conflicts because of the conflict of values held by the spouses 
coming from different cultural and religious backgrounds.  
This corresponds with Yim’s experiences as she faced paradoxical gender 
identities and roles in that she is obliged to perform nurturing (dutiful 
daughter/mother) roles for her natal family as well as the role of a submissive wife 
and daughter in-law for her conjugal family. In general, Thai migrant wives are 
unable to accomplish all these expected gender roles at the same time and this often 
leads to more domestic tensions. In northeastern culture of Thailand, romance, 
courtship, and marriage implicate the dutiful daughter roles of a Thai woman. For 
example, the bride price paid to the parents of a Thai woman represents a groom’s 
obligations to the bride’s family including traditionally/ideally matrilocal residence. 
In this case, the son-in law moves to woman’s parent house and his agricultural labors 
on the wife’s family lands, and the woman’s filial duty  is reinforced by the tendency 
for youngest daughter to look after her parents at home (in turn, inheriting the house) 
(Wilson 2004:93-95). Thus, single Thai women or married women are tied to filial 
obligation to their parents. They are expected to be the caretakers and dutiful 
daughters of their natal family not to be daughter in-laws of conjugal family. 
However, in traditional Chinese family, the gendered role of a married woman was 
expected to put her husband’s family above all and the role of a daughter effectively 
ends upon marriage (Kuo 1998). 
In the global Capitalism of Thai society, a daughter’s filial obligation to their 
parents by taking care of them at home has been replaced by material supports: cash, 
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household entertainment unit like television and modern house. Thai rural women 
migrate to urban cities perform this obligation by remitting money back home. 
Because of the abovementioned cultural logic, except for women who married into 
Chinese families, generally women who are married to Thai men do not encounter the 
domestic tension although they rely on their husbands to send regular remittance to 
their natal families. The exception is when the couple is poor and unable to complete 
this obligation. 
For a transnational migrant, money remittance is the means to accomplish the 
role of a dutiful daughter, a good nurturer back and to protect prestige of their parents 
in Thailand. However, the regular money remittance by these Thai migrant wives to 
their natal families is perceived as disrespectful to the conjugal family by some 
Chinese Singaporean families. This is a common source of domestic tension between 
the Thai migrant wives and their conjugal families. As Dao (28) explains: “It 
certainly brings problem, if I said how much my family wants per month. My husband 
and his family will think that my family wants only money and look down on me. I am 
obliged to remit money to my parents and I try to remit as much as I can. Singaporean 
husbands will be happy if their Thai wives do not remit money. However, we have to 
see why Thai women come here. Most of them come here because of their natal 
families, not because we want to follow our husbands. Thai women migrate to 
anywhere in the world because of their natal families. The first obligation of Thai 
women is a dutiful daughter who must take care of their parents and siblings”.   
However, the issue of money remittance further heightens the domestic 
tension if the Singaporean husbands do not understand the Thai migrant wives’ 
obligations as a ‘dutiful daughter’ to their parents, especially if they have to rely on 
their husband’s money for remittance. On the contrary, if the Thai migrant wives do 
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not want to depend on their husband’s money for remittance, they may attempt to find 
paid work, work two shifts or work in the various male entertainment places to earn 
their own money to remit back home to Thailand. Such decisions also bring about 
domestic tensions as they fail to perform their role of a ‘good wife/mother/daughter-
in-law’ to the conjugal family.  
There are nevertheless few fortunate cases where the Singaporean husbands do 
understand the Thai women’s ‘nurturer roles’ and willingly support their natal family 
and children from previous marriages financially and protect the women from the 
husband’s parents’ involvement. Noi’s case, (34), a wife to a Singaporean senior 
engineer is one such example: “one thing that my husband asked of me is only to b a 
full-time housewife for him and not to go to find a job outside as he promise me that 
he will be responsible my whole family; my parents, aunts, my nieces and my siblings 
for the whole life…. He never says or tells his mother that he gives money every 
month for my family”. In this case, it shows that the husband could possibly be a key 
actor who enables or constrains his Thai migrant wife’s fulfillment of the role of a 
dutiful daughter. However, the majority of Thai migrant wives’ experiences are that 
their husbands do not want or have no capability to remit money for their wives’ natal 
families. 
The clash of these expected gender roles between the two different socio-
cultural contexts results in the limiting of Thai women’s choices as they could only 
accomplish the expected gender roles in one cultural context and seldom both unless 
the Singaporean husbands demonstrate some forms of active agency in this matter. 
Based on my ethnographic study in Singapore, my informants have the same opinion 
that there are considerable distinctions between Singaporean husbands and Westerner 
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husbands,14 especially regarding financial support and money remittance to the natal 
family, which is very relevant to the extended family. Particularly, women who live 
with their Singaporean in-laws such as Dao, money remittance does create domestic 
tension. On the other hand, they also agreed that sending money to the natal family is 
more acknowledged and supported by Singaporean husbands with higher economic 
status who do not live with their parents or being married to Western men as they 
know that the wives’ families are very poor and require their daughters’ money 
remittance for survival. Here, I argue that Thai migrant wives who come from poor 
families encounter domestic conflict which is based on the clash of the expected 
gendered roles between the cultural gender obligation as ‘dutiful daughters’ in the 
Thai Theravada Buddhism context and ‘submissive wife/daughter in-laws’ who must 
look after the conjugal families above her natal families in Chinese family. This is 
different from Thai women who marry Westerner men and have nuclear families. 
 However, it will be interesting to do further research on the women’s act of 
money remittance to natal families in other Asian cultural context whether this will 
create the domestic tension and the similar clashes of gendered expectation like those 
for Thai women in Chinese Singaporean family. 
 
IV. Women’s Agency in Negotiating with Socio Cultural Structure of 
Gender 
 In the following sections, I will explore Thai migrant wives’ experiences in 
negotiating the socio-cultural gender structures of Thailand and Singapore 
respectively as knowledgeable active agents.   
                                                 
14 Since all my informants marry to Singaporean and Western me,  I am able to only compare between 
migrant women who married to Singaporean and live with in-laws, those who do not live with in-laws, 




1. Women’s Experiences of Negotiating Thai Gender Structure through 
Cross-border Marriage Migration 
 “At that time, my family was very poor. I made a decision to marry because of 
my family. I explained to my parent that I do not know how my future is going to be, 
but I want to take a risk if I have a chance…..I did not love him (Dao’s husband) at 
all. I told him that I have to responsible for my family and I hope that he will be 
responsible for his ‘husband’s duty” (Dao, 28). 
 
“I don’t want to think about the time that I lived with my Thai boyfriend. He is 
completely bad and “bloody” promiscuous. Now, he already died because of AIDS.  If 
I still go out with him, I will die because of AIDS already. I often dream about him 
that he wants to bring me to live with him. I am very afraid of Thai man. My parents 
are also happy with me when I am not married to a Thai man. They boasted about 
their foreigner-in-laws to everyone in my village. In my village, only I  have foreigner 
husband while most of women work as sex workers, factory workers, or waged 
workers in rural areas and all of them have Thai husbands who are very poor and 
promiscuous” (Mai, 32). 
  
 “If I did not decide to come to Singapore and still live with my ex-husband, I 
will not have a life like today. I think I will still be only a somtum (papaya salad) 
seller. My life now is much better than the past” (Noi, 34). 
 
 The narratives from Dao, Mai and Noi show that it is insufficient to 
understand Thai migrant wives as only  migrants of economic motives, rather Thai 
women also make their decisions to marry overseas husbands based gender relations 
and expected gender roles in Thai society. 
From Dao’s narrative, it shows that the discourse of ‘Mia Farang’ 
(Westerner’s wife) and the phenomenon of cross cultural marriages are fairly 
legitimate in Thai society as it is one possibility for Thai women to achieve their 
expected gender roles in the Thai socio-cultural context. Although these women 
marry for money attained through their husband’s financial support, they use this 
money to support their natal families. Dao made her choice based on the overlapping 
conditions of the socio-cultural and the economic structure, where she is required to 
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be a ‘dutiful daughter’ who can help her family from poverty (See also: The Dynamic 
and the Duality of Economic Structure). 
The migration decisions of Mai and Noi are based on both their negative 
experiences of Thai masculinity and their positive attitudes towards foreigner men. As 
such, they view Thai masculinity as the reason for women’s subordination and 
poverty. In Alyson Brody’s article (2006, p.141), she revealed that rural migrant 
women who lived in the Bangkok slum communities wanted to find foreign husband 
as they are more responsible than Thai men. Among my informants, there are 13 
women who had bad experiences with Thai masculinity. My informants 
acknowledged that they only chose to marry to foreigners partly because of the 
economic necessity but they also because they had lost hope with Thai masculinity. 
They believe that these foreign men have wealth and are faithful and hard working. 
As such, ,marrying a foreigner will ensure that their families will be looked after, 
thereby helping them escape from poverty and oppression under the Thai economic 
and gender structures. Some women said that marrying a Singaporean man is also 
akin to a ‘slap in the Thai men’s faces and it allow them to challenge dominant Thai 
patriarchal norms. Kai (38) relates: “I was very revengeful towards my ex-husband 
who said that I cannot survive without him. I came to Singapore because I wanted to 
take revenge on my ex-husband. He challenged me that I could not come here. But 
when he knew I could come to Singapore, I was very satisfied when I saw him begged 
me to stay with him, but it was too late”.   
In sum, Thai women’s aspiration to marriage migration is not only shaped 
simply by economic inequalities in the different countries but also by the socio-
cultural gender structure which requires Thai women to fulfill the role of a ‘dutiful 
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daughter’ role as well as to escape from women’s subordination under the exploitative 
characteristics of Thai masculinity. 
 
2. Women’s Experiences of Negotiating the Clash between Gender 
 Structure by Reconstructing Gender Identity  
 To overcome the stereotypical prejudices against Thai women as “lazy” 
women who aim only to exploit their husbands, Thai women attempt to find paid 
work since the worker role is an additional requirement for Singaporean women in 
addition to their wife/mother roles (Tan 2003). Finding employment will also bring 
them self-recognition and public approval (Breger 1998). In this sense, many Thai 
women transform their traditional gender identity and add on the role of a 
‘hardworking’ worker to meet the requirements in Singapore for daily survival and 
public recognition. However, Thai migrant wives are unable to prioritize only this 
“worker” role since the role of a ‘dutiful daughter’ is also of socio-cultural importance 
to them. 
Because one of prevalent motivations of marriage migration among Thai 
migrant wives is the duty to repay their gratitude towards their parents, Thai women 
depend on various strategies throughout the different stages of their marriage. In the 
beginning of their marriage, Thai women usually accomplish this duty by asking their 
husbands to build or renovate her natal family’s house as a bride price or dowry to 
show their gratitude towards their parents. After marriage migration, these practices 
of showing gratitude involves religious rituals such as making merit for their deceased 
parents by offerings made to the Thai Buddhist monks in Singapore or by a rite of 
pouring water to consign merit to their parents at Thai temples located in Singapore as 
well. However, the most significant practice of these Thai migrant wives is money 
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remittance as a way to fulfill their obligations as dutiful daughters to their families. 
The act of remitting money is also a symbol to the family that migrant is doing well in 
the destination that they have migrated to. In reality, this is more often a  face saving 
gesture for their natal families while their struggles lives in the destination countries 
remained unrevealed to the people back home. Generally, money remitted back home 
is initially spent to reconstruct the house of the parents as the reconstructed house 
signifies that their migration is successful and enhance the prestige of their parents. 
Next, the money is used to pay off all their parent’s debt and to provide the economic 
sustenance of their kins. However, for those who are unable to remit money regularly, 
they are still the financial providers for their natal families when they are in trouble. 
Money remittance is not only spent to improve their own family’s financial security 
but also used to support development projects within their local communities. This act 
is not only an act of moral obligation but also shows their parent’s prestige. Thus, 
money remittance substitutes for their gender roles and familial obligations as 
mother/nurturer (parent’s nurturer) which they cannot perform physically. 
However, as the Chinese family in Singapore needs the daughter in-laws to 
take all responsibilities of domestic work, Thai migrant wives often try to juggle both 
the domestic and public spheres by becoming a mother/wife/daughter-in-law in 
domestic realm of the conjugal family and by performing their worker roles to fulfill 
their obligations to both families at the same time. As Ruk (34) explains:  “Thai wives 
are hardworking and tolerant. We have to be a breadwinner and good housewife at 
the same time. We have to be breadwinner and cannot just depend on our husbands 
because our natal families are still hungry and poor”. Generally, q women can 
reconcile her conflicting roles and the dilemma of “home versus career” by choosing 
to revoke her career so that it does not become a burden to her childcare work (Kuo 
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1987). But working class Thai women cannot become full-time housewives as they 
need to work to support their natal families financially, so they attempt to balance 
these conflicting gender roles by working in jobs that do not require them to leave 
home for most or all of the day such as that of an underground lottery seller, 
freelance/part-time hairdresser, cleaner, food seller, working at home and so on. For 
some Thai migrant wives, they choose to have agency over their bodies by controlling 
their pregnancies in order to avoid the burden of childcare duty.  
 
3. Women’s Experiences of Negotiating the Clash between Singapore and 
Thai Socio-Cultural Gender Structure through Pregnant Bodies 
One of the most important factors preventing Thai migrant wives from 
employment is the burden of child care, so most Thai women control their 
reproductive powers by making independent decisions on whether to have children or 
not. 
In general, foreign brides are expected to have children for the Singaporean 
men who seek these foreign brides because they are perceived to be different from the 
local women in that they are more willing to take care of their in laws, to have 
children for them15 and to fulfill traditional gender obligations of a wife, mother, 
daughter-in-law and homemaker. However, as the child-rearing process could restrict 
these migrant wives from potential employment opportunities, many Thai migrant 
wives choose to use contraception  since they prioritize work to accomplish the duty 
of a dutiful daughter. Mai (32) explains:  “I don’t want to have kids because I don’t 
have money. If I work and I have kids at the same time, I will have many problems 
later on. My husband want kids, but I am not ready. I know if I have kids, I cannot 
                                                 
15 Get real. Series 2. Episode 37, Are Singapore women hard to love? [videorecording] / Channel 
NewsAsia. Singapore : MediaCorp News, 2005. 
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work and I must stay at home. I don’t have any relatives here, So, I have to take care 
of my kids alone. I cannot hire a maid because it’s very expensive. Although I have 
PR, the future is uncertain. One day if I divorce my husband, I have to work to 
guarantee myself. So, I think it will be my burden if I have kids. I just married with 
him for 3 years, I don’t want a kid to become my burden”.   Mai’s narrative shows 
how Thai women rationalize and make independent decisions on their body to remain 
childless, leaving aside  and ignoring the expected gender reproductive role of a 
woman in the Singaporean Chinese family. For migrant wives like Mai, the priorities 
of her left behinds in Thailand are more important than Confucian Chinese family 
values or any of their husband’s pre-conceived expectations.  
 
V. The Emergent Dynamic Socio Cultural Gender Structure as the 
Product of Thai Women’s Negotiation 
As I have mentioned earlier, foreign brides do not have the same ability to 
achieve gender equality as the Singaporean women (who are more educated and 
independent, so they easily get employment, then can afford to buy a new house or 
hire maid) do. However, Thai women can negotiate the patriarchal norms imposed on 
them by using their own strategies of finding employment or controlling their own 
bodies in regards to reproduction. For the following part, I will explore the emergent 
dynamic socio-cultural gender structure which Thai women reconstruct in their 
everyday practices and social spaces to circumvent and challenge the Patriarchal 
Chinese familial structure. As such, they are able to move beyond the traditional 




1. Women’s Experiences of Negotiating and Strategizing the Space beyond 
Family Domain 
 The first space which Thai migrant wives use beyond the family domain is 
Golden Mile Complex, the social and physical space where groups of foreign Thai 
workers mark as home away from home (Kitiarsa 2006). It is also a strategic ‘counter 
space’ (Yeoh & Huang 1998; Lan 2006) used by Thai migrant wives to resist the 
patriarchal gender structure of the domestic realm in Singapore. In this ‘counter’ 
space, they are able to perform alternative gender identities and roles and also form 
social networks far away from Thailand. 
 Golden Mile Complex is always the first place outside “home” and “family” in 
Singapore where Thai migrant wives are introduced to when they arrived in 
Singapore. It is of functional importance to these Thai migrant wives because Golden 
Mile Complex is the place to go to, for the facilitation of their marriage registrations. 
This involves the translation of documents, the handling of legal issues and asking for 
advices regarding marriage migration. Apart from the administrative services, they are 
also able to inquire and exchange knowledge regarding the problems and 
opportunities of life in Singapore from the other Thai women who work in Golden 
Mile Complex or from others with similar backgrounds. The Thai women who work 
at the marriage registration service office are one of the key persons in these migrant 
wives’ social networks since they are able to provide information regarding 
immigration laws as well as advices on personal problems.  They often suggest to 
newcomers to involve themselves in other activities beyond the normal household 
chores such as taking up English classes, computer courses, distance learning courses 
from Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University and non-formal education classes 
offered to Thai migrants in Singapore. By doing these activities, they can improve 
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their skills and qualifications and also have their personal space away from the 
familial domain. Thai migrant wives also involve themselves in the public realm by 
doing volunteer work at Friends of Thai Labor Association and in any of the Thai 
festivities celebrated by the Thai community in Singapore such as Labor Day, 
National Elections and so on. To a large extent, many of the organization of these 
festivals or volunteer works are unable to be successful without the Thai migrant 
wives’ contribution.  
Golden Mile Complex is also a place for Thai male workers’ to get a respite 
from their strictly regulated lives in Singapore and to reflexively apprehend their own 
marginalized life and hardship, culminating in the accustomed picture of the 
outrageous anti-social behavior during the festive weekends (Kitiarsa 2006).  
However, it is not only a space for dominated by male resistance practice, but it is 
also a space where Thai migrant wives show their “deviant femininity” in protest 
against their oppression by their expected gender roles and identity of subordinated 
wives and daughter-in-laws in Singapore. At Golden Mile Complex on every Sunday, 
Thai women mingle with Thai men throughout the three stories building. They sit in 
groups at restaurants, karaoke shops, snooker clubs and even on the floor at the 
basement car park. They enjoy a variety of local Thai food with large or ample 
amount of beer. Interestingly, in the karaoke shops, pubs and Thai discos at Golden 
Mile Complex, the customer base  are not only male but also female who are there to  
see the many young beautiful Thai women and good looking Thai male singers and 
dancers. These singers and dancers also escort and sit with both male and female 
customers who pay for their drinks and tip them for their company. At these 
entertainment places in Golden Mile Complex, Thai migrant wives also engage in 
gambling, alcohol sprees, exchange gossips about their in-laws and meet their extra-
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marital affair partners and so on.. These deviant feminine characteristics resonate with 
the Thai migrant wives’ knowledge that they are in an autonomous “insider” space 
that allows them to display identities beyond the ‘subordinate female domestic roles 
of wives/mothers/daughter in-laws in their daily lives. 
Apart from Golden Mile Complex, Thai women also use other social spaces to 
gain social capital by forming woman-only networks beyond the family arena. These 
are formed in spaces where they can do activities together such as English classes at 
Friends of Thai labor Association and Chenli Church16, barber shops or hair saloons, 
Thai temples and some of these Thai migrant wives’ residences. Thai women form 
these social networks to share problems, advices and to help each other through 
loneliness. As most Thai migrant wives encounter problems  in understanding the 
various mediums of the local media, these social networks become important sources 
of news, information, knowledge as well as finding work and goods. As Noi (34) 
pointed out: “I can follow and update Singapore laws and policies which are often 
changed by talking with my Thai friends since each person has different problems and 
knowledge. I often go to barber shop around my house which is owned by a Thai 
woman to talk and cook with other women. I think the first thing to do to survive in 
Singapore is  constantly track the  news, amended laws and policies which I can do 
that by talking with my Thai friends. As Noi explained, barber shops or hair saloons 
owned by Thai migrant wives are places for full-time Thai housewives who are living 
nearby to congregate and form their social networks. While these shops may be a 
public space, it becomes a private space where other Thai women can spend time 
together to enjoy each other’s company as well as learn some hairdressing skills (See 
                                                 
16 Chenli Church is located on Guillemard Road. It is the place for Thai people to study distance 
learning system of non-formal education. It takes two year to finish junior high school (Matthayom 3) 
and another two years to finish senior high school (Matthayom 6).  
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also: The Duality of Economic Structure) out of the surveillance of the husbands or 
their families.  
 
2. Women’s Experiences in Negotiating the Socio-cultural Gender Structure 
through Creating Religious Spiritual Identity 
 Another prominent space that Thai migrant wives develop identities beyond 
the familial gender domain  is located at the 18 Wat Thai (Thai temples) in Singapore. 
In Thai society, a Wat is of extreme importance as it is deemed as “necessary for a 
civilized social existence” (Potter 1976). Wat Thai, much like those in these migrant 
wives’ home villages, provides the space for public worship, religious ceremony,  
community meeting place, solving personal crisis and celebrating festivities in 
Singapore. 
  Being a Buddhist is a crucial aspect of the Thai migrant wives’ gender 
identity. As such, Buddhist activities are important practices for the maintenance of 
these Thai migrant wives’ spiritual identities and roles – “spiritual self”. The 
persistence of the Thai Buddhism institution in Singapore must be credited to the 
daily contributions and involvements of these Thai migrant women’s as the Thai male 
workers rarely go to these Buddhist temples while working in Singapore (Kitiarsa 
2006).  The activities of these Thai migrant women such as giving alms to the monk 
and offering daily subsistent requisites are also consistent with the Thai Buddhist’s 
gender image of “women as nurturers” Keyes (1984). . By engaging in these religious 
activities, Thai migrant wives strengthen not only their existing cultural and social 
capital but also their spiritual gender identities.  
In Singapore, the religious activities of Thai migrant women involves mostly  
paying respect to the Buddha, preparing for the monk’s daily meals, merit offerings  
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to Buddhist monks for their close relatives’ death day, making donations for temples 
in their home villages and joining various religious activities and rituals with the 
temple. They are also volunteers for many of the religious activities run by the 
temples such as teaching Buddhism, Buddhist meditation, Thai classical dance, Thai 
and English language lessons. A Wat Thai also functions as a cultural institution to 
socialize the Thai migrant wives’ children into the Thai culture and its identity. When 
these Thai Buddhist temples have festivals, these Thai housewives will bring their 
children to join in the temple’s activities such as children beauty competitions and 
Thai classical dancing performances on Songkran Day for example. Some Thai 
women or migrant wives are also ordained as nuns for a short while at these Thai 
temples. The practice of nun ordination in Singapore provides opportunities for some 
Thai migrant wives to relieve their stress from living in a Singaporean family since 
they would be in the company of others Thai migrant wives.  Nun ordination also 
serves as a form of resistance against the traditional gender expectations and roles 
imposed on these Thai migrant wives in Singapore.  
Going to Wat Thai and doing religious activities are ways Thai migrant wives 
used to  empower their spiritual identity and gain spiritual support.  When they are 
away from home, religious activities bring spiritual closeness to their left behinds in 
Thailand as Sri (29) explains: “When I have family problems like my mother was sick 
and admitted in the hospital, I often go  to the temples to make merit. So, I feel much 
better, the religion is one thing that I can rely on in this situation”. 
 Thus, Wat Thai is one of the most significant spaces where Thai women can 
feel a sense of home, form religious networks and gain spiritual identities/selfhoods to 
counterbalance the oppressive gender structure in Singapore. They do religious 
activities together, exchange phone numbers, and keep the contacts fresh within their 
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social networks. Within this religious setting, there is a similar sense of insider 
relationships to that of the ones developed at Golden Mile Complex as Thai migrant 
wives feel positive and free to share their personal problems among friends.  
 
3. Negotiating Practices of ‘Thai Tai Tai’ 
 Although the dominant gender and familial norms  in Singapore regulate the 
activities of the Thai migrant wives, they are able to create social spaces independent 
of their husbands and their husbands’ families. While some Thai migrant wives are 
able to become legal or illegal paid workers,  full-time housewives unavoidably have 
to rely entirely on their husbands in all aspects of their lives in Singapore. However, 
these full-time housewives are also able to seek social spaces away from their 
Singaporean husbands and matrimonial families to engage in alternative gender 
performances and identities. 
 In Singapore, the notion of a ‘Tai-Tai’ portrays the image of a woman 
married to rich and influential men who are in the upper echelons of society. A tai-tai 
is also totally dependent on their husbands, hence their husbands are believed to have 
total influence and control over her. However, she also possesses a ‘tremendous 
amount of leisure time’, have ‘lots of money to spend’ and adopts a jet-setting 
lifestyle.  A tai-tai is well known for her concern about her class/social status and the 
dramatization of that social status (Chee 2008). This is akin to a ‘Thai Tai Tai’, a term 
I coined here to represent full-time Thai migrant wives of upper class Singaporean 
men whose lives are completely dependent on their husbands. They come originally 
from rural villages and still maintain their ethno-cultural identities in Singapore. Their 
leisure time is used to reinforce their nostalgic sense of Isan village lifestyle and to 
liberate themselves from the conjugal family domain. 
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 I traced how a social network of ‘Thai Tai Tais’ is formed in Singapore by 
following one group of ‘Thai Tai Tais’. This social network is initiated by “Pen” who 
married an American businessman and lives with her husband in an upscale 
condominium on Orchard Road. Initially, Pen organized informal gatherings with 3 
other Thai migrant wives every week at her house.  Subsequently, others brought 
along their Thai friends who are also full-time migrant wives. Pen’s house which is 
located in the shopping area of the city has now become the regular  space where 
‘Thai Tai Tais’ arrange weekly gatherings. There are 10 Thai migrant wives in this 
‘Thai Tai Tais’ social network, 2 out of 10 married Western men and the rest married 
Singaporean men.  Pen always call her group “Hi-so”17 because they have much more 
leisure time and money to spend for their enjoyment than the average Thai migrant 
wife. Interestingly, in this group, 6 out of 10 women marry working-class 
Singaporean husbands but are still able to integrate into the so called ‘Thai Tai Tais’ 
group well. 
 I had a chance to join their weekly gathering one afternoon while their 
husbands were out at work. I found that all the women brought their children along to 
Pen’s house and let them play together. It is here I witness the ‘Thai Tai Tais’ 
expressing their ethno-cultural identities. While their kids spoke in English, these 
women spoke in the Isan dialect. They sat in together on the floor covered by a mat 
and enjoyed traditional Isan foods which they cooked themselves. They sang and 
listened to Isan and Thai songs together with Thai liquor and beer away from the gaze 
of their husbands. At the gathering, the conversations ranged from housewives roles 
such as child-raising methods, family problems to sexual relationships with their 
husbands, women’s health and dietary regimes, cooking, children’s schooling, 
                                                 
17 Hi-so literally stands for High Society. In Thai, it denotes upper class people in Thai society or 
people who have socio-cultural capital as upper class. 
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Singapore laws and policies and so on. They also talked about their lives in the past 
and everyone agreed that they are grateful to their husbands for their lives in 
Singapore. They also make comparisons between Thai, Singaporean and Western 
husbands. Apart from weekly gatherings, they often organize parties for various 
occasions such as birthdays, New Year where they will bring their husbands along. 
These parties help create trust with their husbands while allowing them to socialize 
with other ‘Thai Tai Tais’. Compared to Thai working-class women, ‘Thai Tai Tais’ 
are more dependent on their husbands for their legal and socio-economic security. By 
establishing a social network among themselves, they form a bond of sisterhood based 
on “fictive kinship” to counter-balance this reliance on their husbands. In the ‘Thai 
Tai Tais’ social network much like the social networks of the working-class Thai 
migrant wives, they are able to exchange goods, labor resources, updated news and 
information, laws and policies regarding their transnational lives without asking their 
husbands. They are also able to share their problems and gain mutual support from 
each other.  Similarly, these ‘Thai Tai Tais’ also engage in ‘deviant femininity 
behaviors’ beyond that of a dependent wife and a mother by going to discotheque and 
behaving like single women there. 
Once, I was invited to a pub in Orchard Road with this ‘Thai Tai Tais’ group 
to celebrate the birthday of one the ‘Thai Tai Tai’. On that night, there were 5 ‘Thai 
Tai Tai’ who dressed sexily to make themselves look younger. In the pub, their 
conversations showed they are enjoying the temporal freedom and pleasure away 
from performing their expected gender roles of wives, mothers and homemakers. 
Below are some excerpts of comments made at that time:  
“When I am  here, I don’t want to get married. I want to be single again” . 
  
“It looks like I am in another world. I feel liberated”. 
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“I want to catch one Farang [Western guy] tonight, just let them treat us beer 
for free”. 
 
On that night, these ‘Thai Tai Tais’ behaved like single women without any 
worries and concerns of their families. They tried to pick up Western men and get 
them to buy beer for them, danced with Western teenagers, flirt with many foreigners, 
make loud noises and also took off their wedding rings to symbolize their single 
status. However, these ‘Thai Tai Tais’ do realize that this space and time is only 
transient whereas being a wife and mother are the most crucial roles for them.  
Although they enjoyed themselves in the pub, Som (40) adds: “But we should not 
forget that if we don’t have them [husbands], we will not have today”. Som, the 
birthday woman wanted to go home first at 11.00 p.m. to perform her mother role: “I 
left my son and ask others to take care of him. My husband does not know I come to 
pub tonight and my son help me to conceal this. I like to go clubbing but I can control 
myself because my son want to hug me when he sleep”. While their leisure activity at 
the pub is stigmatized as “deviant femininity”, it is a space of liberation from their 
expected gender roles which they are totally subservient to while in the family 
domain. However, that night ended with all the ‘Thai Tai Tais’ going home to resume 
their responsible ‘good mother and wife roles’. For example, Puk (33) will get up 
early in the morning to prepare breakfast for her husband and do her daily housework. 
Pin (35) still has to breastfeed for her little baby while Nam (33) has to see her kid off 
to school.  
 
4. Women’s Experiences of Negotiating through Reconstruction of Gender 
Relations and Sexuality: ‘Gik’ 
 “In the past, I wondered why Thai women here are unfaithful. But when I 
experienced it myself, I changed my mind. I never feel angry if Thai wife here commit 
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adultery because their husbands are selfish and treat her badly. When I married my 
husband, he only cares for his family, never care for me. He has a wife because he 
wants someone he can hug in the night. My husband thought that I can live in this 
country because of him, but to me, my parent are the ones that I need to repay my 
gratitude  more than my husband” (Dao, 28). 
 
 “I think that Thai women here have ‘Gik’ because of their greedy sexual 
desire, money and unlimited demands” (Kim, 33). 
 
 The phenomenon of having a ‘Gik’18 may be a fashionable practice among 
Thai people in Thailand but the trend has also diffuses to Singapore and it has become 
increasingly common among Thai migrant wives to do so in Singapore as well. The 
above statements made by Dao and Kim however show that there are contradictory 
attitudes towards committing adultery, depending on each woman’s perspectives and 
experiences.  For example, Dao perceives her ex-husband as a completely wicked 
man while Kim always felt thankful towards her husband’s love.  
 Buo (35), a Thai migrant wife who has been in Singapore for 12 years, 
confirmed that extramarital affair is not a recent phenomena. She said that it had been 
happening since a long time ago although it was not as common as it is today.  In the 
past, Thai women use the word ‘Dek’19 to refer to a male lover in an adulterous 
relationship but ‘Gik’ has become the ubiquitous word for ‘Dek’ among Thai migrant 
wives in Singapore today. In this section, I will explore the phenomenon of having 
‘Giks’ among Thai migrant wives. I will show  how Thai migrant wives conceptualize 
the notions of ‘Gik’ and ‘Gik relationship’. I will also explore the reasons they have 
for having a ‘Gik’. I will argue that the ‘Gik relationship’ must be understood beyond 
individual factors such as moral flaw or avid sexual desire. Rather, it may be 
                                                 
18 ‘Gik’, initially is a teenaged term represents the relationship among Thai youth which they have 
more than one partner at the same time. Afterward, ‘Gik’ become the prevalent phenomena in Thai 
society appearing in all class and age in Thai society which refer to the behavior of unfaithful toward 
partner or spouse. ‘Gik’ literally means the person who is not your partner, but the relation with that 
person is more than friends, but less than your partner while you already have partner at the same time 
( Sources: http://hilight.kapook.com/view/16289). 
19 “Dek” literally means Children, this refer to the relationship which women patronize their adulterer. 
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understood as a type of women’s resistance to the traditional social values, norms and 
ideologies governing their gender identities and sexualities. As such, social values, 
norms and ideologies regarding gender identity and sexuality are sets of knowledge 
that should not be treated as fixed, but can be fluidly manipulated to benefit these 
Thai migrant wives. The information in this section are based on my informal 
interviews with many Thai migrant wives who may or may not have ‘Gik’ as well as 
Thai male migrant workers in Singapore who are ‘Gik’ of these Thai women. All 
these informants are my English class’s students whom I have become acquainted to.  
 
4.1 How Thai Migrant Wives Define ‘Gik’? 
 “‘Gik’ is a cute behavior for Thais. He is the person who gives me help and I 
am happy to talk with” (Pin, 36). 
 
 “‘Gik’ is the person whom we can discuss everything with but I don’t feel love 
for them. The relationship is not necessarily sexual” (Daeng, 21). 
 
 “‘Gik’ is the person we can talk everything with, but husband is the person 
who we cannot do like that” (Sri, 29). 
 
From the above, it shows that my informant’s ideas of ‘Gik’ is analogous to 
someone of the opposite sex that they can talk to about everything regardless of any 
sexual relations with that person. However, the most significant characteristic of a 
‘Gik’ must be a person who can understand them and can help them more than their 
husbands do or can. Nevertheless, I often hear gossips among my informants which 
are further confirmed by the Thai men that ‘Gik relationship’ always involves sex and 
that both parties acknowledge the marital status of each other.   
 
4.2 Grounds for having ‘Gik’: The Disjuncture of Expected Gender Roles 
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The grounds for having ‘Gik’ among Thai migrant wives are derived from 
their marriage aspirations based on economic and socio-cultural necessities rather 
than love in the first place. In the beginning of the marriage, the moral and 
psychological mechanisms which sustain their marriages and loyalties is a sense of 
‘bun khun’ or gratitude towards their husbands. Subsequently, love and bonds may 
develop. To these Thai migrant wives, a sense of love develops because their 
husbands are able to accomplish their expected male gender roles such as being 
breadwinners and financial providers for the women’s left behinds and natal families. 
However, if their husbands do not perform these roles as they expect, then ‘bun khun’ 
or gratitude cannot be sustained in the marriage and this results in a dysfunctional 
marriage. As such, some women will find ways to negotiate the structural constrains 
of marriage by finding another man who can fulfill these expected male gender roles. 
Dao (28) explains her reasons of having a ‘Gik’: “I insist that Thai women are faithful 
to husbands unless he makes the mistake first. If you are irresponsible, unable to give 
me financial support, abandon me, no women in this world will want you to be her 
husband” (Dao, 28). 
 Apart from financial support, an isolated migrant wife who has no kin, 
relatives and friends also needs her husband to be her emotional support. As such, 
even if their husbands are able to provide the necessary financial support, some 
women still have ‘Giks’ to give them emotional support and intimacy. Take the 
example of Guk (28): “I like to go to pub and drink but my husband doesn’t like that 
kind of activities. So, when I go to pub, I like to go with other men. In fact, I want my 
husband to accompany me instead of other men. I know my husband loves me but he 
makes me feel bored. My husband takes care of me, buys me everything that I want 
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but he never gives me the happiness that I want” (Guk, 28)20. Usually, Thai migrant 
wives of working-class men who have to work hard to support their whole family are 
more prone to having extramarital affairs as their husbands lacked the time needed for 
romance and intimacy, not helped also by their lack of financial capability to support 
them. Nevertheless, wives of middle/upper class men also have ‘Giks’ as some of 
their husbands prioritized work more than the family. 
Nonetheless, Thai migrant wives who have extramarital affairs must be 
understood as more than simply straying wives. These migrant wives also want to be 
understood, described, and recognized in multiple terms (Praver 2006). Thai women’s 
rationalization of having a ‘Gik’ could be understood in the context of a disjuncture of 
their male gender expectations before migration (when they only expect their 
Singaporean husbands will be breadwinner and financial provider) and after migration 
(when they desire from their husbands both financial and emotional support at the 
same time). Thus, Thai migrant wives whose husbands fail to support them 
emotionally find Thai male migrant as ‘Gik’ partly because these Thai men could 
speak the same language and understand them better than their foreign husbands. 
Usually, these ‘Giks’ are Thai male guest workers from all types of occupation 
regardless of their financial status.  However, for Thai migrant wives whose husbands 
do not provide any financial support, they will either find other Singaporean men or 
male Thai guest workers who are in higher positions such as those in supervisory to 
support her financially instead of their husbands. In some cases, these Thai migrant 
wives also expect their husbands to provide the companionship and assistance that 
they need. For example Sri (29), a cloth shop owner at Golden Mile Complex said 
                                                 
20 See: Legal Regime, Being forced to contribute to economic growth Part as I explain that as Guk’s 
husband has to work harder to increase salary, he has no time for her. Then, Guk felt lonelier and 




that “Gik is someone who can give me a hand when I am in the trouble. My husband 
helps me in term of legal document, but he never helps me to do business, he is 
addicted to playing VDO game. So, when I am in trouble, the person who can help me 
is my ‘Gik’. For example, once I have too many products remains in the stocks, which 
my husband never cares of my problem, but my ‘Gik’, a Thai construction worker, is 
the one who help me to sell the clothes to Thai workers in many construction sites 
until I can release all the remaining products in warehouse. So, I felt that he is the 
one who can help me more than my husband”. 
One of the places for Thai women to find ‘Giks’ is at Golden Mile Complex 
because it is a safe Thai ethnic enclave and away from the family’s and husband’s 
surveillance. For example,  Sri’s case is known to almost everyone in Golden Mile 
Complex because she introducing her ‘Gik’ as her boyfriend to everyone there. Only 
her husband does not know of her ‘Gik’ relationship. He still thinks that her ‘Gik’ is 
only a good customer. However, ‘Gik’ relationships are not long-lasting as these 
‘Giks’ can only temporarily fulfill their expected gender roles. This is because some 
‘Giks’ already have wives and families to take care of in Thailand. However, there is 
a case of a ‘Gik’ relationship developing  into a serious one. In this case, the Thai 
migrant wife chose to divorce her Singaporean husband to go back to Thailand with 
her ‘Gik’. However, at the end of the day, it is not uncommon to find ex-Thai migrant 
wives coming back to Singapore again in order to find a new Singapore man to marry 
because the Thai men that they left with  could not support her both financially and 
emotionally.  
Given these examples, the ‘Gik’ phenomenon in Singapore is similar to the 
‘Gik’ phenomenon in Thailand, seen as a fashionable among some groups of Thais. 
However, ‘Gik’ relationships in Singapore differ from Thailand in that it is a common 
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practice among married Thai migrant women and not among Thai teenagers as it is in 
Thailand. In Thai society, having a ‘Gik’ or committing adultery is one of the most 
serious sinful conducts in the Buddhist’s five precepts. To some extent, it can be 
argued that Thai migrant wives decide to have ‘Gik’ because there is a lack of well-
placed social control mechanisms such as close-kin communities in Singapore to 
regulate against such taboo behaviors. However, I argue that the primary cause of 
‘Gik’ relationships in the context of Thai migrant wives in Singapore is one of 
women’s agencies. They choose to break away from ‘normative gender behaviors’ by 
using the ‘Gik’ relationship to challenge the patriarchal households that they 
oppressed by in Singapore. For Thai migrant wives, a faithful marriage means that  
complete subservience to their husbands. However,  Gik’ relationships develop as a 
result of the failure of their husbands to satisfy their expected gender roles. The ‘Gik’ 
relationship shows the emergence of a dynamic socio-cultural gender structure that 
enables women to be daring wives with individual agency and autonomy to transform 
and challenge existing gender relations and expectations.  
 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have shown that the understanding of Thai women’s marriage 
migration is intimately related to the workings of the gender structure. Thai migrant 
wives’ experiences show that their migration lives are inevitably attached to the 
expected gendered roles of dutiful daughters or natal family caretakers.  Some of them 
might make migration decisions based on their experiences of women’s subordination 
to Thai masculinity where they cannot achieve dutiful daughter roles if they marry to 
Thai men. 
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 I also show that the conditions of Thai migrant wives in Singapore are the 
results of overlapped workings of the socio cultural gender structure together with the 
structures of the nation-state, economic, religion and family. However, these 
structures are dynamic as Thai women’s experiences show that women also have 
some opportunities to negotiate and circumvent the structures by challenging gender 
roles, gender identities and gender relations beyond that of being 
dependent/submissive/subordinated migrant wives from developing countries.  
 Cross border marriage migration between Thai women and men from 
developed countries can be seen as the alternative for Thai women to accomplish the 
expected gendered roles of dutiful daughters or circumvent the exploitative Thai 
masculinity.  However, the marriage migration lives of Thai women in Singapore 
show that their gendered roles are also constrained and regulated by the domain of the 
Singaporean Chinese household since most of them live with in-laws after migration. 
Chinese Singapore familial structure requires them to be a wife/mother/daughter-in-
law/caregiver/homemaker while a full-time paid worker is required by Singapore 
economic structure at the same time. For some women, although they marry upper 
class men, they might still be unable to remit money home if the in-laws see to that 
their daughter in-laws should no longer give financial support her natal family.   
 In summary, although Thai women have alternatives to challenge or 
circumvent the socio-cultural expected gendered roles, their migration experiences are 
fundamentally grounded in the traditional gender relationship. Thai women may 
negotiate Thai masculinity by cross border marriage migration, and challenge their 
Singaporean husbands’ power by having “Gik”. Nonetheless, these practices only 
avoids the structure in particular circumstance but their lives are still tightly grounded 
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in the traditional expected gender roles and gender relation which are men’s financial 






In this thesis, I examine the phenomenon of cross border marriage migration 
between Thai women and Singaporean men by applying the fundamental idea behind 
Giddens’s Structuration theory which argues that the relationship between social 
structures and human practices is inseparable. As such, social structures are in 
themselves first and foremost constituted of human’s activities but these human 
activities are made possible (enabled) only by the structural properties that guide 
them. This brings about the dynamic characteristics of any given social structure in 
that it is always involved in a process of reproduction through these human activities. 
It shows that a structure does not only constrain or limit human’s activities but the 
process of reproduction also enables opportunities for humans to challenge, 
circumvent and change an existing structure. Based on this theoretical framework, I 
argue that women regardless of class and ethnicity are able to demonstrate agency 
through their choices and independent actions to negotiate, challenge and circumvent 
existing structural constraints that they confront. Such resistance to structures is not 
perfect or wholly emancipatory. In this thesis, I focus on the specific circumstances of 
Thai migrant wives in Singapore. As their experiences demonstrate, in many cases 
women are trading off one set of patriarchal conditions for another. Nevertheless, they 
are active agents in the process of striving to improve their lives and social status, not 
merely passive victims.  
 At a macro level, I examine the historical sociological trajectory influential in 
creating the phenomenon of cross border marriage migration between Thai women 
and Singaporean men as the dynamic product of Thailand economic development 
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process. I show that the exploitative socio-economic structure in Thai society limits 
Thai rural women’s choices in the rural areas and leads to the surge of female rural-
urban migration within Thailand. This internal migration resulted in a readily 
available pool of cheap and unskilled female labor in the major cities of Thailand, in 
particular Bangkok. In response to the exploitative working conditions of the urban 
cities, some Thai rural women choose to engage in prostitution as a mean to 
circumvent this ‘feminization of cheap labor’. This only further enhances the ideas of 
Thai rural women as victims in the historical, political, economic, and cultural 
contexts of Thailand’s economic development. While I do not deny that Thai rural 
women are victims, I try to show that even as victims, these women should not be 
considered as merely passive actors without agency. I show first women’s agency in 
prostitution, that these Thai commercial sex workers can develop strategies to 
romance or even marry men from First World countries. To these women, marrying 
foreigners allow them to escape existing socioeconomic hardship, resist and challenge 
traditional Thai Patriarchy and perform cultural gender roles of filial piety. Therefore, 
I argue that cross border marriage migration between Thai women and Singaporean 
men is not established on the conventional understanding of a lack of agency due to 
the inequalities within the global political economy but on the calculated moves of 
Thai women to achieve upward socio-economic mobility. On the other hand, I also 
point out that this phenomenon is also the product of the change in traditional gender 
structure in the First World countries where  men’s traditional patriarchal privileges 
are being challenged by the emerging economic, social and cultural advances among 
local, First World women. Singaporean men use cross-cultural marriage as a strategy 
to cling on to their patriarchal privileges and advantages given that the general 
perception among these men is that women from developing countries are willing to 
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perform traditional women’s roles. I find that regardless of higher or lower 
socioeconomic class, Singaporean men’s choose to marry foreign bride from 
developing countries in order to sustain their patriarchal privilege challenged by local 
women. As these unskilled migrant women have limited resources to challenge their 
husband’s patriarchal privilege, the structures shape their migrant lives to fully 
depend on their husbands legally and financially. Although their Singaporean 
husbands are economically marginalized, migrant wives must still fully rely on them 
for permanent residency right. Besides, the money of these men from lower economic 
status only 200-300 SGD/month is sufficient for families in rural areas of Thailand 
because of the big difference in cost of living between Thailand and Singapore. 
Therefore, Thai migrant wives are willing to be submissive and dependent on their 
Singaporean husbands as long as they can remit money home. 
  In this respect, the cross border marriage phenomenon is the product of a 
dynamic combination of complementary yet distinct human’s experiences in two 
different cultural contexts. It is thus a demonstration of First World men’s and Third 
World women’s agencies in renegotiating and reconstructing the existing structures 
for their own benefits. Thai women’s marriage migration can be seen as the women’s 
agency in challenging the exploitative Thailand economic structure and traditional 
Thai Patriarchy. Conversely, it also does sustain the patriarchal privilege of 
Singaporean men which are challenged by local women who refuse to marry down or 
be  full-time housewives who are submissive and dependent on their husbands. 
At a micro level, I focus on the individual experiences of Thai migrant 
wives’ after their migration to Singapore.  Applying Giddens’s ideas on the ‘dynamic’ 
and ‘duality of structure’, I show the linkage between Thai women’s activities and the 
immigration legal structure, economic structure  and socio-cultural structure.  I show 
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how Thai migrant wives’ mobility and transnational lives are constrained by these 
various structures which are manipulated by the structural motives of the state and 
their Singaporean husbands. As working class women who migrate to foreign country 
without any relatives, knowledge nor skill, they lack the power/resources to negotiate 
and are inevitably subservient to these structures. However, I continue along the 
theme that these structures are dynamic and enable the Thai migrant wives to use their 
available resources to negotiate, reproduce and circumvent the structures to benefit 
them.  
 I argue that there are opportunities for working class Thai migrant wives’ 
agency in every step of the migration process. However, Thai women’s experiences as 
married migrants have varying forms and degree of success of the agency’s 
challenges and negotiating depending on and individual circumstances. Thai migrant 
women have similar transnational marriage migration pattern, and it begins with the 
internal migration as low-skilled worker or involvement in prostitution related work, 
and then continues with the use of livelihood strategies of marriage migration to 
Singapore. However, after arriving in Singapore, each woman differently encounters 
structural constraint which is subject to her individual position. These structural 
constraints work together and intersect these women’s lives at the same time which 
can sometimes close down the opportunity for women’s agency or in some cases 
require women submit to one structure in order to challenge another structure.  
 After marring to their Singaporean husbands, the first structure that impinges 
on the Thai migrant wives’ transnational lives is the Singapore’s immigration legal 
structure. Here, I focus on the intersections of the activities of the state, the 
Singaporean husbands and Thai migrant wives, all of which possess different 
structural resources and motives. I show the state’s practice of “graduated 
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sovereignty” and “flexible citizenship” to selectively place constraints or freedoms 
according to its economic rationality.  
 When they firstly migrate, every Thai migrant wife encounters the constraint 
of immigration legal structure intersecting with the gendered structure. In the 
marriage migration milieu, migrant women from Third World countries are perceived 
as men’s dependant while local husbands in developed countries are seen as 
breadwinners/financial providers. They are almost totally dependent on their husbands 
as these men have the legitimate (legal, state-enabled) structural power on the 
eligibility of their wives’ PR status, and by extension their financial and legal 
security. Some women cannot get PR as their husbands never initiate any PR 
applications for them. Some Singaporean husbands only apply for social visit passes 
with the intention that their wives must fully rely on them. In this respect, it shows 
that the immigration legal structure overlaps with the gendered structure and this 
closes down the women’s agency and allows Singaporean men to maintain their 
patriarchal power. 
I then explore the phenomenon of cross border marriages in relations to the 
economic structure. I argue that Thai rural women are capable of using their 
‘livelihood strategies’ throughout the migration process to negotiate and reconstruct 
the existing economic structures that restrict their economic activities. I focus first on 
how the changes and the developments in the Thai economic structure forced these 
Thai rural village women to embark on a rural-urban labor migration. This internal 
migration as I mentioned earlier inevitably led to their exploitation in the cities. 
However, this leads also to the emerging possibilities to escape from this exploitative 
economic structure through cross border marriages. 
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Then again, the agencies of Thai migrant women are also restricted by 
overlapping structures.  In Singapore, the state is very strict and limit on the 
immigration of unskilled/working class migrant.  When the immigration legal 
structure intersects with the economic structure, Thai migrant wives of working-class 
backgrounds tend to be one of the most constrained and regulated group of people in 
the nation-state. Thai migrant women who marry Singaporean men with low income, 
low education or has low skilled jobs find it harder to get PR’s than those who marry 
Singaporean men with high income, high education or has high skilled job.  In 
addition, when the economic structure intersects with the legal/state structural 
constraint, the pattern of their marriage migration also determines their chances in 
getting PR’s. Therefore, those who migrated to Singapore first to find their potential 
Singaporean husbands will be more restricted in their economic activities, such as 
access to good legal employment than those who married the Singaporean men first 
before migrating. Particularly, women from unskilled backgrounds such as sex 
workers or domestic workers have no means to negotiate the legal structure to get PRs 
by marrying local men and even their husband’s economic status also cannot be used 
as the resources to negotiate with the state structure.  
 However, in some cases, Thai migrant wives are able to use their ‘female 
reproductive resources’ and ‘socio-cultural resources’ to negotiate other actors in 
order to reconstruct, challenge, and circumvent this immigration legal structure. 
Sometimes women submit to the gendered structure, namely have children according 
to the state’s demand in order to get PR’s. Sometimes women choose to submit to the 
economic constraint to negotiate the legal-state and gendered structures. Like those 
whose husbands’ are not qualified to apply for their PR’s, they are willing to work 
under work permit, but they earn low wages and are exploited. However, they can 
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negotiate with the state to get PR by proving that they can support themselves 
financially without husbands’ presence. Subsequently, when they acquire their PR 
status, they can work and earn enough money to remit home and at the same time 
achieve the gendered roles of caretaker/dutiful daughters of natal family. 
I have illustrated Thai migrant wives’ relationship with the socio-cultural 
gender structure. For Thai transnational migrant wives, their practices are shaped and 
constrained by two different socio-cultural gender structures operating in Thailand 
and Singapore. Before migration, Thai women are subjected to the experiences of 
women’s subordination under Thai masculinity as well as the expected gender roles of 
‘dutiful daughter’. After migration, the socio-cultural gender structure in Singapore 
continues to subordinate these women in traditional Confucian oriented Chinese 
families that expect them to take on the role of a dependent/submissive/subordinated 
migrant wife. At this stage, it is important to note that various properties of the two 
different gender structures in Thailand and Singapore work to produce conflicting 
roles for these Thai migrant wives.  Having ‘Giks” and showing deviant behaviors 
appear only to have avoided the structure in some situation but their migrant lives  are 
still tightly grounded in the traditionally expected gender roles, namely husbands are 
breadwinners/financial providers and wives are their dependents. 
 Furthermore, working class women encounter the contrast of socio-cultural 
gendered structure intersecting with economic structure. Being dutiful daughters, they 
need to do money remittance to ensure their natal families’ survival, while the 
gendered structure of a Singapore Chinese family require them as caretakers/full-time 
housewives/daughter in-laws only for their marital families. In order to provide 
financial support to their natal families, Thai migrant wives choose to challenge  the 
socio cultural gendered and familial structure by performing deviant gender roles such 
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as masseuses, beer sales promoters, night-shift workers, entertainers or the use of  
contraception method to avoid taking mother role and to allow them to be full-time 
paid worker. 
 In this context, it shows that the conditions of Thai migrant wives in Singapore 
are the result of the overlapping workings of the socio cultural gender structure 
together with the nation-state, economic, religion and family structures. Thai migrant 
women primarily negotiate the immigration legal structure in order to acquire the 
right protection from the state. After their PR’s status are granted, they are 
empowered to negotiate the economic structure (are allowed to do any kind of work in 
Singapore) and socio-culture gendered structure (become independent from their 
husbands).  
 At the same time, the legal/state structure are also much tied to gendered 
structure, such as migrant women’s PR applications need their husband’s presence, or 
divorcees cannot renew their PR’s without their husbands’ guarantee if they are not 
paid-workers or make any contribution to CPF. On the other hand, Thai migrant 
wives have the agency to negotiate the structure without the state permission. They 
have migrant social network which is remote from the surveillance of state, legal, and 
familial structures. This Thai migrant network allows them to find work and earn 
money to upward their socio-economic mobility and their natal families. Some choose 
to submit to the economic structure and become work permit holders as the channel to 
obtain PR’s without Singaporean’s husband. 
 In conclusion, my arguments serve as a critique as well as an alternative to 
discourses of  cross border marriages that represent Third World women migrants to 
the First world countries as totally passive victims in an increasingly dominant 
discourse of ‘human trafficking’.  In fact, I argue that women regardless of class, 
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religion and ethnicity are always active agents who are knowledgeable about their 
conditions and have possibilities to act reflexively to challenge the discriminatory 
structures imposed on them.  The case of Thai migrant wives offer an excellent 
example of opportunities and limitation of low-educated migrant women from Third 
World countries and that they are neither absolutely powerless nor totally 
empowering to challenge the structures. 
 
Further Studies 
Due to the specific focus of my thesis, I do not focus much on the migratory 
stage of returning home. The majority of my informants could return home with 
relatively little problems and without concerns about their mother and wife roles in 
Singapore. It would be interesting to complement this transnational live experiences 
with a followed up research on the life experiences of those that have successfully 
returned to their home countries. This potential focus on the final stage of their 
migratory experience (assuming that the migrants in question have the same desire to 
return home like these Thai working-class migrant wives) could shed some light on 
whether they will indeed achieve their life aspirations and achieve success. However, 
the situation for the majority of these Thai migrant wives is such that they are unable 
to leave the receiving countries or home country for good as they have families, left 
behinds in both receiving (Singapore in this case) and home countries(Thailand). 
Here, one could possibly explore the structures in both countries that limit the 
practices of the return migrants to achieve their migration expectations and to perform 
the expected roles in Singapore and Thailand as well as the strategies that they use in 
order to negotiate these structures in order to maintain the bonds in both countries. 
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Another interesting point is that many of these Thai migrant wives bring 
their children (from their marriage with their ex-husbands in Thailand or sometimes 
children adopted from their close relatives in Thailand) to study in Singapore.  I found 
that there are many young Thai children who go to the Friends of Thai Labor 
Association every week and they often have problems in adjusting to life in 
Singapore.  However, there is still a lack research on the migration experiences of 
transnational migrant children who follow their mother or relatives to Singapore. 
Their experiences with the various institutional structures in Singapore are certainly 
different from their mothers or adoptive mothers. This issue is also related to the 
expected gender roles of the migrant women as they have responsibilities as 
caregivers to the children. However, many Thai migrant women find it hard to 
balance their roles as a worker, mother of Thai children and perhaps Singaporean 
husband’s children, wife and mother of Singaporean husband, daughter in-laws and 
filial daughter to their natal parents at the same time. The performance of these 
complex roles may result in suffering and dysfunction of such transnational family 
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Buo 42 Passed 
away 
Hat Yai Nine-year 
schooling 
(Matthayom 3) 










































1 with ex- 
husband 
PR 






























































1 ‘Unknown’ means I did not have data since I did not do systematic collecting data; rather I conducted 
an ethnographic open-ended interview and participant observation as well as I did appendices after 
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Table 2: The Previous Job, the Contact zone and the Period of Contact before 
    Marriage 
Name 
(Pseudo) 
Previous job in 





Buo Waitress in a 
disco 




almost 1 year 










Dee Factory worker, 







Guk Snooker club 
escort 





Kaew Waitress in a 
bar 
Bar in Hat Yai Intended 
Contact 
unknown 





Kat Student In her village Unintended 
Contact 
2 years 

























Nid Factory worker unknown unknown unknown 























Ruk Illegal money 
lender. 
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Table 3: Occupations, Years in Singapore, Estimated Monthly Income and Remittance 
Name 
(Pseudo) 




Buo Employee at Phuean Thai supermarket 12 800 No remittance 
Daeng Full-time housewife 2 N/A 5,000
Dao Employee at travel agency(Golden mile) 11 1,000 unknown 
Dee Freelance employee 2 unknown unknown
Guk Employee in a cloth shop 6 900 11,500 
Kaew Beer sales promoter 22 unknown unknown 
Kai Full-time house wife 2 N/A unknown
Kat Waitress in a coffee shop 20 unknown unknown 
Kim Employee in a cloth shop 3 unknown 10,000
Mai Employee in a job placement agency 3 1,300 3,000 
Muk Full-time housewife 3 months N/A No Remittance
Nam Cook 6 1,000 unknown 
Nid Underground lottery agent 2 1,000 No Remittance 
Nim Undocumented hairdresser 6 unknown 10,000
Noi Full-time housewife 4 N/A 11,000 
Nok Undocumented beer sales promoter 20 500 7,000
Puk Full-time housewife 7 N/A 8,000 
Ruk Beer sales promoter 3 3,000 No remittance 
Rung Full-time housewife 7 N/A unknown
Som Full-time housewife 8 N/A unknown 
Sri The owner of a cloth shop 5 unknown unknown
Yam Chef 24 unknown No Remittance 
Yim Drink seller at primary school 4 5,000 No Remittance  
1 
For monthly income, I mean only Thai women’s personal income; not including that of their husband. Therefore, N/A is applicable to full-time housewife. 
During my interview period, the approximate exchange rate of SGD to THB is 1 SGD = 23 THB. 
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Table 5: Occupations, Monthly Income and Money Remittance of Focus Group 
    Discussants 
 
                                                 
1
 For the particulars, occupations, monthly income and money remittance of focus group discussants, I 














Chin 43 Chiang Mai 4 year compulsory 
education (Prathom 4) 
PR 





Nang 38 Bangkok Vocational Certificate LTSVP 
holder 
Num 48 Samut Sakhon 4 year compulsory 
education (Prathom 4) 
Singapore 
citizen 
Pin 36 Nong Khai Nine-year schooling 
(Matthayom 3) 
PR 
Suay 36 Kanchanaburi Nine-year schooling 
(Matthayom 3) 
PR 
Suk 40 Chiang Rai Twelve-year schooling 
(Matthayom 6) 
PR 
Tang 52 Chiang Rai Unknow PR 
Wan 27 Roi Et High Vocational 
Certificate 
PR 










Amm Full time housewife N/A No Remittance 
Chin Masseuse 1500 No Remittance 
Fon Beer sales promoter 1000 5000 
Nang Part time freelance 200 1000 
Num Beer sales promoter 1200 unknown 
Pin Employee at money 
remittance service  
1050 No Remittance 
Suay Hairdresser 1800 23000 
Suk Hairdresser 1900 3000-5000 
Tang Office cleaner 600 unknown 
Wan Beer sales promoter 1000 8000 
Ying Helping husband business 5000 10000 
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Table 6: Husband’s Occupations, Years in Singapore and Period of Receiving 










Period of Receiving PR 
Amm Salesman 6-7 months Still waiting 
Chin unknown 7 years 4 years 
Fon unknown 17 years After marriage 
registration 
Nang PSA employee 2 years Still waiting 
Num unknown 25 years After marriage 
registration 
Pin unknown 14 years 4 months 
Suay unknown 6 years After marriage 
registration 
Suk Food court manager 14 years After marriage 
registration 
Tang Chief engineer 17 years 2 months 
Wan Programmer 5 years After marriage 
registration 
Ying Business owner unknown 3 years 
